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Since the beginning of the industrial revolution in the late 18th century, the cause of many 
serious accidents in hydrosystems engineering has shifted from natural causes to human 
and technology related causes as these systems get more complex. While natural disasters 
still account for a significant amount of human and material losses, man-made disasters are 
responsible for an increasingly large portion of the toll, especially in the safety critical 
domain such as Dam and Levee systems. The reliable performance of hydraulic flow-
control systems such as dams, reservoirs, levees etc. depends on the time-varying demands 
placed upon it by hydrology, operating rules, the interactions among subsystem 
components, the vagaries of operator interventions and natural disturbances. In the past, 
engineers have concerned themselves with understanding how the component parts of dam 
systems operate individually and not how the components interact with one another. 
Contemporary engineering practices do not address many common causes of accidents and 
failures, which are unforeseen combinations of usual conditions. In recent decades, the 
most likely causes of failures associated with dams have more often had to do with sensor 
and control systems, human agency, and inadequate maintenance than with extreme loads 
such as floods and earthquakes. 
 
 
This thesis presents a new approach, which combines simulation, engineering 
reliability modeling, and systems engineering. The new approach seeks to explore the 
possibilities inherent in taking a systems perspective to modeling the reliability of flow-
control functions in hydrosystems engineering. Thus, taking into account the 
interconnections and dependencies between different components of the system, changes 
over time in their state as well as the influence upon the system of organizational 
limitations, human errors and external disturbances. The proposed framework attempts to 
consider all the physical and functional interrelationships between the parts of the dam and 
reservoir, and to combine the analysis of the parts in their functional and spatial 
interrelationships in a unified structure. The method attempts to bring together the systems 
aspects of engineering and operational concerns in a way that emphasizes their interactions. 
The argument made in this thesis is that systems reliability approach to analyzing 
operational risks—precisely because it treats systems interactions—cannot be based on the 
decomposition, linear methods of contemporary practice. These methods cannot logically 
capture the interactions and feedback of complex systems. The proposed systems approach 
relies on understanding and accurately characterizing the complex interrelationships 
among different elements within an engineered system.  The modeling framework allows 
for analysis of how structural changes in one part of a system might affect the behavior of 
the system as a whole, or how the system responds to emergent geophysical processes. The 
implementation of the proposed approach is presented in the context of two case studies of 
US and Canadian water projects: Wolf Creek Dam in Kentucky and the Lower Mattagami 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Research Motivation 
Failures of complex engineered systems always raise public concern on the safety and 
reliability of engineering infrastructure. Failures of hydrosystems infrastructure (e.g., 
dams, levees etc.) pose a significant threat to public safety and can lead to enormous 
damage to infrastructure and the environment. In recent decades, the cause of many serious 
accidents in hydrosystems has shifted from natural causes to human and technology-related 
causes as these systems get more complex.  In a review of the performance of spillway 
gates and associated operating equipment reported to the National Performance of Dams 
Program, McCann (2013) reports that exclusive of the failure of spillway structures 
themselves, the performance of hydraulic systems is important even during normal 
operations.  These systems are affected by mal-operation, control system errors, and a host 
of interactions among factors.   
 




Figure 1.1 summarizes 65 flow-control accidents identified in the NPDP database, which 
occurred before 1995 at US dams, and grouped by apparent cause.  In each case, a causal 
chain of contributing factors leads to each apparent final cause and thus to the subsequent 
accident.  Further examination of dam failures and safety related incidents shows that most 
were not caused by a single, easily analyzed, component failure but rather by interactions 
between various components, operational considerations, and lack of appropriate 
organizational response (Bruce, 2012).  It is imperative to reduce the risk associated with 
a dam to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable. The optimum must be done within 
the associated operating constraints and within the limits of current knowledge and 
understanding, to recognize potential failure modes before they begin to develop and to 
monitor those failure modes over time. To achieve this goal, dam owners must find an 
effective way to integrate operations, engineering, and dam safety performance monitoring 
into a comprehensive dam safety program. Performance monitoring and record keeping are 
essential to making well-informed decisions regarding the condition of the dam. As the 
systems that control dams get more complex and more automated, and more are remotely 
operated, opportunities increase for undetected incidents that can lead to dam failure. 
Understanding factors relating to dam safety, such as owner risk awareness, management 
responsibility, personnel training, and system and sub-system interactions, are become 
increasingly important.  
1.2. Research Objectives and Scope 
The reliable performance of a hydraulic flow-control system such as dams, reservoirs, 
levees etc. depends on the time-varying demands placed upon it by hydrology, operating 
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rules, the interactions among a cascade of reservoirs, the vagaries of operator interventions 
and natural disturbances. In the past, engineers have concerned themselves with 
understanding how the component parts of dam systems operate individually and not how 
the components interact with one another. They behave in complex ways that are not 
amenable to such simple decompositional analysis, and thus need to be understood in a 
systems engineering context.   
 This thesis examines the operational risks in hydrosystems (such as Hydropower 
Dams and Levees) and proposes a holistic systems reliability framework to incorporate the 
physical and functional interrelationships among the parts of the dam system, and to 
combine the analysis of the parts in their functional and spatial interrelationships in a 
unified structure. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to identify and model 
the dynamic feedback processes that may cause risk to increase over time into the overall 
model. This dissertation introduces a systems framework to model some critical aspects of 
safety and power generation in dam systems. The modeling approach holistically integrates 
river basin hydrology, the routing of reservoir inflows through the reservoir system, 
operating rules and human factors of operating the spillway and other waterways, out flow 
systems, the hydraulics of outflow, the discharge to the downstream river channel and the 
fragility of the structural, mechanical and electrical components of the dam system. 
Emphasis is placed on the interactions of this set of components and how unforeseen 
combinations of varying conditions may lead to failure of dam system.  
1.3. The dynamic nature of flow control in Hydrosystems  
Hydropower plant as an integrated system is comprised of physical and organizational 
(human) sub-systems. The physical sub-system is made of components, which can be in 
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different operational status, i.e., normal, to certain hazardous state, faulty or out of 
operation for maintenance or replacement. The organizational sub-system consists of 
humans organized into operational units and social groups performing different tasks for 
control and operation of the system. A large number of physical components being in 
diverse operational system states controlled by individuals usually organized in 
hierarchical groups makes the whole enterprise into a complex dynamic socio-technical 
system. The complexity becomes even more challenging due to the fact that hydropower 
schemes are operated in a natural environment with the random inputs and stresses in form 
of external disturbances. More and more electronic components are involved in 
hydropower operations, control and monitoring schemes. This kind of system involves a 
time-dependent management of numerous technical and organizational parameters and 
issues. 
10.1.1. Objectives of the study and modelling framework 
The objective of this study was to understand systems interactions in hydropower dam 
systems, and the potential for accidents or failures caused by the interactions. The 
approach was the following: 
• Propose a systems reliability modeling approach (framework) to quantifying 
operational risks in dam systems that considers all the physical and functional 
interrelationships between the parts of the system, and to combine the analysis of 
these parts in a unified structure.  
• Formulate and construct a systems model that accurately characterizes and 
holistically integrates the physics of hydrodynamics (dynamics of transport, storage 
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and power generation), the operating rules and human factors operating the 
spillway, and the dam component fragilities. 
• Balance the main aspects of dam operation, performance and reliability in one 
integrated whole, consisting of the natural siting of the dam, including its hydrology 
and geology, the physics of water containment and the control of discharges and 
power generation, and the monitoring and control of operations.   
• Utilize dynamic fault tree analysis to model the various states of a repaired 
component during/after maintenance and to accommodate the incorporation of 
dependencies among various subcomponents of a system thus allowing for the 
specification of resource dependencies for component repairs. 
• Apply the systems modeling framework to USACE’s Wolf Creek and OPG’s 
Lower Mattagami River Hydroelectric project to better understand the systems 
interactions and to quantify the inherent operational risks. 
Risk and reliability principles are used to evaluate the performance of mechanical, 
electrical, controls, and sensing equipment for scenarios such as loading range (flood, 
earthquake), equipment failure, project staffing with inclusion of human factors including 
training, management practices, etc. to see if the outcomes cause disturbances that affect 
safety. The task addresses systems reliability of operational aspects of hydropower dams 
operated by USACE, using Wolf Creek Dam and Lower Mattagami River Project as test 
cases. The reliability of flow-control systems is a broad topic that covers structural, 
mechanical, electrical, control systems and subsystems reliability, as well as human 
interactions, organization issues, policies and procedures. A systems reliability approach 
is developed for grappling with these varied influences.  
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Overall, this study would result in two major contributions. From one perspective, the 
establishment of a systems Reliability Framework to be used as a guidance for future 
Quantitative risk assessments (QRA) in hydrosystems engineering. Additionally, the 
proposed Systems Reliability Framework will enable the fusion of models of across 
different technological and human systems by offering an overall framework to combine 
all of the sources of uncertainty. 
1.4. Thesis Outline 
Based on the proposed research objectives and scope, this dissertation consists of nine 
chapters. Details of Chapters 2-9 are summarized as follows:      
Chapter 2 provides background and the motivation for a systems approach to 
hydrosystems and flow control. The need for a new holistic approach for analysis of 
hydrosystems, what requirements should they fulfil, how they are configured, how they 
function and fail as well as the use and limitations of contemporary methods of risk analysis 
for dams are presented.  
Chapter 3 discusses Monte Carlo simulation approaches to modelling and analysing dam 
systems, with emphasis on flow control, and describes how these approaches allow the 
analyst better to understand the interactions among components, operating procedures and 
disturbances. Additionally, the foundations of systems thinking about hydrosystems, 




Chapter 4 addresses hydrology and reservoir management and sets up the fundamental 
dam-reservoir systems model for simulation modeling and analysis. Also addressed are the 
hydraulics of waterways, such as spillways, turbines, and conduits. 
Chapter 5 addresses the loading conditions on flow control components of hydrosystems. 
Mathematical foundations are laid for the characterization of load-resistance performance 
parameters and reliability concepts are also presented. 
Chapter 6 reviews maintenance policies applicable to hydrosystems modeling and lays the 
foundation for estimation of reliability parameters. Simulation based maintenance 
optimization literature is also reviewed and as a final step a virtual age-based, Preventive 
Maintenance model is presented to be incorporated into the systems model. 
Chapter 7 and 8 presents the two supporting case studies for the application of the 
proposed Systems reliability modeling to analyzing operational risks in hydrosystems. 
More specifically, Chapter 7 & 8 takes on the Systems reliability modeling approach to 
dam safety performance analysis by applying the systems proposed framework to Ontario 
Power Generation’s cascade of four dams in the Lower Mattagami Basin (Northern 
Ontario, Canada) and the Wolf Creek dam—located in Kentucky. 






CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most dam safety accidents and failures occur not because an extreme event happens (e.g., 
a flood or earthquake); but because a series of more common things occurs, which in their 
unfortunate and unexpected combination leads to an accident or failure. Such combinations 
of unforeseen yet unfortunate events cannot be predicted easily ahead of time—or maybe 
at all. They are what systems engineers call emergent behaviours (Leveson, 2012).  
This unfortunate combination may be of unusual events. Accidents and failures often occur 
due to a combination of events that individually are in the range of the design events. In a 
review of the performance of spillway gates and associated operating equipment reported 
to the National Performance of Dams Program, McCann (2013) reports that exclusive of 
the failure of spillway structures themselves, the performance of hydraulic systems is 
important even during normal operations. These systems are affected by mal-operation, 
control system errors, and a host of interactions among factors. McCann (2013), 
summarizes 65 flow-control accidents, which occurred before 1995 at US dams, and 
grouped by apparent cause. In each case, a causal chain of contributing factors lead to an 
apparent final cause and thus to the subsequent accident. Although the final cause may be 
identified as the root cause, it need not be. 
The observation that most accidents and failures occur not from extreme loads but through 
more common, yet unforeseen sequences of events is now widely recognized. Perrow 
(1999) argues that ever increasing complexity in technological systems makes these 
failures inevitable. He argues that complex rather than linear interactions among 




dam systems displays both sorts of interactions. Perrow (2006) also argues that tight vs. 
loose coupling among components increases the chance of accidents. Tightly coupled 
systems are rigid. They provide little slack between what happens at one component and 
at another. Loose systems provide more buffer and opportunity for intervention. Tight 
coupling increases the likelihood that operator intervention will make things worse rather 
than better, since the nature of an emerging situation may well not be understood 
immediately. 
Many dams may be considered to be tightly coupled systems because they have little 
flexibility and have time-dependent operational needs. That is, a dam cannot usually wait 
while disturbances are attended to in an orderly way. Delays in operations may not be 
tolerable. Water flows into the reservoir and it must be dealt with now, not at some more 
convenient time in the future. Characteristics of tightly coupled systems are that delays in 
processing are not possible; production sequences are invariant; little slack exists in 
methods, equipment, or personnel; and substitutions of supplies, equipment, or personnel 
are limited. All of these things increase the likelihood of accidents. In tightly coupled 
systems, expediencies cannot be used to save a situation:  Rigbey (2013) recommends that, 
redundancy, segregation, diversity, and defence in depth must be designed into the system 
from the start. 
Rasmussen et al., (1990) and Leveson (Leveson, 2012) argue that the chain of causality 
leading to an accident is often opaque. The causal path to an accident will be “prepared by 
resident conditions that are latent effects of earlier events or acts.”  Thus, the length of the 




Do the causes stop with technical faults, or with operator “errors”, or do they extend back 
to management and design decisions?  Regan (2010) makes this argument but with specific 
reference to dams: 
[…] chain-of-event models, such as a typically defined failure mode or risk 
assessment event tree, oversimplify the causes of incidents and exclude many 
systemic factors and non-linear interactions. The failures of Teton, Silver Lake 
and Taum Sauk all had contributions from systemic factors and non-linear 
interactions that were unrecognized prior to the failure. Our current dam safety 
programs are, in essence, trying to determine the safety of the dam by examining 
a few components of the dam, one component at a time. […]. 
Analysing individual components against a prescribed standard is insufficient to assure the 
safety of dams. Reducing the risk associated with dams to a level that is as low as 
reasonably practicable requires evaluating the dam as a complex system with interactions 
of sub-systems that may be difficult to recognize.  
2.1. Current State of The Practice 
Contemporary dam safety decision-making generally falls into one or more of the 
following categories:  
• Standards-based decision making,  
• Risk-informed decision making, or 




Decisions based on these respective premises require an ascending order of sophistication 
from standards- to values dominated decisions regarding information, analyses, corporate-
level decisions and regulatory environment. Many complex and important dam safety 
decisions involve portions of all three processes at different stages. A decision-making 
framework, which explicitly incorporates and elaborates on these processes, allows 
engineers, owners, regulators and stakeholders to determine the appropriate actions and 
tools to implement and sustain dam safety decisions given a wide variety of situations. 
These approaches to dam safety decisions are discussed at greater length in Hartford and 
Baecher (2004). 
2.1.1. Standards-Based Decision-Making 
Standards-based decisions have been the most commonly used in the analysis of flow-
control systems at dams, although spillway configuration and dimensioning was one of the 
earliest dam safety problems to be addressed by risk analysis. Standards-based decisions 
are essentially decisions based on engineering principles and norms that employ a form of 
design checking against stated criteria. While historically such criteria were mostly 
associated with structural analysis, today similar engineering criteria have evolved for the 
consideration of hydrology and hydraulics, foundations, abutments and other components 
of the dam system (ICOLD, 1988). These engineering criteria have also evolved in parallel 
with advances in dam engineering and the development of advanced analytical modelling. 
The common design check against deterministic engineering standards is the factor of 
safety (FS). This is the ratio of the capacity (strength) of the dam or its components to the 








Intuitively, a factor of safety less than 1.0 suggests that the dam will not be able to perform 
its intended function under the demand of the loads placed upon it. Alternatively, a factor 
of safety of 1.0 or higher suggests the dam is sufficiently strong to withstand the specified 
demand. The typical rule in dam design is to make the factor of safety sufficiently larger 
than one to account for uncertainties in both the specified demand and calculated capacity. 
The factor of safety, although a calculated construct, is related to the physical properties of 
a dam, in that the larger the factor of safety, the greater the capacity of the dam to with-
stand the applied loads. 
Quantitative engineering standards are usually promulgated by regulatory authorities, even 
though they are typically taken from industry practices, by standards-setting professional 
organizations approved by the government and by the industry; or more indirectly in terms 
of guidance provided by non-governmental organizations such as the national member 
bodies of ICOLD (Hartford and Baecher, 2004).  Current dam safety practice is usually 
predicated on the rare occurrences of extreme loads, such as unlikely but possible reservoir 
inflows or powerful seismic events.   
Engineering standards-based decision making has evolved over the years but its focus still 
remains on the physical structure, not on operations, data collection, communications or 
operations.  Loading scenarios are assessed separately, meaning the capacity of spillways 
and other waterways is considered to the extent that they are large enough and stable 




of gates and valves are considered to the extent of their availability on demand. Analytical 
criteria for the internal erosion of embankment dams have improved somewhat since that 
era, but still today, operational factors, SCADA (Supervisory control and data acquisition) 
system errors, and human factors have little place in engineering standards-based 
assessment of dam safety. 
2.1.2. Risk-informed decision making 
Risk-informed dam safety programs provide many benefits. However, according to 
Baecher et al, “Risk-informed decision making is different from engineering standards-
based decision making in that the focus is on the level of protection to the public from the 
hazardous dam and reservoir.” In contrast, in standards-based decision making, the hazards 
are the natural and other conditions that threaten the dam.  What generally passes for a risk-
informed approach might more accurately be described as traditional standards-based 
rationale with a probabilistic outlook. 
Risk-informed decision-making implies taking into consideration a probabilistic 
description of the natural and other hazards imposed on, and the fragility of, the dam 
system, as well as the quantitative consequences of accidents or failures, in making 
decisions about dam safety, in a way that is focused on the totality of the level of protection 
to the public. Within this context, risk is taken to be the expected consequences of accidents 
or failures, that is, the product of the probability of an accident or failure, and the resultant 
consequences of that accident or failure. Risk-informed decision making involves 
balancing the expected economic, social, and environmental costs of a dam safety risk 




The shortcoming of this approach is its inability to assess non-linear failure modes and 
interactions between apparently unrelated components and subsystems. This hinders the 
identification of opportunities to prevent failures before they progress to the point where a 
typical risk analysis would begin (Regan, 2010). This linear nature of typical risk 
assessment approaches, combined with the fact that the majority of dam safety 
professionals are civil engineers, results in a rather narrow focus on failure modes that 
affect the civil structures and a neglect of the contributions to those failure modes from 
electrical, mechanical and control systems or human decision-making. 
2.1.3. Bow-tie model 
The bow-tie representation attempts to show the link between preventive actions, hazards, 
and mitigation responses in a qualitative way that allows for interactions to be identified 
and rational decisions to be made. To construct the bow-tie model, it is necessary to create 
a model of how the system works. This typically requires sub-models, such as schematic 
diagrams, influence diagrams, engineering drawings, plans and so on. Upstream of the 
bow-tie, to the left-hand side, is the traditional risk matrix of potentially adverse events. To 
the downstream side, to the right-hand side, is the organizational risk management scheme. 
So, one reason why this representation of risk informed decision-making has been 
successful is because it integrates threat assessment with risk management. It also meshes 
with the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) risk management paradigm (HSE 2001). 




2.1.4. Failure modes and effects analysis 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a form of risk-informed analysis that is used 
to map out the consequences of specific events that can occur during the operation of an 
engineered system, and to use this information to identify and prioritize necessary actions. 
FMEA can be applied in several forms and for a number of purposes. In its simplest 
application it can be a free-standing technique to give a structured understanding of the 
failure modes applicable to the components of an engineered system, or it can be an integral 
part of a more comprehensive probabilistic analysis of the risks associated with multiple 
integrated systems. 
FMEA was developed originally for design purposes, but now finds application in the 
analysis of potential for failure of existing systems. It also finds application as part of a 
wider asset management process that deals with the ongoing satisfactory output of the 
system under consideration. The use of FMEA is no longer restricted to engineered systems 
and is now used in a diverse range of societal activities, healthcare management being an 
example. 
2.1.5. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) provides practical techniques for predicting and 
managing risks (i.e., frequencies and severities of adverse consequences) in many complex 
engineered systems. 
Risk-based decision making differs from risk-informed decision making in that it relies on 




corresponding consequences, in order to calculate quantitative risk.  In the literature of 
techno-logical risk management, risk-based decision making is often referred to as 
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). The principal methodologies of PRA are fault-tree and 
event-tree analysis.  The former is more common in nuclear and chemical plant safety.  The 
latter is more common in dam safety and civil infrastructure risk analysis.  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a technique whose mathematical foundation is well-developed 
and that has been applied extensively in reliability and safety assessments for a wide range 
of engineered systems such as missile launch systems, chemical process facilities, nuclear 
power plants, dams, control systems and computers. In addition, the software and the 
databases available for conducting a FTA are sophisticated and add significantly to the 
efficiency of performing a risk analysis.  The fault tree is a graphical construct that shows 
the logical interaction among the elements of a system whose failure individually or in 
combination could contribute to the occurrence of a defined undesired event such as a 
system failure. Fault trees offer the analyst the capability to construct a logic model of a 
system that is visual and therefore is easy to view and read, and that provides a qualitative 
and quantitative insight to the system’s operations and reliability. 
It is important to note at the outset that FTA is one of many tools available to the risk 
analysis team. In a risk analysis for a dam system, various methods will generally be used 
to build a logic structure to analyze the expected future performance. As such, FTA will 
simply be one of the methods used. In the course of the risk assessment it is important to 
co-ordinate how a FTA for a system fits into the overall risk analysis model. This theme is 




Event tree analysis (ETA) is one of the techniques available to the engineer conducting a 
reliability or safety analysis for a dam. It is an apparently straightforward endeavor that 
finds widespread application in many industries and businesses. It is an inductive type of 
analysis that, unlike fault tree analysis, is not supported by an extensive theoretical basis. 
ETA is the most widely used form of analysis in risk analysis for dam safety, although the 
lack of theoretical basis means that the correctness of these constructs may be difficult to 
determine.  
An ETA is an analysis process whose essential component is the event tree. The event tree 
is a graphical construct that shows the logical sequence of the occurrence of events that is 
visual and therefore is easy to view and read, and that provides a qualitative and 
quantitative insight to the system’s operations and reliability. 
Current dam safety practice, both in the traditional deterministic form and in the more 
modern probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) form using fault trees and event trees, is still 
usually based on the rare occurrences of extreme loads, such as unlikely but possible 
reservoir inflows or powerful seismic events.  Adding PRA to the evaluation changes this 
situation not at all.  As an example, the Canadian Dam Association (CDA) guidelines for 
dam safety risk analysis presume extreme floods and earthquakes to be probabilistically 
independent events. Each has some probability of occurring in any given year, and each 
has some probability of leading to an accident or failure. This is the same whether in 
standards-based evaluation or in PRA. Indeed, from a geophysical view, these natural 
phenomena likely are probabilistically independent. The occurrence of one does nothing 




From an operational and safety view, however, earthquakes and floods are not independent. 
If an earthquake occurs and causes serious damage to a dam system, it may take a year or 
more for repairs to be completed. 
2.1.6. Alternative Approaches 
A dam is not a single independent entity but rather its system comprising of the dam body 
and the waterways past the dam, usually with accompanying mechanical and electrical 
equipment for on-site operational control. A dam may also be considered to include the 
reservoir, communication links, and the organization responsible for operation of the 
system, including on-site operators, dispatch center and company policy makers.  This 
system is made up of several subsystems for instance the spillway subsystem will include 
the gates and its complete hoist and control system, the spillway chute and the stilling basin. 
Thus the dam system would include all the subsystems that we normally associate with a 
dam: i.e., the foundation, abutments, reservoir, and reservoir rim, the operating 
organization and may also include a powerhouse and all its associated subsystems. 
The state and nature of these components and sub components will not remain constant 
during the lifetime of a dam system for reasons such as wear and aging and maintenance 
activities as well as changes to the surrounding infra-structure and society. On a larger 
scale, a dam might be a subsystem within a larger system that could be a watershed with 
projects owned by one or more entities or an entire regional electrical grid. 
2.1.7. Normal Accident Theory 
This concept was developed by Charles Perrow in his book Normal Accidents (1984), in 




This categorization is based on a combination of features of such systems: interactive 
complexity and tight coupling. Normal accidents in a particular system may be common or 
rare, but the system's characteristics make it inherently vulnerable to such accidents, hence 
their description as “normal”. 
NAT suggests that high risk systems have some special characteristics including complex 
interactions, dependencies and performance conditions that make it essentially impossible 
to foresee all possible failures, especially when one “minor” failure interacts with one or 
more other “minor” failures in an unforeseen manner. Since the failure of some parts is 
unavoidable, some failures must be expected and should be considered “Normal”. Perrow 
advocates a focus on the overall system rather than individual components. Failure in just 
one part (material, sub-system, human, or organization) may coincide with the failure of 
an entirely different part, revealing hidden connections, neutralized redundancies, random 
occurrences etc., for which no engineer or manager could reasonably plan. 
Historically dams were operated by dam operators residing near the dam and working 
almost exclusively to assure the safe and reliable operation of the dam. Economic and 
Socio-political pressures, brought about in large part by deregulation of the electric 
industry, have resulted in the conversion of dam operations from a local dam tender to a 
remote operations control center (Regan, 2010). Thus, human operators on site have been 
consequently replaced with SCADA (Supervision, Control and Data Acquisition) which is 
composed of but not limited to river gauges upstream of the reservoir, gauges within the 
reservoir and gauges at the spillway. At the control center one or more operators (no longer 




SCADA systems without directly seeing the structure. In addition, an operator’s principal 
responsibilities are often primarily related to operation of one or more powerhouses with 
dam safety as an additional responsibility (Regan, 2010). 
Likewise, spillway gates are now rarely operated by a dam operator on site. Presently, a 
remote operator may click a virtual button on a computer screen. In the first case, the dam 
tender gets immediate visual feedback that the proper gate is indeed moving or not. In the 
second case, the remote operator gets a signal that the gate is moving from some form of 
position sensor. If the sensor is giving erroneous data, the operator has no real knowledge 
if the gate is moving or how far it is moving (Regan, 2010). 
When we bring the causes of technological accidents up to closer scrutiny in a bid to 
understand them the inherent causes, it’s often very difficult to pinpoint what exactly went 
wrong. The reason for this is that technologies are intrinsically complex and depend on 
many things working closely together: Materials and components of different quality are 
structured into tightly engineered sub-systems, which are operated by error-prone humans 
in not always optimal organizational structures, which in turn are subject to production 
pressures and all kinds of managerial maneuvering. 
Normal Accidents was first published in 1984, prior to the deregulation of the electric 
industry and prior to the large-scale introduction of remote operation of dams. These two 
factors have greatly increased the complexity of dam operation and have introduced 
opportunities for unforeseen interactions that did not previously exist. Perrow (1984), came 
to the conclusion that “some technologies, such as nuclear power, should simply be 




highly controversial, and the main body of research has since then concentrated on how to 
make organizations and high-risk technologies more reliable, i.e. “disaster proof”, so that 
the political and democratically important discussion of allowing or not allowing specific 
technologies need not be taken. 
2.1.8. High Reliability Organizations 
Subsequent researchers challenged Perrow’s (1984) theory, and in particular his 
conclusions regarding the inevitability of accidents. Another school of thought, High 
Reliability Organizations (HRO), argues that four key organizational characteristics: 1) 
prioritization of safety and performance and achieving a consensus on the goals throughout 
the organization; 2) promoting a culture of reliability; 3) organizational learning to learn 
from accidents and safety related incidents; and 4) use of redundancy. Advocates of HRO 
suggest that by improving the reliability of components, system safety can be improved. 
Critics of the HRO theory point out that simultaneously promoting safety and performance, 
i.e. dam safety and powerhouse generation, creates conflicting priorities. HRO describes a 
subset of hazardous organizations that enjoy a high level of safety over long periods of 
time. What distinguishes types of high-risk systems is the source of risk, whether it is the 
technical or social factors that the system must control or whether the environment, itself, 
constantly changes. Promoting reliability is often taken to mean training all employees on 
exactly the steps to take in a safety related incident. Unfortunately, this can mean, at times, 
that the employees do exactly what they’ve been trained to do but the specific incident was 
outside the understanding of those who prepared the training and the response actually 




place in any dam safety program but this is due mainly to the fact that the industry has 
historically evolved at a relatively slow rate. The recent development of SCADA systems 
that allow remote operation of dams is a radical departure from the historical developments 
in dam design and operation. However, there is little to no history to help  understand the 
risks inherent to the remote operation of dams. It is notable that many of the recent 
experiences with uncontrolled releases of water are due to unintended operation of outlet 
works by glitches in SCADA systems, an area where the dam safety community has 
relatively little history. The last concern with HRO is its emphasis on redundancy, a fact 
that may increase complexity and thereby reduce safety, especially if operations become 





CHAPTER 3: RISK & RELIABILITY IN HYDRO SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
The reliable performance of hydro systems infrastructure depends on the time-varying 
demands placed upon it by hydrology, operating rules, the interactions of its components, 
the vagaries of operator interventions and natural disturbances. Most of these factors, if not 
all, are subject to various types of uncertainty (Figure 3.1). Uncertainties in systems 
analysis can be classified into two forms; aleatory uncertainties associated with the natural 
variability in the world and epistemic uncertainties arising from knowledge deficiency 
about the system or processes being modeled. The overall risk in an engineering system is 
the result of the combined effect of these two types of uncertainties. As shown in Figure 
3.1, other forms uncertainties fall under these 2 classifications. In general, the uncertainty 
due to geophysical processes cannot be eliminated. On the other hand, uncertainties 
associated with the knowledge deficiency about processes, models, parameters etc., can be 
reduced through improvements in data collection and analysis techniques, research, etc. 
The task of modeling operational risks in hydro systems engineering—specifically Dam 
and levee Systems—necessitates the need to capture the day to day operational activities 
of these systems against the backdrop of the natural processes in which the systems are 
embedded. Tung et al. (2005), broke down the uncertainties and variabilities inherent in 
these natural processes into 5 sub categories: structural, geophysical, operational, trans-





Figure 3.1: Sources of uncertainty (Adapted from Tung and Yen, 2005.) 
Operational risks arise not only from the day-day operations of the system but also from 
any disturbance in its operational processes ((HKIB), 2013). In the case of dam systems, 
the disruption may come from a one-off event, ranging from simple human error activities 
such as operator push button error, to cascading failures triggered by natural occurrences 
such as a 50-year storm event, or from a systems breakdown due to sabotage. Physical 
failure of structures in hydrosystems can be caused by many things such as system 
overloading or structural collapse. Economic uncertainty can arise from uncertainties in 
construction costs, damage costs, projected revenue, operation and maintenance cost, 




(1986) classified various sources of uncertainty in the analyses and designs of hydraulic 
engineering systems including natural variability, model uncertainties, parameter 
uncertainties, data uncertainties, and operational uncertainties that are equally relevant for 
other civil engineering infrastructural systems. Natural variability is associated with the 
inherent randomness of natural geo-physical processes such as the occurrence of 
precipitation, floods, and earthquakes. The occurrence of geophysical events often displays 
variations in time and space. Among the uncertainties due to knowledge deficiency, the 
most important are those of model, operation, and data. Detailed elaboration of 
uncertainties in dam and Levee systems engineering and their analysis are presented in the 
uncertainty task. 
3.1. Systems Modeling Approach 
The systems modeling approach (framework) attempts to consider all the physical and 
functional interrelationships between the parts of the dam and reservoir, and to combine 
the analysis of the parts in their functional and spatial interrelationships in a unified 
structure. The approach relies on understanding and accurately characterizing the complex 
interrelationships among different elements within a system.  The modeling framework 
allows for analysis of how structural changes in one part of a system might affect the 
behavior of the system as a whole or how the system responds to emergent geophysical 
processes. Perturbing the system under probable but unlikely scenarios makes it possible 
to test how the system will respond under varying sets of rare event scenarios. The systems 
approach also gives consideration to the influence of disturbances internal to the system. 




ranging from those that occur essentially simultaneously to those that occur at different 
times but in ways that the effects of the disturbances combine. 
Rather than separating the analysis into physical parts, analyzing the performance of each 
part separately and then recombining the results to provide an overall statement of expected 
performance; the systems approach attempts to address the interactions of these physical 
and operational parts. The framework attempts to capture the dynamics of dam functions 
and dam safety philosophies in a more thorough way than is allowed by decompositional 
analysis. The intention to treat all conditions relevant to safety and performance analysis 
involves an expansion of the traditional design-check concept. The approach includes 
internal factors that pertain to the management, operation and maintenance of the dam, in 
addition to design loadings, which in themselves result in changes in the required 
functional performance of the dam.  
The approach affords us a platform to incorporate into the model, feedback of operating 
procedures and human reliability in systems function and the ability to fuse models across 
different technological and human systems. Operational procedures and human decision 
intervention strongly affect system operations, accidents, and failures. These have not 
usually been accounted for in dam safety risk analysis. The proposed systems reliability 
approach intends to account for these systems interactions and feedback loops that are 
generally unaccounted for in the contemporary methods. Viewed in this way, systems-
focused dam safety involves a much broader, structured and tractable view of all factors 
that contribute to the safe functioning of dams than does the traditional load-resistance 




3.1.1. Practicalities of a systems approach for dams 
The question that arises from systems thinking is how does one identify and define all 
operational and physical conditions? Central to the approach presented herein is the 
premise that dynamic modelling and simulation of systems provides an operational basis 
to resolve this question. 
The philosophy of systems engineering as a whole has two essential attributes:  
• Structural performance and resilience; and  
• Functional performance and resilience.  
Structural performance and resilience pertain to the ability of the dam to withstand the 
forces that are applied to it and to maintain the structural support and integrity required for 
the functions of the dam and reservoir. Functional performance and resilience pertain to 
processes, products and services that the dam is intended to provide. Specifically, the dam 
is intended to retain the stored volume and to pass all flows through and around the dam in 
a controlled manner.  
3.1.2. Systems Reliability Modelling Framework 
Modelling the system’s reliability of flow-control functions in a modern dam involves: (1) 
characterizing the performance of a spectrum of systems components, (2) following the 
dynamic interaction of these components over time, and (3) tracking the possible 
occurrence of external disturbances to the system that may perturb component 
performance.  The modelling framework for appraising the systems reliability of flow-




1) Simulation by which stochastic reservoir inflows are randomly generated through time 
using a Monte Carlo approach propagated through the reservoir-spillway-outflow 
system generating demand functions on all system components;  
2) Engineering modelling to infer the impact of spillway heads and discharges (demand 
functions) on the hydraulic structures accommodating the outflows;  
3) Component reliability analysis to ascertain the performance of individual components 
of the outflow works relative to defined failure modes and metrics; and 
4) Systems reliability assessment through which demands on and performance of flow-
control systems components are convolved into annual exceedance probabilities of 
adverse performance and fault and failure sequences identified. 
The modelling framework is accommodating with respect to the simulation approach. The 
river basin may include other dams or facilities modelled as separate systems or just be the 
(natural) environment of the modelled dam. The catchment area provides the input driving 
the flow-control system. The modelling framework conceives of the flow-control system 
as a number of components. The outputs of each component generally form the input to 
the next component in the system logic.  At each component, the upstream demand function 
is applied to the operation of the component. Engineering reliability modelling is used to 
evaluate the performance of that component in relation to the demand function. The 
performance of the component is characterized stochastically, expressing the component’s 
probabilistic behavior as a function of the demand placed upon it. The reliability models 
for each component will generally describe performances of more than one type, and may 
be of more than one analytical structure. For example, the performance of a lift-gate may 




3.1.2.1 Context Diagram: Systems Reliability Analysis of Operational Risks 
The context diagram (figure 3.2) of the proposed systems reliability approach shows how 
the external entities interact with the hydrosystem against a backdrop of certain constraints 
and environmental factors at a higher level of abstraction. It explains the boundary 
conditions, required inputs, outputs, constraints and enablers for the systems reliability 
analysis framework. 
The clear definition of the boundary is important because those elements within the 
boundary are presumably under the direct control of the engineers and operators, and 
become elements of a systems model. Modeling the systems reliability of flow-control 
functions in a modern dam involves (1) characterizing the performance of a spectrum of 
systems components, (2) following the dynamic interaction of these components through 
time, and (3) tracking the possible occurrence of external disturbances to the system that 
may perturb component performance. The constraints include factors at the management 
or policy level, government regulations and technical constraints of system components.   
The inflows include a random time series of reservoir inflows from which the performance 
of the flow-control system can be modelled, reliability data for assessing how certain 
components react to varying load demands, statistical data required for a complete 
reliability analysis of components and the physical parameters of the dam system. The 
outputs are the statistical data generated from the simulation which can be data mined and 
analysed to aid in decision making. They include outflow graphs, elevation graphs, 




that can be used to estimate reliability parameters such as Mean Time to Failure (Mean 














Figure 3.2: Context Diagram for Proposed framework 
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3.1.3. Reliability Analysis 
Goodarzi (2013), defined reliability as the probability of non-failure and the complement 
of risk. The fundamental notion of reliability engineering is to determine the failure 
probability of an engineering system, from which the safety of the system can be assessed. 
Reliability and risk have an inverse relation in which the probability of increasing failure 
results in decreasing system reliability. In engineering, reliability signifies the ability of a 
set of components to carry out its required functions under some definite conditions over a 
specific time interval. One of the main objectives of risk and reliability analysis is to 
calculate the probability of failure or non-failure regarding potential loads and resistance. 
There are two major steps in reliability analysis: (1) to identify and analyze the 
uncertainties of each contributing factor and (2) to combine the uncertainties of the 
stochastic factors to determine the overall reliability of the structure. The second step, in 
turn, also may proceed in two different ways: (1) directly combining the uncertainties of 
all factors and (2) separately combining the uncertainties of the factors belonging to 
different components or subsystems to evaluate first the respective subsystem reliability 
and then combining the reliabilities of the different components or subsystems to yield the 
overall reliability of the structure. The first approach applies to very simple structures, 
whereas the second approach is more suitable to complicated systems. As dam systems are 
complex systems, an evaluation of the reliability of a dam system will comprise the 
hydrologic, hydraulic, geotechnical, structural, and other disciplinary reliabilities. These 
could be evaluated separately first and then combined to yield the overall dam reliability. 




modes and then combined. Analysis tools described in Chap. 8, such as fault tree and 
fragility analysis, are useful to divide the system into component evaluation and 
combination. 
3.1.3.1 Assessment of Reliability Function 
In the previous section, the reliability of systems was introduced in probabilistic terms and 
a general relationship with risk analysis was established. However, performing reliability 
analysis requires finding the reliability function of a real component or system. There are 
two different approaches to this problem. Either the reliability function can be estimated 
from curve-fitting failure data obtained from extensive historic failure records (non-
parametric methods) or it may be hypothesized to be a certain parameterized function 
(parametric methods) with the parameters estimated via statistical sampling techniques 
(Simonović, 2009). 
3.1.3.2 Parametric Reliability Function Assessment 
The parametric methods make an assumption about the functional form/shape of the 
reliability function f. For example in a linear regression analysis the relationship between 
the predictor X and the response Y is assumed to be linear; thus f is linear. This greatly 
simplifies the analysis. Linear regression is very useful in many applications but has its 
limitations as things in the real world don’t always follow a linear pattern and in such 
scenarios a simple linear regression function will increase the reducible error and not lead 
to accurate predictions. The general form of the response function of a simple linear 




𝑌𝑌 ≈ 𝛽𝛽0 + β1𝑋𝑋1 + β2𝑋𝑋2 + ⋯+ β𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝                                      (3.1) 
The linear assumption here means that the task of estimating the function f boils down to 
estimating the set of parameters (𝛽𝛽0,𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2... 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝). The higher the flexibility of the parametric 
model, the more parameters we need to account for in our model. 
Of course, linear models are the most basic form of parametric modeling. In fact a family 
of parametric models have been developed. This measure depends upon the amount of data 
available and/or the results observed. The data are normally governed by some parametric 
probability distribution. This means that the data can be interpreted by one or other 
mathematical formula representing a specific statistical probability distribution that 
belongs to a family of distributions differing from one another only in the values of their 
parameters. 
Such a family of distributions may be grouped accordingly: 
• Beta distribution 
• Binomial distribution 
• Lognormal distribution 
• Exponential (Poisson) distribution 
• Weibull distribution. 
Estimation techniques for determining the level of confidence related to an assessment of 
reliability based on these probability distributions are the methods of maximum likelihood, 
and Bayesian estimation (Stapelberg, 2009). Most of these distributions are adopted 




3.1.3.3 Non-Parametric Reliability Function Assessment 
Non-parametric methods, unlike parametric methods make no assumptions about the 
shape/functional form of f. Instead the approach is to estimate f that gets us as close to the 
data points as possible without capturing too much of the noise in the system (James et al., 
2013). With parametric methods, it is possible that the functional form used to estimate the 
underlying function f (i.e. fo) is substantially different from the true underlying f; leading 
to a model which does not accurately fit the data. In contrast, non-parametric methods do 
not suffer from this issue since they essentially make no assumption about the underlying 
function f. However, non-parametric methods do suffer from high variance since they do 
not curtail the number of parameters used to make the fit. 
Any parametric models are at best only an approximation to the true stochastic dynamics 
that generates a given data set. Meaning, parametric methods are plagued with the issues 
of models biases. According to Fan et al. (2003), “Many data in applications exhibit 
nonlinear features such as non-normality, asymmetric cycles, bimodality, nonlinearity 
between lagged variables, and heteroscedasticity.” They require nonlinear models to 
describe the law that generates the data. A natural alternative is to use nonparametric 
methods. Non-parametric methods are better at reducing the possible modeling biases that 
plague their parametric counterparts. This paper explores non-parametric models in the 
assessment of reliability functions (Non-parametric failure analysis) of certain flow control 





3.1.4. Systems Reliability Models 
The systems reliability modeling approach aims to combine techniques from engineering 
risk analysis, system safety engineering, system theory, reliability theory, and system 
dynamics.    
The systems reliability approach will involve some or all of the following components: 
System representation (Cox, 2009) : An engineered system is often represented 
mathematically in one of the following forms:  
(a) A “blackbox” statistical model: In this setting, the model used to estimate the system 
can be treated as a “black box” statistical model (see Figure 3.3) since the mathematical 
form of the model function is of little concern to us provided it is accurate in characterizing 
the system and predicting its performance. 
 
Figure 3.3: Schematic of Blackbox statistical Model Concept 
(b) Component failure rates combined via a coherent structure function (such as a fault tree 




(c) A stochastic state-transition model (e.g., transition models representing component 
failure and repair rates);  
(d) A combination of both discrete-event and continuous simulation model (Smith, 2005). 
Environment representation: Like a system model, a model of the environment may be 
a statistical black-box model (e.g., a function describing the frequency and intensity of 
stresses to the system’s components), a stochastic process, or a simulation model. The 
model of the environment is incorporated directly into the systems model. 
Operating-rules representation: The operational rules for managing an engineered 
system maps observed information about the system into a resulting action or intervention. 
For example, a component may be replaced based on the observed history of failures and 
repairs for its components.  
3.1.5. Data in Systems Reliability Modeling 
The reliability data required in systems reliability modeling are the parameters of 
component performance (failure under demand loads) models. These parameters are 
generally extrapolated from historical performance statistics, although expert opinion on 
individual equipment assessments may also be used in some cases. Collecting suitable data 
is at least as essential as developing risk evaluation methods. The data must be sufficiently 
comprehensive to ensure that an evaluation method can be applied, but restrictive enough 
to ensure that unnecessary data are not collected (Li, 2005). Fundamentally, the data relates 




restoration process (e.g. Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) and Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) 
of a gate mechanical hoist system).  
The quality of data is imperative to data collection.  The common analogy “garbage in and 
garbage out” applies here. If the quality of the data cannot be guaranteed, the subsequent 
reliability model built with such data will also not be accurate. In some cases, data 
preprocessing may be necessary to filter out bad data. The adoption of a parameter 
estimation procedure to pre-process the data and extract the input parameters of the systems 
reliability evaluation is imperative. This requires the suitable design of statistical data 
modeling. 
3.1.6. Stochastic Simulation 
A simulation typically consists of three parts:  
1. Sub-system components such as reservoir inflow channels, spillway gates, 
hydraulic conveyances, and data acquisition and control systems. These can be 
interfaced to model a particular reservoir system.  
2. Data acquisition components which track the progress of a simulation. These 
aggregate the data from the simulation runs and create summaries.  
3. User interface and dashboard ( i.e., visualization) components, which allow the data 
from the simulations to be portrayed to the user.  
The modelled system comprises a large number of inter-related sub-system components. 




a particular reservoir and flow-control system. The sub-systems are designed to be free-
standing, and may be redundant in the sense that duplicative types of sub-components 
might be developed for different purpose. For example, two or more sub-components might 
be developed for reservoir inflow. One might be a simple flood-frequency statistical model 
using a stochastic time series of river discharges. Another might be a spatially distributed 
rainfall-runoff model. These two could be swapped for one another depending on the needs 
of a particular analysis.  
 
Figure 3.4: Schematic system component. 
Each sub-system component is abstracted in mathematical expressions that describe the 
behavior of the component for a given input and a given set of disturbances, and specifies 
the output interactions of the component with other components (Figure 3.4). This set of 





Figure 3.5: System boundary and interactions. 
The mathematical expressions that describe the system component contain parameters, the 
realized values of which are the system states at any one moment in time. Some of these 
parameters are fixed and unchanging; others change under the influence of the history of 
inputs and disturbances up to that moment. At the end of any one cycle in the simulation 
the totality of parameter values at all of the systems components define the system state at 
that moment. 
The total number of system state parameter values at any cycle can be large, too large to 
track efficiently. Thus, a subset of a limited number of these is identified as select system 
states, for example, water levels, flow rates, pressure distribution, vibrations, temperature, 
etc., and the values of these are tracked and compared against performance criteria to 
identify important functions, hazardous states or failures.  
As a general rule in modelling systems, the systems states at the respective components 
may change upon each simulated cycle, but components may also be added, eliminated, or 




spillway systems, components may be modified but they are not typically added or 
eliminated once a simulation in in progress.  
From an operational point of view the critical issue is to develop an interface protocol 
among the sub-system components such that the output of one sub-system is readily 
accepted as the input to the next in the chain. This allows any of the sub-system modules 
to be replaced with a similar module using a different calculation approach (e.g., stochastic 
reservoir inflows vs. rainfall-runoff generated inflows).  
Within the simulation, three process flows are tracked:  
 Physical flows ( i.e., water, sediments, debris, etc.),  
 Communication ( i.e., information flows), and  
 Control ( i.e., human action flows). 
The principal models along the part of the water flow start with the hydrology model which 
generates inflows. Next comes the reservoir module which translates inflows into pool 
elevations and possibly related performance variables. The reservoir model provides inputs 
to the hydraulic gate and valve modules which control outflows to the respective waterways 
( i.e., the surface spillway, powerhouse, bottom drain if any, and auxiliary spillway if any). 
The gate and valve modules provide input to the downstream conveyances, energy 
dissipation structure, and ultimately the downstream channel.  
In general, the water flow modules and path are reasonably straight forward physics-based 
models of the type common in hydropower engineering. They take naturally occurring 




3.1.7. Monte Carlo Simulation  
Goodarzi et al. (2013) defined simulation as the imitation of a real thing or process to 
replicate the behavior of a system under different conditions. Simulation helps to evaluate 
desired strategies to manage the system in the best way and see how it will be changed in 
the future.  The Monte Carlo method is a numerical method based on random sampling to 
solve complicated integrals that is difficult or impossible to be evaluated analytically. The 
basic idea behind this integration technique is choosing sample points randomly over 
desired domain to approximate their results. In many cases, Monte Carlo Simulation is 
used to estimate the performance of a real system in different situations over a desired time 
interval before investments are made. This process determines the main properties of 
outcomes with regards to input and transfer functions between input and output. The 
transfer function plays an important role in simulation analysis and output accuracy 
strongly depends on its proper identification. When the transfer function is simple, 
analytical techniques are applied to determine outputs, while for complex transfer functions 
which it is not possible to derive output properties analytically, approximation methods are 
normally used. 
Simulation resolves to a great deal of computer modelling. The relatively simple 
subsystems are modelled mathematically, and then their behaviors are interrelated by 
means of simulation. Simulation is relied upon because closed-form analytical solution of 
the overall complex system is usually beyond our modelling capabilities. The simulation 
modelling involves mathematical characterization of the sub-systems, a backbone of 




numerical computation. The result is that we can approximately simulate how the complex 
system behaves, and we can change things in the input and formulation to see what might 
happen when the complex system is disturbed. The disturbance might either be by routine 
variations as, for example, human factors or stochastic variations, or by systemic loadings 
as from earthquakes or landslides. 
For many applications in the natural sciences, social sciences, and industry, simulation 
modelling has become a required tool of analysis and understanding. The use of large-scale 
stochastic simulation to study complex systems is now common in many scientific 
disciplines, especially when exploring questions that are poorly suited to traditionally 
deductive, deterministic analysis. This approach has proven particularly powerful when 
dealing with systems involving multiple and seemingly incommensurate aspects, for 
example in combining together factors such as physical science, natural processes, 
information networks, economics, and human factors. Today, simulation approaches are 
used in fields as far flung as oil and gas exploration, medicine, materials science, urban 
planning, and aerospace (NSF, 2006). Over the past decade the US National Research 
Council has published more than a dozen reports on the use of simulation in engineering 
science, public policy, STEMS training, and other applications (NRC, 2002, 2008, 2010). 
To simulate real-world conditions, the impact of a number of different physics that occur 
concurrently, such as the physics of hydrodynamics, storage, power generation, etc. have 
to be accurately characterized. Typically, effects from one physics domain also impact how 
a product behaves in another physics domain. For example, combined water pressure-




A simulation typically consists of three parts:  
1. Sub-system components such as reservoir inflow channels, spillway gates, 
hydraulic conveyances, and data acquisition and control systems. These can be 
interfaced to model a particular reservoir system.  
2. Data acquisition components which track the progress of a simulation. These 
aggregate the data from the simulation runs and create summaries.  
3. User interface and dashboard ( i.e., visualization) components, which allow the data 
from the simulations to be portrayed to the user.  
The modelled system comprises a large number of inter-related sub-system components. 
Modules can be developed to be free standing, and to ‘snap’ together as appropriate to form 
a particular reservoir and flow-control system.  
3.1.8. Simulating Flow Control Operations 
The previous sections lay out the systems approach to understanding operational safety and 
reliability, how simulation modelling can be used to track operations and flow-control, and 
to identify malevolent chains of events is discussed herein. This section delves deeper into 
the concepts and mathematics of systems modelling.  
The problem faced in analyzing flow-control through a reservoir (in a broad sense, 
including spillways and generating units) or a cascade of reservoirs is that the whole 





Complex systems comprise a large number of relatively simple systems interacting 
together. Each of these relatively simple sub-systems can, in principle, be mathematically 
modelled, at least to a first-order, but their interactions within the larger system typically 
cannot be. It is commonly the case that the quantitative behavior of the complex system 
cannot be forecast with precision, yet its qualitative behavior may be structured and 
understood using contemporary simulation techniques. Today, stochastic simulation 
techniques have been used to unravel the mysteries of many engineered and natural systems 
which had heretofore proven opaque to analysis. Among these are the electrical power grid, 
communications systems, aircraft performance, nuclear power plants, climate systems, and 
financial markets.  
Simulation resolves to a great deal of computer modelling. The relatively simple 
subsystems are modelled mathematically, and then their behaviors are interrelated by 
means of simulation. Simulation is relied upon because closed-form analytical solution of 
the overall complex system is usually beyond our modelling capabilities. The simulation 
modelling involves mathematical characterization of the sub-systems, a backbone of 
network theory, probabilistic cauterization and differential equations, and a good deal of 
numerical computation. The result is that we can approximately simulate how the complex 
system behaves, and we can change things in the input and formulation to see what might 
happen when the complex system is disturbed. The disturbance might either be by routine 
variations as, for example, human factors or stochastic variations, or by systemic loadings 




The purpose of the simulation is to gain holistic understanding of how the complex system 
works by numerically mimicking its behaviors. Things will go wrong, often by a 
combination of not-improbable conditions whose juxtaposition threatens the stability of 
the system, and in ways that no one thought of beforehand. The modelling leads to an 
understanding of how management might anticipate or respond to things going wrong in 
an operation.  
The use of large-scale stochastic simulation to study complex systems is now common in 
many scientific disciplines, especially when exploring questions that are poorly suited to 
traditionally deductive, deterministic analysis. This approach has proven particularly 
powerful when dealing with systems involving multiple and seemingly incommensurate 
aspects, for example in combining together factors such as physical science, natural 
processes, information networks, economics, and human factors. Today, simulation 
approaches are used in fields as far flung as oil and gas exploration, medicine, materials 
science, urban planning, and aerospace (NSF, 2006). Over the past decade the US National 
Research Council has published more than a dozen reports on the use of simulation in 
engineering science, public policy, STEMS training, and other applications (NRC, 2002, 
2008, 2010). 
3.1.9. System Simulation of Hydropower operations 
The system of interest is flow control operations, the fundamental functions of which are 
to store, bypass, or divert water. These functions are treated as sub-functions of a control 
system. The operating objective of different kinds of dam systems might be hydropower 




Nevertheless, flow control is the critical enabling system for any of these primary operating 
objectives.  
Here, we are mostly concerned with hydropower generation and discharge control. The 
natural and engineered systems typical of hydropower can be categorized using the 
taxonomy proposed by Simonovic (2008): 
Natural systems are those regularly occurring in the world, such as hydrological, 
geological, climatological, or biological processes. These are the settings within 
which engineered systems are built. Natural systems, by virtue of their 
evolutionary development, exhibit a high degree of interconnectedness. They 
typically exhibit cyclic behavior in that energy, material, and other flows have 
established themselves over long periods of time and are in balance, until 
disturbed by externally imposed change. 
Engineered systems are those designed and constructed by people. They may or 
may not exhibit the high degrees of interconnectedness characteristic of natural 
systems. A river basin with a cascade of dams is a system composed of both 
natural and engineered aspects, and is made more complex by the juxtaposition 
of these naturally occurring and man-made factors.  
Conceptual systems exist as concepts and mathematical relations but not in an 
instantiation in physical reality, that is, in contrast to natural and engineered 
systems, which do exist in the physical world. Conceptual systems are important 




important in the present discussion in the extent to which they may be used in an 
abstract, analytical capacity to mimic physical systems. 
Yet another distinction among systems involves those that are static in contrast to those 
that are dynamic. A static system, such as a structural frame, responds to forces and other 
disturbances but does not change or evolve in response to external perturbations. A static 
system, such as the embankment of a dam, will respond to loads and perturbations, and 
will generate interactions among its subcomponents; but its structure or interactions will 
not evolve in response. A dynamic system is one whose properties do change or evolve in 
response to the forces or other disturbances applied to them. The riverbed downstream of 
a spillway and stilling basin is a dynamic system. It’s properties may be changed by the 
loads and perturbations to which it is subjected. The boundary between static and dynamic 




   
        Figure 3.6: Simulation Activity Diagram 
Within the simulation three process flows are tracked:  water (i.e., the physical flows), 
communication (i.e., information flows), and control (i.e., human action flows).  The 
activity diagram in Figure 3.6 shows how the simulation proceeds in a sequential manner 
capturing the three processes described. Once the simulation run is started, flows are 
generated and routed through the reservoir. The reservoir responds through changes in 
elevation. The operators and automated systems communicate this change in elevation to 
the spillway gates if its demand is needed. If its demand is needed, the spillway gates are 




This set of events happen iteratively through time and their performance and reliabilities 
are computed before and provided as outputs at the end of the simulation run. 
3.1.10. System states and process 
At its core, simulation is the imitation of salient properties of one process by another. 
Typically, the first process is something occurring in the natural world, in our case flows 
of water, information, human actions, and possibly other things through a reservoir or 
series of reservoirs. Typically, the second process is mathematical. We say salient 
properties to mean those that are important, noticeable, or conspicuous to the current 
purpose. The natural system may have many properties that a simulation will not and need 
not capture, because they are irrelevant to the purpose at hand. 
System states are the variables necessary to describe a system at a particular time and for 
the particular purposes of the study. In principle, there is an infinite number of potential 
systems states. Thus, system states need to be defined by the modeler for the particular 
purpose at hand and in a multitude that balances comprehensiveness with efficiency. 
Defining system states is simply one of the many modelling decisions that need to be made. 
For a hydropower dam, system states might include the reservoir inflow, the water surface 
elevation, the power being generated by each turbine, the open or closed condition of each 
gate, the discharge of water downstream, and so on. 
As a simulation proceeds, the realized values of system states are tracked at each cycle of 
time. The values of some of the system states become inputs to other subsystems. The 
values of others of these (select) system states may be related to, or may themselves be, 




constitute adverse performance or failure of the system functions. The rate at which these 
adverse systems states appear in the simulated record may be taken as a statistical estimate 
of the probability of system failure in particular ways. For example, the rate in simulated 
time at which the system state, “spillway gate fails to open”, can be used as a statistical 
estimate of gate availability. The rate in simulated time at which the system state 
“minimum hydraulic flow pressure on the spillway conveyance” exceeds cavitation limits, 
can be used to statistically estimate the probability of cavitation. 
The term process means the sequence of system states as they evolve in time. Because 
these transitions among states may reflect many intellectual disciplines—hydrology and 
hydraulics, geotechnology, human behavior, instrumentation and control, 
thermodynamics—the simulation approach lends itself to multi-disciplinary analyses. The 
transitions within individual states or similar sets of states is modelled mathematically. 
From a mathematical view, the sorts of systems that we attempt to simulate have 
characteristic mathematical properties that are useful as a way of categorizing the types of 
simulations needing to be built (Table 3.1). 
The simulation models used to replicate and forecast the behavior of spillway systems 
reliability are usually non-linear, stochastic, and spatially distributed. For example, the 
hydraulic pressures and cavitation damages induced in outflow conduits or stilling basins 
depend in highly non-linear ways on spillway discharges and thus reservoir pool elevations. 
Those pool elevations fluctuate as random time-series depending on the hydrological 




such as landslides in turn depend on spatially and possibly temporally variable basin 
parameters affecting runoff, debris generation, and other processes. 
3.1.11. Why use simulation for hydropower? 
Stochastic simulation approaches to modelling and understanding complex water resource 
system performance has become increasingly common. For example, in large-scale water 
and power infrastructure Tilmant et al. (2012) have applied simulation to optimizing power 
production in a cascade of reservoirs under variable hydrology. Von Stackelberg and 
Neilson (2012) apply simulation to riverine water quality. Gersonius et al. (2012) applied 
simulation to incorporate uncertainty and flexibility in the economic analysis of flood risk 
and coastal management strategies. Regan ( 2010) has suggested a simulation approach to 
dam safety. Billinton and Li ( 1994) applied simulation to assessing the reliability of power 
distribution systems. In applications to other systems safety problems Blum et al. (2010) 
applied simulation to safety analysis of airspace craft design, Leveson (2012) applies 
simulation to power generation systems, Hosse and Schnieder (2012) have applied 
simulation to highway safety, and Zio (2013) and Blom et al. (2006) survey many systems 
safety applications. Simulation methods are also now widely used in modern financial 







Table 3.1. Categories of mathematical systems models 
System property Characteristics 
Linear vs.  
non-linear 
In a linear model all the relations among input and output processes, the 
external constraints on the system, and the objectives for operation (if 
applicable) are represented by simple linear relationships. This is 
infrequently the case in flow control models, where these relationship, 
constraints, and objective functions tend to be non-linear. The behavior of 
non-linear models tends to be much less intuitive and predictable than for 
linear models due to the complexity of interactions among variables. 
Deterministic vs. 
probabilistic 
For the case that each input parameter to the system model can be assigned 
a specific and definite value, and each computer relation or sub-model 
within the model translates specific and definite input parameter values to 
specific and definite output values, a model is deterministic. Those input 
values may themselves be uncertain, and varying those parameter values 
might allow sensitivity computations; but if the values and relations are 
specific and definite in any one running of the model, then the 
deterministic nature of the model still holds. The opposite of deterministic 
is probabilistic, in which input and output values are represented by 
probability distributions rather than specific and definite values.
   
Static vs. 
dynamic  
A static model is not a function of time. The forces or perturbations on the 
system achieve an equilibrium condition and remain such until conditions 
are changed or another condition is imposed. Dynamic systems respond, 




internal processes. If those conditions and the responses are probabilistic, 
then a dynamic system is said to be stochastic. 
Lumped vs.  
Distributed 
parameter 
Models in which parameter values are assumed constant throughout space 
are usually referred to as lumped parameter models. That is, the 
parameters are lumped at some average or at least defined value and are 
assumed to be homogeneous in space. They may change in time. 
Distributed parameter models are those that model parameter values as 
varying in space. The variation may be deterministic or probabilistic. In 
the latter case the models might be called stochastic or in special cases 
may be called geo-statistical (depending on the modelling approach). 
There are a variety of good reasons for the increasing popularity of simulation approaches 
to safety and risk analysis: 
• Simulation allows complex systems interactions to be modelled easily when 
compared to closed-form analytical models.  
• Computer speeds are rapidly increasing, and engineers have increasing access to 
high-performance computing. 
• Discrete events are readily included in simulations while they often pose 
combinatorial problems in fault tree and event tree models.  
• Simulation readily allows for the inclusion and interaction of many and differing 
types of system response (physics of failure, communication and control, and 
human reliability, for example). 
• The numerical precision of simulation results are independent of the complexity of 





Complex systems, of the type related to operational reliability, share several characteristics 
that make them suitable subjects for stochastic simulation approaches.  
 They involve many parts (components).  
 These parts have combinatorically many interactions, one-to-one and many-to-
many.  
 The input parameter space is large.  
 The timing of events is important.  
 Uncertainties in the parameters are of many types and often correlated.  
 The system behaviors or outputs are also stochastic and usually unpredictable based 
on simple abstractions.  
Finally, and perhaps most relevant, the output behaviors of these systems are emergent, 
that is, patterns of performance arise out of the diversity and number of relatively simple 
component interactions, and those patterns are usually not obvious ahead of time. 
3.1.12. Tracking physical flows 
The hydrology model is coupled with a reservoir routing module that takes reservoir 
inflows as input and returns pool elevation and possibly other states and processes as 
output. These reservoir outputs provide demand inputs to the various waterways (Figure 
3.7). The waterway modules in turn provide outputs to the downstream channel. The 
physical characteristics of the water flows are instantiated in states at a set of pre-defined 
system states, and these system states are compared against a set of limiting state criteria 





Figure 3.7: Simplified simulation logic. The sub-system modules are designed such that 
the interface protocols among the modules allow the modules to be replaced with other 
technologies. 
The safe operation of any industrial facility is highly dependent on the humans who operate 
and manage them, and who may be called upon to make decisions in the face of unexpected 
disruptions or other events. Over the past many decades a systematic body of theory and 
practice has emerged on the types, rates, and importance of human operator errors, and this 
insight needs to be incorporated in simulation models. The system simulations discussed 
so far have assumed present basin and climatological conditions: That is, how does the 
flow-control systems perform given the current basin configuration and environment and 





CHAPTER 4: COMPONENTS OF HYDROPOWER PLANT OPERATIONS 
4.1. The Reservoir  
The reservoir component itself is a rather complex subsystem in which a number of 
interacting processes takes place. The structure of a reservoir is defined by the interactions 
between inflow, storage, outflow and other variables specific to a particular reservoir 
location  (Simonović, 2009). Very often reservoirs are built and operated to satisfy water 
quantity requirements such as irrigation or drinking water consumption, hydropower 
production, etc. Optimal operation of these reservoirs is vital to maximize benefits. The 
attributes of a reservoir can include a large number of quantities characterizing both 
physical properties of the reservoir as well as characteristics of the processes occurring 
within the component. Not all of the properties and the processes are relevant to the 
objectives of a particular modelling endeavor and the systems analyst has to make a 
decision which attributes should be included in the component model. The relevant 
attributes for the reservoir may include inflow, water level, discharge, chemical properties 
of water, storage, water temperature and many others.  Regardless of the number of original 
or current purposes of a reservoir the storage behind the dam can be subdivided into the 





Figure 4.1: Schematic Diagram Showing Storage Reservoir Zones 
Full Reservoir Level (operating range maximum level): It is the level corresponding to 
the storage which includes both inactive and active storages and also the flood storage, if 
provided for. In gated reservoir systems, this is typically the highest active pool elevation 
before spillway flow is required. 
Minimum Drawdown Level (MDDL): It is the level below which the reservoir will not be 
drawn down so as to maintain a minimum head water requirement for power generation.  
Dead Storage Level (DSL): Below the level, there are no outlets to drain the water in the 
reservoir by gravity.  
Maximum Water Level (MWL): This is the water level that is ever likely to be attained 
during the passage of the design flood. This level is also called sometimes as the Highest 




Live storage: This is the storage available for the intended purpose between the operating 
range maximum level and the Invert Level of the lowest discharge outlet. This is the 
reservoir operating levels usually assigned to hydropower generation. 
Dead storage: It is the total storage below the invert level of the lowest discharge outlet 
from the reservoir.  
Surcharge or Flood storage: This is required as a reserve between the operating range 
maximum level and the Maximum Water level to contain the peaks of floods that might 
occur when there is insufficient storage capacity for them below the operating range 
maximum level.  
Freeboard: It is the margin kept for safety between the level at which the dam would be 
overtopped and the maximum still water level. This is required to allow for settlement of 
the dam, for wave run up above still water level and for unforeseen rises in water level, 
because of surges resulting from landslides into the reservoir from the peripheral hills, 
earthquakes or unforeseen floods or operational deficiencies. 
4.1.1. Key Parameters of Reservoir Operation 
The following section describes the key parameters of reservoir modeling: 
Water Level (denoted by h) can be defined is the water level measured at a specific gauge 
and at a specific time. Quite often in the past the measurements at hydrometric stations 




Inflow (denoted by q) can be defined as total inflow into the reservoirs from all sources. 
Streamflow, like many other quantities observed in natural systems, is always continuous 
in time. However, the sampling of not only inflows but all other attributes usually takes 
place at discrete time instants. For these reason, it is convenient to build the discrete-time 
model in which the time parameter t represents the sampling or decision time instants. 
Following this assumption, the inflow can be now defined in more precise terms as follows 
and we will understand that inflow qt+1 represents amount of water that entered the 
reservoir during the time interval [t, t+1). 
Discharge (denoted by d) is the total flow released from the reservoir through all spillway 
facilities, turbines of the hydropower station (if present), through the navigation locks (if 
present) and through the lower level outlets. Similarly, as for the inflow, discharge dt+1 
represents the amount of water that was released from the reservoir during the time interval 
[t, t+1). 
Storage (denoted by s) is the volume of water stored in the reservoir. 
If water level is denoted by ht then inflow within the interval [t, t+1) is not known at the 
time t and it can be known only when it have been realized at the end of time interval and 
for that reason will be denoted by qt+1. Storage has a unique property since its value st+1 at 
time t+1 can be calculated from its value st at time t using the following formula: 
 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1                                                  (4.1) 
When a variable at any instant of time depends on its value at the previous instant, it is 




component which is determined from its past history and is necessary in order to predict 
the future. Therefore, storage is a state variable in the reservoir model. 
The water level ht+1 at time t+1 can be determined from the storage st+1 using either stage-
storage relationship or from information about the bathymetry of the reservoir and 
topography of its rim. 
 
4.1.2. Hydrologic routing methods 
Hydrologic routing techniques model the downstream conditions within the river reach in 
response to a given flow hydrograph at the upstream end of the reach.  The modelling 
utilizes only the continuity equation and analytic or empirical relationships between the 
channel storage and the discharge at the outlet. The continuity equation for the river reach 
can be conceptualized as: 
Continuous time 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹(𝑅𝑅)
𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑅𝑅) − 𝑄𝑄(𝑅𝑅) 
                                 
(4.2) 




                                           
(4.3) 
Where for the discrete time formulation 𝐼𝐼 is the average inflow at the upstream end of the 
river reach during time interval  𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅, 𝑄𝑄 is the average discharge from the reach during time 




The most commonly used methods applied for hydrologic routing are: 
a) Linear reservoir(s) 
b) Modified pulse 
c) Muskingam 
d) Muskingum-Cunge 
The analytical methodology adopted for the systems reliability modeling will be examined 
in more depth in the next chapter. 
4.2. Reservoir Outflow structures 
Reservoir outflow structures are combinations of structures used to route excess flows 
downstream of the reservoir and also to convey water from the reservoir to a discharge 
point downstream from a dam (Jansen, 2012). These can be divided into two main outflow 
systems; namely spillways systems and outlet systems. Outlets are frequently used for 
diversion during construction, and may, if highly reliable, be used to help to accommodate 
the design flood. 
Outflow components are classified according to their function: 
• Irrigation 
• Municipal and/or industrial use 
• Flood control 
• Power production 
• River outlet (for release of river flow requirements) 




These general types have various kinds of intakes and provisions for gating and energy 
dissipation. 
4.3. Spillway Gates 
Spillway is an integral part of any dam. A spillway is a method for spilling of water from 
dams. It is used to prevent overtopping of the dams which could result in damage or failure 
of dams or in some cases used to maintain prescribed water levels for energy generation. 
Spillways are of two types: controlled type and uncontrolled type. The uncontrolled type 
of spillway is one which starts releasing water when water rises above a particular level. In 
this type, overflow is the only way for water to reach the other side of the dam. In the case 
of the controlled type spillway, it is possible to regulate flow through gates provided within 
the dam structure that provide an opening for releasing water downstream without passing 
it through the turbine.  
4.3.1. Gated Spillways 
Gated spillways generally permit the use of a larger live storage than do ungated spillways, 
which is often economically favorable. On the other hand, gates are critically sensitive 
components of dam systems and gated waterways cannot be expected to always be 
available on demand. 
The greater flexibility of operation provided by gated spillways makes it possible to 
regulate either the upstream water level or the water conduit discharge in a narrower band. 
Thus the pool elevation in a reservoir can be operated within optimal levels for power 




reduction in spillway function reliability since several components and subcomponents 
have to come together and function on demand for the gated spillway System to work. The 
issue of functional reliability will be looked at in more details in chapter 7. 
Operating experience with spillways for dams has revealed problems of two types: (1) 
inadequate capacity and (2) unsatisfactory performance for design or less-than-design 
discharges. Particular items that appear to be most critical in the second area are identified 
and categorized in the subsequent chapters.  
4.3.1.1 Spillway Gate Operations and Model Characterizations 
Depending on the gate operating conditions and the water elevation on either side of the 
spillway flow, spillways are classified into five different flow categories. More specifically 
those categories are (Brebbia and Carlomagno, 2007): 
• Free orifice-flow (partially opened gate – i.e. gate is in the water) 
• Submerged orifice-flow (partially opened gate) 
• Free weir-flow (fully opened gate – i.e. gate is out of the water) 
• Submerged weir-flow (fully opened gate) 
• Submerged tidally-affected weir-flow (fully or partially opened gate) 
Within the systems modeling framework, flows through gated spillways are generally 
computed from instantaneous stage and operational control information using in-house 
developed discharge rating tables (See Figure 4.2). The table relates discharge as a function 
of head water elevation. However, where such information is not available or the accuracy 
of discharge estimates is compromised due to certain conditions, mathematical 




flow, fluid and geometric features of the spillway gate structure. Traditionally, submerged 
flow is estimated as 
𝑄𝑄 =  𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 �2𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻 −  𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 )                                                  (4.4) 
Where B is the gate width, H is the upstream head, Ht is the tail-water elevation, g is the 
gravitational acceleration, and CS is an empirical coefficient expressed as: 





                                                          (4.5) 
where α and β are experimental constants(Tillis et al., 1998).Other basic formulas 
developed for the estimation of orifice and weir type of flows can also be tested to see 
which ones best characterizes the spillway flow being analyzed and improvisations made 
where necessary (Brebbia and Carlomagno, 2007). 
 





4.3.1.2 Specific Deficiencies and Problems to incorporate into the model 
The  outlet,  spillways and  gates  have  been  traditionally  viewed  from  the  perspective  
of   structural mechanical–electrical reliability considerations. They comprise, at a 
minimum, the following: structural subsystems, mechanical subsystems, electrical 
subsystems and controls subsystems. The controls subsystems include any SCADA 
technology that may be present. These systems are also those for which human factors are 
important. The human factors, in a broad sense, include the control room operations of 
people and equipment, operating rules and procedures, and the supervisory system (real-
time interfaces, forecasts of reservoir inflows, etc.).  
Spillway deficiencies that could compromise the safety of a dam can be broadly 
categorized as: 
1. Inadequate spillway capacity. 
2. Failure of flow surfaces due to cavitation and abrasion. 
3. Structural failure because of inadequate foundation treatment and failure to prevent 
excessive uplift pressures. 
4. Structural failure caused by dynamic loadings. 






The turbine can be considered as the heart of any hydropower plant. Its role is to convert 
the power of water into mechanical power, i.e. by rotating the shaft. The water strikes the 
turbine blades and turns the turbine, which is attached to a generator by a shaft.  
 There are two main turbine categories: “reaction” and “impulse” (International Renewable 
Energy Agency, 2012). Impulse turbines extract the energy from the momentum of the 
flowing water, as opposed to the weight of the water. Reaction turbines extract energy from 
the pressure of the water head. The Francis turbine-which is the most common hydropower 
turbine—is a reaction turbine and is the most widely used hydropower turbine in existence. 
Impulse turbines such as Pelton are also used in certain scenarios.  
 
Figure 4.3: Schematic of Dam-Reservoir-Generation Systems 
Analytically, the electric power, P, in Watts (W), of a reaction turbine can be determined 




𝑃𝑃 =  𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑄𝑄(𝐻𝐻𝑔𝑔  −  ℎ𝐿𝐿)                                                  (4.6) 
where γ (= ρ × g) is specific weight of water in kg/(m2 × s 2 ), Q is flow discharge in m3/s, 
Hg is gross head in m, hL is sum of head losses in m, ρ is water density in kg/m3 , g is 
acceleration of gravity in m/s2 , and η is overall hydroelectric unit efficiency, which in turn 
is the product of turbine efficiency (ηt) and generator efficiency(ηg).  











�                                          (4.7) 
where L, D2 and A2 are length, diameter and cross-sectional area of penstock, respectively. 
In addition, f is friction factor, ∑k1−2 is the sum of local losses in penstock due to entrance, 
bends, penstock fittings and gates, AN is nozzle area at its exit (and kN is nozzle head loss 




2 − 1                                                               (4.8) 
Where CV is nozzle velocity coefficient.  
Likewise, for the purpose of systems modeling, power generation as a function of turbine 
discharge relationships (See Figure 4.4) are usually generated in-house and the modeler 
may have to incorporate this data in the form of look-up tables. The table relates power 
generation as a function of discharge and head water elevation. However, where such 




discharge is inaccurate, the presented mathematical formulations can be incorporated into 
the model used. 
 
Figure 4.4: Power Generation Rating Tables 
4.4.1. Operational Aspects of Turbines 
The efficiency of a turbine depends on the water flow and the type of turbine. The 
efficiency of Pelton and Kaplan turbines is high over a wide range of water flow. Propeller 
and Crossflow turbines present a distinct optimum. The following features are to be noted: 
• The maximum efficiency of most turbines are usually around order of 90% (Wagner and 
Mathur, 2011), however, this maximum efficiency is not at 100% flow (see Figure 4.6).  
• The efficiency of all the turbines is low if the flow is much reduced. There must be a 




• The shape of the efficiency curve is also dependent on the ratio of flow (Q) to design flow 
(Qo). 
 
Figure 4.5: Efficiency Curves for turbine types 
 
Figure 4.6: Snapshot of Best Efficiency turbine flows vs Maximum turbine flows 
4.5. Control Gates 
Control gates play a very important role by regulating the amount of water flow into the 
turbine through the penstock. These gates are normally of the vertical lifting type and due 
to their heavy weight and large size, can only be lifted with the help of large motors 
mounted on the top portion of the dam. The major part of the control gates remains 
submerged in the water body. As it is constant contact with corrosive conditions, the 
24.50 25.00 25.50 26.00 26.50 27.00 27.50 28.00 28.50 29.00 29.50 30.00 30.50
BEST EFFICIENCY
FLOW (m3/sec) 264.0 264.5 265.0 265.0 264.9 264.1 262.6 261.0 259.4 257.5 255.5 253.5 251.5
OUTPUT (kW) 53,600 55,050 56,500 57,750 59,000 60,000 61,000 61,900 62,800 63,500 64,200 64,800 65,400
MAXIMUM OUTPUT
FLOW (m3/sec) 283.5 284.8 286.0 287.5 289.0 291.0 289.4 291.0 292.0 292.3 292.8 293.0 293.2





material of the control gates of a hydropower plant is very important and critical. For the 
same reason the maintenance and repair of the control gates is a work-filled job related to 
hydropower plants. 
4.6. Hydropower systems operation 
This chapter focusses on the broader context of hydropower systems operation and how 
systems reliability modeling can be employed to emulate the performance of the 
hydropower systems. Emulation of the salient aspects of hydropower operation is 
imperative to devising operating rules and maintenance schedules to optimize the 
performance and reliability of the system as a whole. System operation is defined as the 
modus operandi of the organization that owns and operates the system. It is recognized that 
the owner-operator model is not the only feasible organizational arrangement, but the term 
is used as a convenient means of conveying the notion that both ownership type and 
operator type decisions and actions together constitute operation of the system. The next 
sections talk about the constraints within the framework that organizations must develop 
hydropower operating rules in. 
4.7. Operating objectives 
Together with the determination of physical parameters of a system, the operating 
objectives of the system are equally important in finding the best performance of the system 
to serve its purpose. Modeling the operational objectives of a dam system and must capture 
the uncertainty of the system, its components and all related phenomena of interest 
(Nandalal and Bogardi, 2013). From the perspective of long term operational objectives, 




in the modeling process. The operational objectives main goal is to provide an expected 
optimal response of the dam system under a wide range of short- and long-term scenarios. 
In general, the systems analysis implies two basic strategies in operational assessment: 
simulation and optimization approaches. These two strategies are incorporated into the 
systems modeling framework to emulate the real-world performance of the dam systems 
under consideration and to test out improvements to already established operating policies 
and objectives.  
4.7.1. Optimal Reservoir Operation and Modeling 
The reservoir subsystem is a complex subsystem in which interacts with other processes 
within the larger hydropower system. The attributes of a reservoir can include a large 
number of quantities characterizing both physical properties and processes occurring 
within the component. Not all of the properties and the processes are relevant to the 
objectives of a particular modelling endeavor, and the system analyst has to make a 
decision which attributes should be included in the component model. The relevant 
attributes of the reservoir may include inflow, water level, discharge, chemical properties 
of water, bathymetry, water temperature etc.  
Reservoirs have to be best operated to achieve maximum benefits from them. The rule 
curves (see Figure 4.7), which define instantaneous ideal reservoir storage levels, have 
been the essential operational tool. Reservoir operators are expected to maintain these pre-
fixed water levels as closely as possible while generally trying to satisfy various water 
needs downstream. If the levels of reservoir storage are above the target or desired levels, 




rates are decreased. Typically, these operating rules are defined to include not only storage 
target levels, but also various storage allocation zones, such as conservation, flood control, 
spill or surcharge, buffer, and inactive or dead storage zones. These zones also may vary 
throughout the year and the advised release range for each zone is provided by the rules. 
The desired storage levels and allocation zones mentioned above are usually defined based 
on historical operating practice and experience while meeting Power production 
expectations and downstream release constraints. Having only these target levels for each 
reservoir, the reservoir operator has considerable responsibility in day-to-day operation 
with respect to the appropriate trade-off between storage levels and discharge deviations 
from ideal conditions. Hence, such an operation requires experienced operators with sound 
judgment.  
 




The systems modeling technique can be used to test these operating rules in a wide range 
of scenarios and also to test out improvements and modifications (optimizations) to the 
pre-existing operating rules. This is a key advantage that the systems modeling has given 
the fact that dam systems are dynamic systems with emergent properties that may not have 
been conceived at the time of the rule curves developments. In general, these techniques 
lead to models which can be classified into two categories: optimization models and 
simulation models.  
To counteract the inefficiency in operating a reservoir system only by the ‘‘rule curves,’’ 
additional policies for operation have now been incorporated into most reservoir operation 
rules. These operation guidelines define precisely when conditions   are not ideal (e.g., 
when maintenance of the ideal storage levels becomes impractical), and the decisions to be 
made for various combinations of hydrological and reservoir storage conditions. For some 
reservoir systems, this type of operation policy has already taken over the rule curves and 
is acting as the principal rule for reservoir operation. 
Simulation models can effectively analyze the consequences of various proposed operation 
rules and indicate where marginal improvements in operation policy might be made. 
Although both optimization and simulation can be, and at times are, used independently to 
analyze an operational problem, they are essentially two complementary methods which 




4.7.2. Salient Aspects of Systems Modeling Approach To Reservoir Operations 
In order to be able to accurately account for the uncertainty involved with hydropower 
operations, it is imperative to incorporate the reservoir optimization concepts into the 
Monte-Carlo simulation framework. This captures the optimal, expectation oriented, long-
term operational strategy for reservoirs. The aspects of the reservoir optimization model 
that need to be captured within the systems simulation framework are present in the next 
sections. 
4.7.3. Objective Function 
From the perspective of an optimization model, the objective is to maximize the expected 
annual energy generation from the reservoir. If there are other objectives for the reservoir 
system such as releases for irrigation or for environmental deficits, these will have to be 
factored in as well. The assumption for this objective function is that, the sole objective is 
to maximize energy generation. In that case, the objective function will in the form 
presented below. 
𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 = 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝜉𝜉 ��𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
𝑇𝑇
𝑗𝑗=1
�                                                  (4.1) 
Where, 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = energy generation by power plant at period j (MWh) 
        =9.81 × η × 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 × (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸)/106 




𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗=release from reservoir during period j (m3/s), 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 =normal tail water level of power plant (m), 
T=number of periods within annual cycle, 
η =overall efficiency of power plant, and 
𝜉𝜉=denotes expectation. 
 
4.7.4. Stages, State, and Decision Variables 
The state of the system is described by water available in the reservoir at the beginning of 
any time step and inflow level at the present time period. Consecutive time steps are 
identified as stages. The decision variable is storage volume at the end of the time period. 
The optimization is subject to constraints on reservoir storage and release. 
4.7.5. Storage Volume Constraint 
The storage volume constraints are usually set in the operating rules for the reservoir 
operation. This is usually a pre-specified upper and lower bound limits of minimum and 
maximum live storage capacity: 
                                                    𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚;       𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, . . . . ,𝑇𝑇                                             
(4.2) 
Where, 
𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗=storage volume at beginning of period j, 
𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = allowable minimum storage volume, and 





4.7.6. Release Constraint 
The releases from each reservoir are subject to the constraints of maximum and minimum 
limits. This is due to the maximum capacities of outlets and the compulsory releases such 
as environmental flows, if any: 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚;       𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, . . . . ,𝑇𝑇                                    
(4.3) 
Where, 
𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗=reservoir release during period, 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = maximum allowable release through turbines in period j, and 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=minimum release from reservoir during period j. 
 
4.7.1. Reservoir Routing Analysis 
One of the main objectives of a systems reliability analysis of dams is to performing 
overtopping analysis and generate analytical outputs that can be used to analyze the 
performance of the dam system during breach scenarios. The key parameters at play here 
are water height in the reservoir under various inflows and disturbance conditions 
(hurricanes), and comparing the result with the dam crest elevation. The change in reservoir 
pool elevation is simply the net of the inflows and outflows of the reservoir system. 





𝐼𝐼 − 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
                                                                     
(4.4) 
Where I and Q represent the reservoir inflows and outflows respectively. S is the storage 









                                            (4.5) 
Where It and It+1 are inflow into the reservoir Qt and Qt+1 are outflow from the reservoir, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 
and 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 are reservoir storage at t and t+1 respectively and △ 𝑅𝑅 is the time interval. 
The water height in the reservoir could be estimated by solving Equation 4.5 at each time 
step. Time interval Dt determines the length of each step in the reservoir routing and output 
precision will be increased with decreasing Dt.  
4.8. Risk and Uncertainty of Overtopping  
Overtopping happens when the reservoir release outlets cannot release water fast enough 
and water rises above the dam and spills over. In overtopping analysis, the maximum water 
height in the reservoir (Hmax) and dam height (HR) can be considered load and resistance 
of the system, respectively.  
In most cases, overtopping leads to dam breach. The consequences of this resulting breach 





In order to develop an accurate Systems Risk Model, the objective of the reservoir routing 
analysis is to provide the system loading (reservoir levels, inflow volumes, outflow 
discharges, overtopping durations, failure intervention measures etc.). In order to 
accomplish this, the needed data are: incoming hydrographs (inflows), starting pool 
elevations, spillway and outlet waterways properties (including functionality), hydraulics 
and hydrodynamics of power generation, reservoir physical properties and reservoir 
operating procedures. This leads to a parametric flood routing analysis, considering all the 
possible permutations of input variables. All this is done from a probabilistic point of view. 
 
Figure 4.8: Overtopping risk concept based on probabilistic approach 
4.9. Generation of synthetic streamflow data 
Accurate forecasts of the net inflows into a reservoir is essential for determining the 
optimal operation policy and management of the reservoir system.  In practice, the reservoir 
net inflow is computed based upon the application of the water balance equation to the 
reservoir system since it is difficult to obtain direct and reliable measurements of this 




behavior because it is related to the stochastic nature of various physical processes involved 
in the water balance computation (e.g., precipitation, evaporation, etc.). Therefore, the aim 
the adopting forecasting method should be to accurately and efficiently predict the random 
reservoir inflow series. 
The generation of stochastic inputs to the system can be approached in several ways. The 
modelling framework accommodates any of these, and it is left to the user to decide which 
approach is most appropriate or preferred for a particular application. Accuracy of reservoir 
inflow forecasts is instrumental for maximizing the value of water resources and benefits 
gained through hydropower generation. There are two distinct approaches to modeling 
reservoir inflows; namely, conceptual and data-driven models (Gragne et al., 2015). 
Lumped conceptual hydrologic models use sets of mathematical expressions to provide a 
simplified generalization of the complex natural processes of the hydrologic systems in the 
headwater areas of reservoirs. Application of such models conventionally requires 
estimating the model parameters by conditioning them to observed hydrologic data. Unlike 
conceptual models, data-driven models establish mathematical relationship between input 
and output data without any explicit attempt to represent the physical processes of the 
hydrologic system. However, the two approaches can be reconciled and thus combining 
the advantages of both approaches (Todini, 2007).  
The case studies presented in chapter 11 and 12 utilize data driven time series forecasting 
models; specifically the Auto regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models. The 




4.9.1. Reservoir Inflow time series model building 
This section is intended to present the time series concepts for transforming the available 
reservoir inflow time series into the stationary series, which would then be fitted to the 
ARIMA or seasonal ARIMA models. A three-step iterative procedure is used to build an 
ARIMA model. First, a tentative model of the ARIMA class is identified through analysis 
of historical data. Second, the unknown parameters of the model are estimated. Third, 
through residual analysis, diagnostic checks are performed to determine the adequacy of 
the model and make improvements if necessary (Montgomery et al., 2015). 
4.9.1.1 Model Identification 
The first step in modeling time index data is to convert the non-stationary time series to a 
stationary one. This is important due to the fact that a most statistical time series methods 
are based on the assumption of stationarity and can only be applied to stationary time series. 
Simple time series plots can be used as a preliminary assessment tool to test for stationarity 
and seasonality in the time series data. The visual inspection of these plots is a crude way 
of assessing the stationarity of time series data (see Figure 4.9). Better and more 
methodological tests of stationarity also exist and are presented in several texts on time 
series analysis. Statistical software packages such as Minitab, STATA and JMP all have 
more mathematically rigorous methods for testing for stationarity and trends in time series 
data.  
If nonstationarity is suspected, the time series plot of the first (or dth) difference should 




to make sure that differencing is indeed needed. Once the stationarity of the time series can 
be presumed, the sample ACF (autocorrelation function) and PACF (partial autocorrelation 
function) of the time series of the original time series (or its dth difference if necessary) 
should be obtained (see Figure 4.10). 
 






Figure 4.10: ACF and PACF for pre-processed inflows from example 
 
4.9.1.2 Parameter Estimation 
There are several methods such as the methods of moments, maximum likelihood, and least 
squares that can be employed to estimate the parameters in the tentatively identified model. 
However, unlike the regression models, most ARIMA models are nonlinear models and 
require the use of a nonlinear model fitting procedure. This is usually automatically 
performed by sophisticated software packages such as Minitab, JMP, and SAS. In some 
software packages, the user may have the choice of estimation method and can accordingly 
choose the most appropriate method based on the problem specifications. 
4.9.1.3 Diagnostic Checking 
After a tentative model has been fit to the data, the adequacy of the model must be 




analysis. According to Montgomery et al. (2015), the residuals for an ARMA (p, q) process 
can be obtained from  





𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡−𝑚𝑚�                                          (4.6) 
If the specified model is adequate and hence the appropriate orders p and q are identified, 
it should transform the observations to a white noise process. Thus the residuals in Equation 
(4.6) should behave like white noise. Detailed analysis of the further diagnostic procedures 





CHAPTER 5: CHARACTERIZATION OF LOAD AND RESISTANCE 
PARAMETERS OF FLOW CONTROL SYSTEMS 
In a multitude of hydrosystems engineering problems, uncertainties in data and in theory, 
including design and analysis procedures, warrant a probabilistic treatment of the 
problems. The risk associated with the potential failure of a dam system, is the result of the 
combined effects of inherent randomness of external loads and various uncertainties 
involved in the analysis, design, construction, and operational procedures. Hence, to 
evaluate the probability that a dam system will function as designed requires uncertainty 
and reliability analyses. 
The basic idea of reliability engineering is to determine the failure probability of an 
engineering system, from which the safety of the system can be assessed, or a rational 
decision can be made on the design, operation, or forecasting of the system. Without 
exception, failures of hydrosystem infrastructure (e.g., dams, levees, and storm sewers) 
could potentially pose significant threats to public safety and inflict enormous damage on 
properties and the environment. (Tung et al., 2005). 
Dams and their associated flow control are highly complex systems of engineered 
structures, natural processes, and human operation. They behave in complex ways that are 
not amenable to such simple decompositional analysis, and thus need to be understood in 
a systems engineering context. This chapter presents a primer on the basics of reliability 
analysis as it pertains to flow control systems. These reliability concepts will be built on 





5.1. Basic concept of Systems Reliability Computation 
Failure of an engineering system can be defined as the load L (external forces or demands) 
on the system exceeding the resistance R (strength or capacity) of the system. The 
reliability ps is defined as the probability of safe (or nonfailure) operation, in which the 
resistance of the structure exceeds or equals to the load, that is, 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑅𝑅 > 𝐸𝐸)                                                                  (5.1) 
in which P(·) denotes the probability. Conversely, failure probability pf can be computed 
as 
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸 > 𝑅𝑅) = 1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠                                           (5.2) 
The definitions of reliability and failure probability, Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2), are equally 
applicable to component reliability, as well as total system reliability. In hydro systems 
engineering analyses, the resistance and load frequently are functions of several stochastic 
basic variables, that is, L = g(XL) = g(X1, X2, . . . , Xm) and R = h(XR) = h(Xm+1, Xm+2, 
. . . , XK), where X1, X2, . . . , XK are stochastic basic variables defining the load function 
g(XL) and the resistance function h(XR). Accordingly, the failure probability and reliability 
are functions of stochastic basic variables, that is, 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃[𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿) ≤ ℎ(𝑋𝑋𝑅𝑅)]                                              (5.3) 
Evaluation of reliability or failure probability by Eqs. (5.1) through (5.3) does not consider 
the time-dependent nature of the load and resistance if statistical properties of the elements 




performance of the system subject to a single worst-load event is considered. From the 
reliability computation viewpoint, this is referred to as static reliability analysis. 
In general, a hydrosystem infrastructure is expected to serve its designated function over 
an expected period of time. Engineers frequently are interested in knowing the reliability 
of the structure over its intended service life. In such circumstances, elements of service 
period, randomness of load occurrences, and possible change in resistance characteristics 
over time must be considered. Reliability models incorporating these elements are called 
time-dependent reliability models (Karamouz et al., 2012). 
5.1.1. Relationship between Load and Resistance 
One of the popular ways of modeling the reliability of a component is the direct integration 
method. This method works very well within the probabilistic monte-carlo framework. The 
direct integration computation of reliability requires knowledge of the probability 
distributions of the load and resistance or of the component being modeled. In terms of the 
joint PDF of the load and resistance, can be expressed as 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠
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in which 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅,𝐿𝐿(𝑟𝑟, 𝑙𝑙) is the joint PDF of random load L and resistance R, r and l are dummy 
arguments for the resistance and load, respectively, and (r1, r2) and (l1, l2) are the lower and 
upper bounds for the resistance and load, respectively. The failure probability can be 
computed as 
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = � �� 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅,𝐿𝐿(𝑟𝑟, 𝑙𝑙)𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙
𝑟𝑟
𝑙𝑙1




                      = � �� 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅,𝐿𝐿(𝑟𝑟, 𝑙𝑙)𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙
𝑟𝑟2
𝑙𝑙




This computation of reliability is commonly referred to as load-resistance interference. 
The failure probability, when the load and resistance are independent, can be expressed as 
     𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓  =  1 −  𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 =  𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅[1 −  𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝑅𝑅)]  =   𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿[𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅(𝐸𝐸)]                     (5.8) 
A schematic diagram illustrating load-resistance interference in the reliability computation, 





Figure 5.1: Schematic diagram of load-resistance interference for computing failure 
probability: (a) marginal densities of load and resistance; (b) PDF of load and CDF of 
resistance; (c) compute f L(l) × FR(r) over valid range of load; the area underneath the 
curve is the failure probability; (d) PDF of the performance function; the area left of w = 




5.1.2. Time-Dependent Reliability Models 
In preceding section, emphasis was placed on static reliability analysis, which does not 
consider the time dependency of the load and resistance. This section considers the time-
dependent random variables in reliability analysis. As a result, the reliability is a function 
of time, i.e., time dependent or time variant. The objective of time-dependent reliability 
models is to determine the system reliability over a specified time interval in which the 
number of occurrences of loads is a random variable. 
When both loading and resistance are functions of time, the performance function 𝑇𝑇(𝑅𝑅)  =
 𝑅𝑅(𝑅𝑅)  −  𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅) is time-dependent. Consequently, the reliability 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑅𝑅)  =  𝑃𝑃[𝑇𝑇(𝑅𝑅)  >  0] 
would vary with respect to time. Figure 5.1 shows schematically the key feature of the 
time-dependent reliability problem in which the PDFs of load and resistance change with 
time. In Figure 5.2, the mean of resistance has a downward trend with time, whereas that 
of the load increases with time. As the standard deviations of both resistance and load 
increase with time, the area of interference increases, and this results in an increase in the 
failure probability with time. The static reliability analysis described in preceding sections 





Figure 5.2: Time Dependent Load and resistance probability distribution functions 
For a hydraulic structure placed in a natural environment over a period of time, its 
operational characteristics could change over time owing to deterioration, aging, fatigue, 
and lack of maintenance. Consequently, the structural capacity (or resistance) would vary 
with respect to time.  Modeling time-dependent features of the resistance of a hydrosystem 
requires descriptions of the time-varying nature of statistical properties of the resistance.  
5.1.3. Time-dependent load 
In time-dependent reliability analysis, one is concerned with system reliability over a 
specified time period during which external loads can occur more than once. Therefore, 
not only the intensity or magnitude of load is important but also the number or frequency 




Over an anticipated service period, the characteristics of load to be imposed on the system 
could change. More specifically, the magnitude of floods could increase as urbanization 
progresses upstream, or downstream dams in a cascade could be subjected to handling 
larger than normal volumes of water due to operational necessities in the upstream 
reservoirs. Characterization of the time-varying nature of load intensity requires extensive 
monitoring, data collection, and engineering analysis. 
5.1.4. Modeling intensity and occurrence of loads 
A hydraulic structure placed in a natural environment over an expected service period is 
subject to repeated application of loads of varying intensities. The magnitude of load 
intensity and the number of occurrences of load are, in general, random by nature. 
Therefore, probabilistic models that properly describe the stochastic mechanisms of load 
intensity and load occurrence are essential for accurate evaluation of the time-dependent 
reliability of dam systems. 
Probability models for load intensity: In the great majority of situations in dam system 
reliability analysis, the magnitudes of load to be imposed on the system are continuous 
random variables. Therefore, univariate probability distributions may be used to model the 
intensity of a single random load. In a case in which more than one type of load is 
considered in the analysis, multivariate distributions may be used.  
The selection of an appropriate probability model for load intensity depends on the 
availability of information. In a case for which sample data about the load intensity are 




distribution. On the other hand, when data on load intensity are not available, selection of 
the probability distribution for modeling load intensity has to rely on the analyst’s logical 
judgment on the basis of the physical processes that produce the load. 
Probability models for load occurrence: In time-dependent reliability analysis, the time 
domain is customarily divided into a number of intervals such as days, months, or years, 
and the random nature of the load occurrence in each time interval should be considered 
explicitly. The occurrences of load are discrete by nature, which can be treated as a point 
random process. Two popular types of discrete distributions for such characterizations are 
the binomial and Poisson distributions(Melchers, 1999). This section briefly summarizes 
two distributions in the context of modeling the load-occurrences. Other load occurrence 
models can be found elsewhere. 
Bernoulli process. A Bernoulli process is characterized by three features: (1) binary 
outcomes in each trial, (2) constant probability of occurrence of outcome in each time 
interval, and (3) the outcomes are independent between trials. In the context of load-
occurrence modeling, each time interval represents a trial in which the outcome is either 
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the load (with a constant probability) causing failure 
or non-failure of the system. Hence the number of occurrences of load follows a binomial 
distribution, Equation (5.9), with parameters p (the probability of occurrence of load in 
each time interval) and n (the number of time intervals). It is interesting to note that the 
number of intervals until the first occurrence T (the waiting time) in a Bernoulli process 
follows a geometric distribution with the PMF 




The expected value of waiting time T is 1/p, which is the mean occurrence period. It should 
be noted that the parameter p depends on the time interval used. 
Poisson process. In the Bernoulli process, as the time interval shrinks to zero and the 
number of time intervals increases to infinity, the occurrence of events reduces to a Poisson 
process. The conditions under which a Poisson process applies are (1) the rate occurrence 
of an event in time is constant (stationarity) (2) the occurrences of events are independent, 
and (3) only one event occurs at a given time instant. The PMF describing the number of 




              𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝐷𝐷 = 0,1, … … ..                             (5.10) 
in which λ is the average time rate of occurrence of the event of interest. The inter-arrival 
time between two successive occurrences is described by an exponential distribution with 
the PDF 
𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑅|𝜆𝜆) =  𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷−λ𝑡𝑡                                                                         (5.11) 
5.2. Fragility Analytics 
In safety or risk assessment of dams, limit states or probability of failure serve as yardsticks 
of system performance.  The fragility curve gives the conditional probability that a certain 
limit-state be exceeded (i.e., probability of failure) given a certain load (or demand). They 
can be derived from analysis, expert opinion, or case history data, or often a combination 




Fragility analysis deals with the balance of demands (loads) on a system and the capacity 
of the system (resistance) to withstand those demands. This relationship is used to generate 
a fragility curve for a particular component. The fragility curve relates the demand function 
on the component to the probability of adverse performance (Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3: Reliability analysis of the individual component based on upstream demand 
function. 
In dam safety risk analysis, the fragility curve is typically used to predict the probability of 
a dam component failure, given a hydraulic hazard (Ebeling et al., 2012).  It is an alternative 
way of characterizing the relationship between load and resistance other than explicitly 
using probability distributions to define the inherent load and the systems performance 
(resistance). The fragility curve is defined by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
of the system response curve. 
For example, if a dam in which the overtopping limit state, i.e., FSovertopped≤ 1.0, is the limit 
state resulting in failure of the dam.  




P𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 ≤ 1.0 ∥ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 =𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙)𝑃𝑃(𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 = 𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙)        (5.12) 
In which Pool is a vector of random variables describing the intensity of demand (e.g. pool 
elevation, etc.) and other factors; P(Pool = 𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙) is the hazard, considering channel 
inflows and storm runoff from the watershed behind the dam, and is expressed in terms of 
annual probability; and P(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑≤ 1.0 | Pool = 𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 ) is the conditional probability 
of structural failure, given that Pool = 𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, Expressing the limit state probability as in 
Equation 5.12 allows the overall risk to be deconstructed into its significant contributors 
(Chase, Sr, 2012).  Figure 5.4 shows the fragility characterization of mechanical gate 
components where the inherent load is the height of gate opening. The higher the gate 
opening, the more overstressed the mechanical components of the gates become and 
consequently, the higher the chance of the mechanical component failing. 
 
Figure 5.4: Mechanical Equipment failure fragility curves 
The fragility equation in this instance can be written as 
P𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 = � 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 ≤ 1.0 ∥ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 =
𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝






Figure 5.5: Earthquake Load on Gates 
5.3. Reliability Parameter Characterization of Repairable Systems  
For repairable components of dam systems, such as spillway gate mechanical hoists, 
electrical generators, and turbines, failed components within the system can be repaired or 
replaced so service can be restored. The time required to have the failed system repaired is 
uncertain, and consequently, the total time required to restore the system from its failure 
state to an operational state is a random variable. 
5.3.1. Relationship between mean time to failure (MTTF), mean time between failures 
(MTBF), and mean time to repair (MTTR) 
The mean time to failure of a system is a commonly used reliability performance measure 





𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹) = � 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑅𝑅)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
∞
0
                                                         (5.14) 
By Equation (5.14), the MTTF geometrically is the area underneath the reliability function. 
The MTTFs can be determined from mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time 
to repair (MTTR) (See Equation 5.15). 
The mean time to repair (MTTR) is the expected value of the time to repair of a failed 
system. It measures the elapsed time required to perform the maintenance operation and is 
used to estimate the downtime of a system. It is also a commonly used measure for the 
maintainability of a system. 
The MTTF is a proper measure of the mean life span of a non-repairable system. However, 
for a repairable system, a more representative indicator for the fail-repair cycle is the mean 
time between failures (MTBF) (Tung et al., 2005), which is the sum of MTTF and MTTR, 
that is, 
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 =  𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 +  𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅                                                              (5.15) 
The mean time between Failure (MTBF) is the expected value of the time between two 
consecutive repairs, and it is equal to MTBF.  
5.4. Systems concepts Applied to the Reliability of Flow control Systems 
Most systems involve many subsystems and components whose performances affect the 
performance of the system as a whole. The reliability of the entire system is affected not 




interactions and configurations of the subsystems and components. Many engineering 
systems involve multiple failure paths or modes; that is, there are several potential paths 
and modes of failure in which the occurrence, either individually or in combination, would 
constitute system failure. As discussed in Sec. 4.1.1, engineering system failure can be 
structural failure such that the system can no longer function, or it can be performance 
failure, for which the objective is not achieved but the functioning of the system is not 
damaged.  
 
5.5. General View of System Reliability Computation 
As mentioned previously, the reliability of a system depends on the component reliabilities 
and interactions and configurations of components. Consequently, computation of system 
reliability requires knowing what constitutes the system being in a failed or satisfactory 
state. Such knowledge is essential for system classification and dictates the methodology 
to be used for system reliability determination. 
5.5.1. Classification of systems 
From the reliability computation viewpoint, classification of the system depends primarily 
on how system performance is affected by its components or modes of operation. A 
multiple-component system called a series system (see Figure 5.6) requires that all its 
components perform satisfactorily to allow satisfactory performance of the entire system. 




viewed as a series system if satisfactory performance of the system requires satisfactory 
performance of all its different modes of operation. 
A second basic type of system is called a parallel system (see Figure 5.7). A parallel system 
is characterized by the property that the system would serve its intended purpose 
satisfactorily as long as at least one of its components or modes of operation performs 
satisfactorily. 
For most real-life problems, system configurations are complex, in which the components 
are arranged as a mixture of series and parallel subsystems or in the form of a loop. In 
dealing with the reliability analysis of a complex system, the general approach is to reduce 
the system configuration, based on the arrangement of its components or modes of 
operation, to a simpler situation for which the reliability analysis can be performed easily. 
However, this goal may not always be achievable, in which case a special procedure would 
have to be devised. 
5.6. Reliability of Simple Systems 
In this section the reliability of some simple systems will be discussed. In the framework 
of time-to-failure analysis, availability of such systems will be presented. Information such 
as this is essential to serve as the building blocks for determination of reliability or 




5.6.1. Basic probability rules for system reliability 
The solution approaches to system reliability problems can be classified broadly into 
failure-modes approach and survival-modes approach (Bennett and Ang, 1983). The 
failure-modes approach is based on identification of all possible failure modes for the 
system, whereas the survival-modes approach is based on the all possible modes of 
operation under which the system will be operational. 
The two approaches are complementary. Depending on the operational characteristics and 
configuration of the system, a proper choice of one of the two approaches often can lead to 
significant reduction in efforts needed for the reliability computation. Consider that a 
system has M components or modes of operation. Let event Fm indicate that the mth 
component or mode of operation is in the failure state. If the system is a series system, the 
failure probability of the system is the probability that at least one of the M components or 
modes of operation fails, namely, 
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  =  𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹1  ∪  𝐹𝐹2  ∪ ··· ∪  𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀) =  𝑃𝑃 �� 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
�                             (5.1) 
in which pf ,sys is the failure probability of the system. On the other hand, the system 
reliability ps,sys is the probability that all its components or modes of operation perform 
satisfactorily, that is, 
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  =  𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹1  ∩  𝐹𝐹2  ∩ ··· ∩  𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀) = �𝑃𝑃� 𝐹𝐹′𝑚𝑚 
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1




in which 𝐹𝐹′𝑚𝑚 is the complementary event of 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 indicating that the mth component or mode 
of operation does not fail. 
5.6.2. Series systems 
A series system requires that all its components or modes of operation perform on demand 
to ensure a satisfactory operation of the entire system. In the context of load-resistance 
interference, the reliability associated with a mode of operation assuming non-repairable 
components can be computed as: 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃[𝐸𝐸1 × 𝐸𝐸2, . . . ,𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 , . . . ,𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚]                                               (5.3) 
Where 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 is the event that component Ci is operating at time t. If all the events are 




                                                             (5.4) 
Or in other words, the reliability of the system R is calculated as a product of the reliabilities 









Figure 5.6 Reliability block diagram with n components in series 
  
5.6.3. Parallel systems 
For a parallel system, the entire system would perform satisfactorily if any one or more of 
its components or modes of operation is functioning satisfactorily; the entire system would 
fail only if all its components or modes of operation fail. Figure 5.7 shows a reliability 
block diagram of a system containing n parallel components. 
 
Figure 5.7: Reliability block diagram with n parallel components 
If E is the event that component Ci is operating at time t, then the reliability of the system 
may be written as: 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃[𝐸𝐸1 + 𝐸𝐸2+, . . . , +𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚+, . . . , +𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚]                                         (5.6) 
If 𝐸𝐸𝚤𝚤�  is the complement of the event 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 and represents the event that component I has failed 




𝑅𝑅 = 1 −�𝑃𝑃[𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚]
𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚=1
                                                            (5.7) 
Or in other words, the reliability of the system is calculated from the reliabilities of its 
components: 




Figure 5.8 shows that the system reliability increases fast with increased number of parallel 
components. The redundant components largely increase the reliability of the system. 
Figure 5.9 shows that the system reliability increases fast with increased reliability of its 
components. 
 





Figure 5.9: System reliability versus number of parallel components 
5.6.1. Availability 
If one considers both reliability and maintainability (the probability that the item is 
successfully restored after failure), then an additional metric is needed for the probability 
that the component/system is operational at a given time, (i.e., has not failed or it has been 
restored after failure) (Subburaj, 2015). This metric is availability. Availability is a 
performance criterion for repairable systems that accounts for both the reliability and 
maintainability properties of a component or system. It is defined as the probability that 
the system is operating properly when it is requested for use. That is, availability is the 
probability that a system is not failed or undergoing a repair action when it needs to be 
used.  
5.6.1.1 Availability Classifications 
The definition of availability is somewhat flexible and is largely based on what types of 
downtimes one chooses to consider in the analysis. As a result, there are a number of 




Instantaneous or Point Availability 
This is the probability that the system is operating at time t. The point availability is very 
similar to the reliability function in that it gives a probability that a system will function at 
the given time, t. Unlike reliability, however, the instantaneous availability measure 
incorporates maintainability information. At a given time, t, the system will be operational 
if one of the following conditions is met: 
• The system functioned properly from 0 to t, i.e., it never failed by time t. The 
probability of this happening is R(t).  
              Or, 
• The system functioned properly since the last repair at time u, 0 < u < t. The 
probability of this condition is: 
Average Uptime Availability (or Mean Availability) 
The mean availability is the proportion of time during a mission or time period that the 
system is available for use. It represents the mean value of the instantaneous availability 
function over the period (0, T]. 
Operational Availability: 
Operational availability, which is symbolized by Ao, represents the probability that the an 
item—System or Entity—will operate in accordance with its specified performance 
requirements and prescribed Operating Environment conditions when tasked to perform its 
mission (Wasson, 2015). Operational availability is a measure of the average availability 




administrative downtime, logistic downtime, etc. Mathematically, a System or Entity’s 









• MDT = Mean Downtime   
• MTBM = Mean Time between Maintenance (repairable items)   
Inherent Availability 
Inherent availability is the steady state availability when considering only the corrective 
downtime of the system. According to the FAA (2008), it is the maximum availability 
theoretically within the capabilities of the system or constituent piece 





5.7. Methods for Computing Reliability of Complex Systems 
Evaluation of the reliability of simple systems, as described in the preceding section, is 
generally straightforward. However, many practical hydrosystems engineering 
infrastructures, such as water distribution systems, have neither series nor parallel 
configuration. Evaluation of the reliability for such complex systems generally is difficult. 




possible to combine components into groups in such a manner that it appears as in series 
or in parallel. For other systems, special techniques have to be developed that require a 
certain degree of insight and ingenuity from engineers. A great deal of work has been done 
on developing techniques for evaluating the reliability of complex systems. This section 
describes some of the potentially useful techniques for hydro systems reliability evaluation. 
 
5.7.1. Fault Tree Analysis  
A fault tree is a graphical logic diagram representing main system faults that shows the 
malfunctions and other events inside a system. It tracks the consequence of the component 
failures (basic or primary failures) on the system failure (top failure or top event). 
Basically, the main purpose of fault tree analysis is to evaluate the probability of top event 
failure while gaining insight on the interaction of malfunctions and other events inside a 
system that led to the failure. A simple fault tree is given in Figure 5.10 as an example. 
Two major types of combination nodes (or gates) are used in a fault tree. The AND node 
implies that the output event occurs only if all the input events occur simultaneously, 
corresponding to the intersection operation in probability theory. The OR node indicates 





Figure 5.10: Simple fault tree for failure of existing dam (After Cheng, 1982) 
5.7.2.  Dynamic Monte-Carlo based Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree and event tree analysis are static and Boolean logic based (Verma et al., 
2015a).Incorporating dynamic (time-dependent) interactions into these models is essential 
to accurate system characterization within the monte-carlo framework. Stochastic 
variabilities need to be considered. For example, if actual tests on the components were not 
performed, the parameters describing their failure modes would be uncertain, and 
probability distributions can be used in order to capture this uncertainty. The 
subcomponents such as the electric motor in Figure 5.11 shows the basic events in the 
traditional fault tree nomenclature. 
The behavior of components of complex systems and their interactions such as sequence- 
and functional-dependent failures, spares and dynamic redundancy management, and 
priority of failure events cannot be adequately captured by traditional FTs. The inherent 
variability of failures and repairs times of equipment imposes the use of probabilistic 




this inherent variability, there may also be uncertainty about some of the failure parameters 
such as Repair time and down time. Dynamic Fault trees within the monte-carlo framework 
make it possible to quantify such epistemic uncertainty which could be modeled as 
probability distributions. Dynamic simulation then allows the analyst to develop a 
representation of the system whose reliability is to be determined, and then observe that 
system’s performance over a specified period of time. It also provides the ability to model 
the interdependencies of components, as well as the capability to define multiple 
independent failure modes for each component. 
 
Figure 5.11: Spillway gates fault tree analysis 
The Dynamic fault trees also enable the use of real world systems reliability metrics such 
as availability and Reliability. Availability is more commonly used to represent a 
maintainable system which is a function of reliability and maintainability. The nature of 




unavailability/availability of components of interest based on failure rates, repair rates and 
demand failure probabilities (stand by failure rate) time to failure and time to repair over a 
period of time.  
The primary advantages of dynamic fault tree based probabilistic simulation are: 
• The system can evolve into any feasible state and its properties can change suddenly 
or gradually as the simulation progresses. 
• The system can be affected by random processes, within the system itself (internal 
failure) or from external an external event that may influence the system (external 
failure). 
• If some system properties are uncertain, the significance of those uncertainties can 
be determined. 
• The ability to incorporate repair logic means automatic repairs can be specified for 
each individual component failure mode using repair time distributions. Multiple 
failure modes can also be repaired using a Preventive Maintenance event, or the 
entire component can be replaced during a maintenance event. 
• Each component can either act as a simple element, with its failure distribution 
specified by failure modes, or as a more complex system which contains models of 
subcomponents. This makes it possible to construct an initial model by using simple 
reliability elements with failure modes, and in subsequent versions of the model 
these are enhanced with subsystem models until an appropriate overall degree of 
modeling realism is achieved. 
• Ability to track all the unique System and subcomponent states during the 
simulation (i.e., whether the component is operating, if a particular failure mode 




fault tree shows the component cannot operate). These unique states also record the 
states of any reliability elements referenced as part fault-tree. 












CHAPTER 6: MAINTENANCE OPTIMIZATION APPROACHES IN 
HYDROPOWER SYSTEMS 
The performance of an engineered system depends not only on its design and operation, 
but also on its maintenance during its operational lifetime. Duffuaa and Raouf (2015), 
defined maintenance as the combination of activities by which equipment or a system is 
kept or restored to a state in which it can perform its designated function. The idea of an 
“optimized” maintenance program suggests that an adequate mix of maintenance actions 
and policies needs to be selected and fine-tuned in order to improve Equipment/System 
uptime, extend the total life cycle of physical assets and assure safe working conditions, 
while bearing in mind limiting maintenance budgets and environmental legislation.  
One of the major maintenance concerns is the complex decision making problem when the 
availability aspect as well as the economic issue of maintenance activities is considered . 
The goal here is to improve the availability of equipment/systems in order to ensure given 
production throughputs and meet service level agreements at the lowest cost. This decision 
making problem concerns the allocation of the right budget to the appropriate equipment 
or component. The objective is to minimize the total expenditure and to maximize the 
effective availability of production resources. Different maintenance policies can be 
applied. These actions can be derived from different approaches leading to different 
categories of maintenance strategies: failure based maintenance, use based maintenance, 
detection based maintenance, condition based maintenance and design-out maintenance 
(Ben-Daya et al., 2009).  
Engineered systems have different maintenance requirements, different levels of 




differences shows clearly that maintenance is multifaceted and there are several aspects 
involved including technical, commercial, social, and management viewpoints (Ben-Daya 
et al., 2016). This implies that effective maintenance decisions need to be made in a 
framework that takes into account these issues from an overall business perspective. In 
particular, a comprehensive maintenance system is needed, combining science, 
engineering, technology, and management. 
In this section, the incorporation of maintenance modeling and optimization of repairable 
systems into the systems framework is explored.  
6.1. Maintenance Policies 
Maintenance actions can be divided into two broad categories: (i) preventive maintenance 
(PM) and (ii) corrective maintenance (CM). PM can be divided into predetermined PM 
tasks based on a clock or usage and Condition Based Maintenance (based on equipment 
condition). CM actions are maintenance activities that are carried out after a failure has 
occurred. CM must be initiated immediately to restore critical systems to their functional 
state or can be deferred to a more convenient timing if the failure is not critical and does 
not need immediate action. Maintenance improvement is possible by using maintenance 
data and feedback information to design out maintenance (removing the need for 
maintenance) or design for maintenance (ease of maintenance). 
Preventive Maintenance (PM) is a key element of the performance of Maintainable 
Systems and plays a very vital role throughout the systems planned life-cycle. Preventive 




systems to a satisfactory level. Therefore, the objective is to attain an optimal balance 
between the Maintenance policies and Resource requirements (available budget, Spares 
etc.). Bridging the gap between theory and practice in this area requires realistic modelling 
of the effect of PM activities on the failure characteristics of maintainable systems.  
The maintenance policy defines which type of maintenance will (normally) be performed 
on the various components of the system. It is determined by maintenance engineers, 
system producers and users to achieve high safety, reliability and availability at minimum 
cost. With respect to the relation of the instant of occurrence of failure and the instant of 
performing the maintenance task the following maintenance policies exist: 
 
Figure 6.1: Systematics of maintenance strategies (Oelker et al., 2016) 
The maintenance load denotes the volume of maintenance work anticipated over time into 




Planned maintenance: This includes all PM (preventive maintenance) work that has been 
planned and scheduled in advance. 
Unplanned maintenance: This includes all CM (corrective maintenance) work due to 
unforeseen breakdowns and failures. 
 
1. Failure-Based maintenance policy (Corrective Maintenance), where corrective 
maintenance tasks are initiated by the occurrence of failure, i.e., loss of function or 
performance (Kumar et al., 2012) . Failure-Based maintenance policy, FBM, represents an 
approach where corrective maintenance tasks are carried out after a failure has occurred, 
in order to restore the functionality of the item/system considered. Consequently, this 
approach to maintenance is known as breakdown, post failure, firefighting, reactive, or 
unscheduled maintenance. According to this policy, maintenance tasks often take place in 
ad hoc manner in response to breakdown of an item following a report from the system 
user. 
Disadvantages of failure-based maintenance 
In spite of the advantages of implementing failure based maintenance policy, it has some 
disadvantages when not utilized in the right scenario (Kumar et al., 2012).  
• The failure of an item will generally occur at an inconvenient time. 
• Maintenance activities cannot be planned leading to prolonged down time of failed 
component. 




• The failure of an item can cause a large amount of consequential damage to other 
items in the system. 
 
2. Time-Based maintenance policy, TBM, where preventive maintenance tasks are 
performed at predetermined times during operation, at fixed length of operational life. 
TBM, maintenance decisions (e.g., preventive repair times/intervals) are determined 
based on failure time analyses. In other words, the aging (expected lifetime), T, of some 
equipment is estimated based on failure time data or used-based data (Kobbacy and 
Murthy, 2008).  
In TBM, maintenance decisions are determined based on failure time analyses. In other 
words, the aging (expected lifetime), T, of some equipment is estimated based on 
failure time data (life data analysis) or used-based data (Lee et al., 2006). TBM assumes 
that the failure behavior (characteristic) of the equipment is predictable.  
 The first process of TBM starts with failure data analysis/modelling. The basic purpose of 
this process is to statistically investigate the failure characteristics of the equipment based 
on the set of failure time data gathered. Analysis of maintenance costs have shown that a 
repair made after failure will normally be three to four times more expensive than the same 
maintenance activity when it is well planned (Mobley, 2002). One of the main advantages 
of this maintenance policy is the fact that preventive maintenance tasks are performed at a 
predetermined instant of time when all maintenance support resources could be planned 
and provided in advance, and potential costly outages avoided. For failures, which could 




feasible option. Time-based maintenance has many advantages over failure-based 
maintenance, which are summarized in the following list: 
I. Maintenance can be planned ahead and performed when it is convenient from 
the operational and logistics point of view. 
II. The cost of lost production and of consequential damage can be reduced. 
III. Downtime, the time that the system is out of service, can be minimized. 
IV. Safety can be improved. 
3. Condition-Based maintenance policy, CBM, where conditional maintenance tasks in 
the form of inspections are performed at fixed intervals of operation, until the 
performance of a preventive maintenance task is required or until a failure occurs 
requiring corrective maintenance. The principal difference between the above 
maintenance policies occurs at the time when the maintenance task is performed. 
6.2. Maintenance of Repairable Systems 
A commonly used definition of a repairable system (Ascher and Feingold, 1984) states that 
this is a system which, after failing to perform one or more of its functions satisfactorily, 
can be restored to fully satisfactory performance by any method other than replacement of 
the entire system. In order to cover more realistic applications, and to cover much recent 
literature on the subject, we need to extend this definition to include the possibility of 
additional maintenance actions which aim at servicing the system for better performance. 
This is referred to as preventive maintenance (PM), where one may further distinguish 




the system exhibits inferior performance while the latter is performed at predetermined 
points in time. 
Traditionally, the literature on repairable systems is concerned with modelling of the failure 
times only, using point process theory. A classical reference here is Ascher and Feingold 
(1984). The most commonly used models for the failure process of a repairable system are 
renewal processes (RP), including the homogeneous Poisson processes (HPP), and 
nonhomogeneous Poisson processes (NHPP). While such models often are sufficient for 
simple reliability studies, the need for more complex models is clear. In this chapter we 
consider some generalizations and extensions of the basic models, with the aim to arrive at 
more realistic models which can be applied to maintenance optimization policies in 
hydrosystems maintenance optimization.  
6.2.1. Preventive Maintenance 
Preventive maintenance (PM) is a schedule of planned maintenance actions aimed at the 
prevention of breakdowns and failures . The primary goal of preventive maintenance is to 
prevent the failure of equipment before it actually occurs. It is designed to preserve and 
enhance equipment reliability by replacing worn components before they actually fail. 
Preventive maintenance activities include equipment checks, partial or complete overhauls 
at specified periods, oil changes, lubrication and so on. In addition, workers can record 
equipment deterioration so they know to replace or repair worn parts before they cause 
system failure. Recent technological advances in tools for inspection and diagnosis have 
enabled even more accurate and effective equipment maintenance. The ideal preventive 




6.2.2. When Does Preventive Maintenance Make Sense? 
Preventive maintenance is a logical choice if, and only if, the following two conditions are 
met: 
• Condition #1: The component in question has an increasing failure rate. In other words, 
the failure rate of the component increases with time, implying wear-out. Preventive 
maintenance of a component that is assumed to have an exponential distribution (which 
implies a constant failure rate) does not make sense! 
• Condition #2: The overall cost of the preventive maintenance action must be less than the 
overall cost of a corrective action. 
If both of these conditions are met, then preventive maintenance makes sense. Additionally, 
based on the costs ratios, an optimum time for such action can be easily computed for a 
single component. This is detailed in later sections. 
 
6.3. Reliability Centered Maintenance 
Reliability centered maintenance (RCM) is a method for maintenance planning that was 
developed within the aircraft industry and later adapted to several other industries and 
military branches (Kobbacy and Murthy, 2008). A high number of standards and guidelines 
have been issued where the RCM methodology is tailored to different application areas. A 
major advantage of the RCM analysis process is a structured, and traceable approach to 




detailed analysis of failure modes and failure causes. Although the main objective of RCM 
is to determine the preventive maintenance, the results from the analysis may also be used 
in relation to corrective maintenance strategies, spare part optimization, and logistic 
consideration. In addition, RCM also has an important role in overall system safety 
management. 
Reliability data may be derived from the operational data by statistical analysis. The 
reliability data is used to decide the criticality, to describe the failure process 
mathematically and to optimize the time between PM tasks. 
 






6.4. Systems Framework for Study of Maintenance (Strategic Holistic Systems Approach) 
The study of maintenance in hydrosystems engineering requires a comprehensive 
framework that incorporates all the key elements. However, not all the elements would be 
relevant for a particular maintenance problem under consideration. The systems framework 
offers an effective means of solving maintenance problems while factoring in the impact 
from the natural system that the component under consideration is embedded in, 
organizational influences and other salient contributors to its performance. In this 
approach, the real world relevant to the problem is described through a characterization 
where one identifies the relevant variables and the interaction between the variables. This 
characterization can be done using language or a schematic network representation where 
the nodes represent the variables and the connected arcs denote the relationships. This is 
good for qualitative analysis. For quantitative analysis, one needs to build mathematical 
models to describe the relationships. Often this requires stochastic and dynamical 
formulations as system degradation and failures occur in an uncertain manner. In this 
section, we discuss the various key elements and some related issues. 
Maintenance can be considered as a system with a set of processes and activities carried 
out in parallel with production or service systems.  The primary outputs of the operation 
systems are services (power production, flood control), and the secondary output is 
degraded or failed equipment. This secondary output generates demand for maintenance. 
The maintenance system takes this as an input and adds to it know-how, manpower, and 




capacity for production or service. The overall primary goal of hydrosystems is to provide 
flood control and maximize economic value.  Maintenance systems assist in achieving 
these goals, by increasing the operational availability of flow control systems and 
maximize profit from the available market opportunities. These are achieved by 
minimizing the plant downtime, improving the quality, increasing the productivity and by 
reliable timely intervention of disturbances in order to safeguard the safety of downstream 
population. 
 
Figure 6.3: Elements of Effective Maintenance. (Adapted from Ben Daya et. Al, 2016) 
A well‐structured PM program is characterized by a sound methodology such as reliability 
centered maintenance (RCM) and based on a good understanding of the function and 




combination of various time‐based, condition‐based, and opportunistic maintenance 
policies (Ben-Daya et al., 2016).  
Once the reliability models are estimated a discrete/continuous event simulation model 
reproducing the dynamic of the system as well as its stochastic behavior can be run in order 
to validate different maintenance policies and optimize their parameters. The idea is to 
evaluate the performances of the appropriate strategy before its implementation.  
Once the reliability of the system is captured, an integrated systems framework will allow 
maintenance decision makers to design their production system, to model its functioning 
and to optimize the appropriate maintenance strategies. Thus the use of a systems approach 
to the study of dam systems allows us to consider all the technological, engineering and 
management aspects of maintenance capacity planning (Figure 6.3).  
It should be noted that if we want to consider the wider scope of operational risks in dam 
systems, it is necessary to evaluate not only the interaction of the individual subsystems of 
the flow control components, but also its interaction with external systems, 
n\communication systems, etc. Thus, it becomes apparent that operational Risks in dam 
systems can be considered only with a systems approach. Moreover, regardless of the level 
at which one or the other system is considered, an acceptable solution can be found with 
the use of a systems approach. 
6.4.1. Forecasting Maintenance Work 
In this section, quantitative forecasting techniques for maintenance optimization aspects of 




the historical data and are usually based on life data of the components under consideration. 
These models either assume future values follow historical trends or that a predictor 
(independent) variable exists that can provide a model or a functional relationship that 
predicts the failure and repair characteristics of the components under study. For example, 
the age of the equipment can predict the number of maintenance hours required on the 
equipment.  
Forecasting techniques can be classified into two approaches: qualitative and quantitative. 
Qualitative forecasting is based on the expert or engineering experience and judgment. 
Such techniques include historical analogy, surveys, and the Delphi method. Quantitative 
techniques are based on mathematical models that are derived from the historical data 
estimates for future trends. These models are either time series-based data such as moving 
averages and exponential smoothing or structural such as regression models (Johnson and 
Montgomery, 2009). 
Maintenance systems have several characteristics that make capacity planning a rather 
complex problem. These characteristics are as follows: 
• Maintenance as a function interacts with other technical and engineering functions 
in a complex fashion. 
• The maintenance factors are highly dependent on each other. 
• Maintenance as a function has many uncertain elements. These elements include 
demand for maintenance, time of arrival of job requests, content, time to complete 




• The complexity of the maintenance capacity planning suggests that simulation is 
one of the most desirable approaches for modeling it (Duffuaa and Raouf, 2015). 
Stochastic simulation is the process of representing a system on the computer and 
then employing well-designed experiments (scenarios), to evaluate the system 
performance. Using this process, systems can be analyzed, planned, and designed. 
 
6.4.1.1 Stochastic Simulation 
Law and Kelton (2007) provide ten major steps for conducting a typical simulation study. 
In this section, these ten steps are summarized in eight steps and the relationships among 
them are outlined: 
1. Purpose of simulation: The first step toward a successful simulation study is to state 
precisely the purpose of the study. Simulation has been used in maintenance systems 
for the following purposes: to determine the optimal crew size and staffing, to evaluate 
the effect of maintenance policies on production systems, to design and plan 
maintenance operations, and to determine the shutdown time periods. 
2. Simulation models: The conceptual model used in building the computer simulation 
study will affect the simulation accuracy and efficiency. The simulation model should 
contain only the necessary information that captures the essence of the system under 
study. 
3. Model assumptions: The assumptions of a simulation model will affect the realism of 
the simulation results. They also may affect the way results are interpreted. Therefore, 
each assumption should be reviewed carefully before putting it into effect. Availability 
of manpower, equipment, job standards, and spare parts are some of the assumptions 




4. Data Accuracy: Accurate data and their distributions are very essential for a reliable 
simulation model. To simulate a maintenance system, the distribution of equipment 
failures and repair times must be identified using sound statistical methodology. 
5. Simulation languages and computers: One of the major jobs in building a simulation 
model is to convert the conceptual model into an actual computer simulation program.  
6. Program verification and model validation: Verification is testing and checking the 
computer code to show that it performs as intended. Validation is to ensure that the 
model’s assumptions are realistic and correct, and the simulation model fairly 
represents the behavior of the modeled system. Even though this step is fairly tedious 
and time-consuming, it is the most important step in simulation studies. 
7. Output analysis: In any simulation study, it pays very well to spend time on output 
analysis. To check for the true estimate, test, validate, and decide on the output results 
from your simulation, statistical techniques that ensure reliable estimates for system 
performance must be used. These include deciding on the length of the simulation run, 
the number of runs, and confidence intervals for estimated measures of performance. 
6.5. Key Issues and the Need for Multi-disciplinary Approach 
The key issues in the maintenance of an asset are shown in Figure 1.3. The asset acquisition 
is influenced by business considerations and its inherent reliability is determined by the 
decisions made during design. The field reliability and degradation is affected by 
operations (usage intensity, operating environment, operating\ load etc.). Through use of 
technologies, one can assess the state of the asset. The analysis of the data and models 
allow for optimizing the maintenance decisions (either for a given operating condition or 
jointly optimizing the maintenance and operations). Once the maintenance actions have 





6.6. Modeling the impact of Maintenance Actions 
An operating system (machine) is observed to undergo failures. On failure, one of three 
actions was taken: failures were minimally repaired, given a minor repair or given a major 
repair. Furthermore, periodically the machine was stopped for either minor maintenance 
action or major maintenance action. In addition to the kind of maintenance action, the 
length of duration for each repair action is known. Either on failure or maintenance 
stoppage, both types of repairs are assumed to impact the intensity following a virtual age 
process of the general form proposed by Kijima. There are several possibilities for 
assumptions of the impact of repair: it can be assumed that a minor or major repair impact 
the virtual age of the item to an unknown fixed part. It is also possible to assume that the 
impact of repair depends on the repair time. The issue in this research is to identify not 
only the virtual aging process associated with repairs but also the form of the failure 
intensity associated with the system. A series of models appropriate for such an 
operating/maintenance environment are developed and estimated in order to identify the 
most appropriate statistical structure. Field data from an industrial setting are used to fit 
the models. 
6.6.1. Generalized Renewal Process 
According to Rigdon & Basu (2000), a system is called repairable if, when a failure occurs, 
it can be restored to an operating condition by some repair process other than replacement 
of the entire system.  For situations where downtime associated with maintenance, repair 
or replacement actions is negligible, compared with the mean-time-between failures 




(Martorell et al., 2014). The commonly adopted point processes in PSA are as follows: (i) 
homogeneous Poisson process (HPP), (ii) ordinary renewal processes (ORP) and (iii) non-
homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). However, these approaches do not represent the 
real life-cycle of a repairable system (Modarres, 2006). Rather, they have some 
assumptions that conflict with reality. In HPP and ORP, the device, after a repair, returns 
to an as-good-as-new condition, and in a NHPP the device, after a repair, returns to an as-
bad-as-old condition. Kijima & Sumita (1986) introduced the concept of generalized 
renewal process (GRP) to generalize the three point processes previously mentioned. With 
this approach, reliability is modeled considering the effect of a non-perfect maintenance 
process, which uses a better-than-old-but-worse-than-new repair assumption. Basically, 
GRP addresses the repair assumption by introducing the concept of virtual age, which 
defines a parameter q that represents the effectiveness of repair. 
As mentioned, the probabilistic modeling to be considered in this work to approach repair 
action, especially imperfect repairs, is the generalized renewal process (GRP). 
Nevertheless, for a complete understanding about GRP, it is necessary to define the concept 
of virtual age (Vn). The Vn corresponds to the calculated age of particular equipment after 
the n-th repair action. Kijima & Sumita (1986) has proposed two ways to modeling this 
virtual age. The first one, commonly named type I, consists basically of the assumption 
that a repair action acts just in the step time just before. With this assumption, the virtual 
age of a component increases proportionally to the time between failures: 




whereas the assumption of q = 1 leads to an NHPP (as bad as old). The values of q that fall 
in the interval 0 < q < 1 represent the after repair state in which the condition of the system 
is ‘‘better than old but worse than new’’. On the basis of this proposition of virtual age, 
Kijima et al., (1988) has proposed the following approach to calculate the conditional 
probability of failure. 
The type II model considers that the repair can restore the system considering the elapsed 
time since the beginning of its life. In this model, the virtual age increases proportionally 
to the total time.  
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚 = 𝑞𝑞(𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚−1 + 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚−1) 
q can be defined as the repair effectiveness parameter (restoration factor) in both models. 
1) q = 0 → “good-as-new”, i.e. ORP  
2) q = 1 → “same-as-old”, i.e., NHPP  
3) 0 < q < 1 → “better-than-old-but-worse-than-new”  
4) q > 1 → “worse-than-old”  GRP 
 
According to this modeling, the result of assuming a value of q = 0 leads to an RP (as good 
as new), whereas the assumption of q = 1 leads to an NHPP (as bad as old). The values of 
q that fall in the interval 0 < q < 1 represent the after repair state in which the condition of 
the system is ‘‘better than old but worse than new’’. 
• Perfect  Repair (Ordinary Renewal Process: Good as new): A repair completely 




one. This type of repair is equivalent to a replacement of the faulty item by a new one, 
identical to the original.  
• Imperfect Repair (Better than Old but Worse than new): A repair contributes to 
some noticeable improvement of the product. It effectively sets back the clock for the 
repaired item. After the repair the performance and expected lifetime of the item are as 
they were at an earlier age.  
• Minimal Repair (Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process: Same as Old): A repair has 
no impact on the performance of the item. The repair brings the product from a 'down' 
to an 'up' state without affecting its performance.  
• Worse than Old Repair: A repair contributes to some noticeable worsening of the 
product. It effectively sets forward the clock for the repaired item. After the repair the 
performance of the item is as it would have been at a later age.  
 
6.7. Mathematical Models for Optimum Preventive Policies 
In this section, several maintenance policies for systems that are subject to stochastic 
failure are defined and mathematical models to determine the optimum level for each 
policy are formulated. Two basic preventive maintenance policies proposed by Barlow and 
Proschan (1996) are examined in the literature extensively. These are age-based and 
constant interval replacement polices known as type I and type II policies. The statements 
of the polices, their models, and generalizations are given in the next sections. In this part, 




𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 cost of preventive maintenance 
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 cost of breakdown (failure) maintenance 
𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑅) time to failure probability density function (p.d.f.) 
𝐹𝐹(𝑅𝑅) equipment or system failure distribution, and it is the integral of 𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑅) 
𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑅) failure rate function 
𝑁𝑁�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� number of failures in the interval (0, tp); N(tp) is a random variable 
𝐻𝐻�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� expected number of failures in the interval (0, tp) 
𝑅𝑅(𝑅𝑅) reliability or survival function 







𝐶𝐶�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� expected cost per cycle 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� expected cost per unit time 
 
6.7.1. Optimal Age Preventive Replacement (Type I Policy) 
Policy I (age preventive replacement) is defined as follows: perform preventive 
replacement after tp hours of continuing operation without failure; tp could be finite or 
infinite. In case of an infinite tp, no preventive maintenance (replacement) is scheduled. If 
the system fails prior to tp hours having elapsed, perform maintenance (replacement) at the 




policy, it is assumed that the system is as good as new after any type of maintenance 
(replacement) is performed. 
 
Figure 6.4: Timeline of Preventive and Failure based Maintenance Policies  
This policy is suited for simple equipment or a single unit in which repair at the time of 
failure (or replacement) could nearly correspond to general overhaul. An example of such 
equipment is a vacuum tube. This policy is illustrated in Fig. 6.4. In this situation, as shown 
in Fig. 6.4, there are two operations cycles. In one cycle, the equipment operates till the 
time for preventive maintenance (replacement) tp, and in the second cycle, the equipment 
fails prior to the planned maintenance.  
The main objective of maintenance policies is to optimize the maintenance actions 
according to certain criteria, such as risk, cost, reliability, and availability (Yan, 2014). The 
objective of the model in this section is to determine the optimal tp, meaning that the tp at 
which preventive replacement is performed after the equipment has operated continuously 
for tp hours without failure. The model determines the tp that minimizes the total expected 





             𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� =
𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅ℎ
                                        (6.2) 
The total expected cost per cycle consists of the cost of preventive maintenance in addition 
to the cost of breakdown (failure) maintenance, which is: 
 
              𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅) =
𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅ℎ
                                                             (6.3) 
                                                
The total expected cost per cycle consists of the cost of preventive maintenance in addition 
to the cost of breakdown (failure) maintenance, which is 
                                       𝐶𝐶�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� = 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 × 𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� + 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓�1 − 𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝��                          (6.4) 
Where 𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� is the probability the equipment survives till age tp, which is represented by 
the shaded area in Fig. 6.5. 
 




The expected cycle length consists of the expected length of preventive cycle plus the 
expected length of a failure cycle. 








          
                    =
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚) + 𝑅𝑅(1 −  𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚))
∫ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎0 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹(𝑅𝑅)  +  𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚)  +  (𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚  +  𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚)(1 −  𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚))
                              (6.6) 
                                 
𝑀𝑀�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� is the mean of the truncated distribution at 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝(see Figure 6.4) 
                𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� =
𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� + 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓�1 − 𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝��
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� + 𝑀𝑀�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� �1 − 𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝��
                                                           (6.7) 
6.7.2. AVAILABILITY MODEL 
Availability is a measure of system readiness and it is one of the most important measures 
of effectiveness usually employed in mission-oriented situations especially in the dam 
safety environment. Operational availability, as defined earlier, is the probability that a 
system or equipment, when used under stated conditions in an actual operational 
environment, will operate satisfactorily when called upon. System availability is influenced 




elements) it takes to restore a failed system to service. Times to failure or 'up times' and to 
restoration or 'down times' may vary considerably, and not necessarily independently, 
depending upon the mode of failure, the time required to diagnose the failure, availability 
of special tools, test equipment, and spare parts, and the proper documentation and the 
required personnel skills. The long-run availability or steady state is expressed as follows: 
 
                  𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶) =
𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅ℎ
                                                             (6.8) 
                                         =
∫ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎0 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹(𝑅𝑅) + 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚(1 −  𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚)))
∫ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎0 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹(𝑅𝑅)  +  𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚)  + (𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚  +  𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚)(1 −  𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚))











CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY 1- WOLF CREEK HYDROPOWER PROJECT 
7.1. Background 
Wolf Creek Dam is a combination concrete gravity and earthfill structure located at mile 




the dam is 5,736 feet. The concrete section is 1,796 feet long, ties into the left abutment, 
and extends across the old river channel toward the right abutment. It has a maximum 
structural height of 258 feet (dam crest to base of concrete dam) and contains a gate control 
section, a powerhouse section, and non-overflow sections on both ends. US Highway 127 
traverses the top of the dam. Normal storage in Lake Cumberland, created by the dam, is 
about four million acre-ft. Up to 6,089,000 acre-ft. can be impounded at a maximum pool 
elevation of 760. It is the largest reservoir east of the Mississippi River, and the ninth largest 
in the United States. 
 
Figure 7.1: Map of Nashville River Basins and Boundaries 
The control section within the concrete gravity section contains a spillway with ten, 50-
feet wide, by 37-feet high tainter gates and six 4-feet by 6-feet low level sluices. The top 
of the dam is at elevation 773, the crest of the spillway is at elevation 723, and the top of 




Power can be generated when the pool elevation is at or above elevation 680. The 
powerhouse contains six turbines rated at 45,000 KW each (total 270 MW). The earth 
embankment section of the dam extends 3,940 feet from the end of Monolith 37 of the 
concrete section across the valley to the right abutment. The earth section is a non-zoned 
compacted clay embankment with a maximum structural height of 215 feet. 
7.1.1. The Cumberland River Basin 
The Upper Cumberland River Basin covers over 7,300 square miles, 5,180 in Kentucky 
and 2,130 in Tennessee. All or parts of 20 Kentucky counties lie in the basin. The basin 
contains nearly 15,100 miles of streams, 10,430 in Kentucky and 4,640 in Tennessee. From 
the headwaters of Looney Creek in Harlan County, 4,100 feet above sea level, and the Poor 
Fork in Letcher County, runoff flows down the Upper Cumberland River west to an 
elevation of 460 feet at the Kentucky-Tennessee line. 
The Lake Cumberland reservoir is 101 miles long in length and has 1,255 miles of 
shoreline, providing a total storage capacity of 6,089,000 acre-feet (1 acre-foot = 1 acre, 1 
foot deep or 325,850 gallons). The upper portion of the reservoir containing 2,094,000 
acre-feet of area, is used to hold floodwaters which would otherwise cause flooding 
downstream. Such impounded water is utilized to the maximum extent possible for power 
production and the surplus water is released through the spillway gates after any flood 





Figure 7.2: Cumberland River System Schematic 
Of the remaining 3,995,000 acre-feet of reservoir capacity, 2,142,000 acre-feet, 
corresponding to a drawdown of 50 feet, is allocated specifically for power operation, 
leaving a minimum pool of at least 1,853,000 acre-feet available at all times for public use 
and conservation purposes. The electrical energy produced by the project is sufficient to 
supply the needs of an average city with a population of 375,000. Incidental to the 
production of power, the water released through the turbines provides a favorable 
streamflow below the dam. In supplementing low flows, this water improves domestic 
water supply, reduces stream pollution and provides aid to navigation. The reservoir 
normally fluctuates between 50,250 acres at the top of the power pool and a minimum 
surface area of 35,820 acres. During periods of high inflow, when it is necessary to utilize 
the flood storage, the surface area may reach 63,530 acres. However, such floods occur 
infrequently, and the levels resulting from minor floods and power operations do not 




Table 7.1. Wolf Creek Dam Statistical Information  
DAM     
  
Type  Concrete-gravity and earth fill  
Quantities:    
   Concrete, cubic yards  1,380,000  
   Earth fill, cubic yards  10,016,500   
Dimensions:     
   Maximum height, feet  258  
   Length, feet (concrete, 1796; earth, 3940)  5,736  
Elevations (above mean sea level):     
   Top of dam  773  
   Top of gates  760  
   Spillway crest  723  
Spillway crest gates:    
   Number and type  10, Radial  
   Size (width and height), feet  50 X 37  
   Discharge capacity, c.f.s.  553,000  
Sluices    
   Number of conduits  6  
   Size (width and height), feet  4 X 6  
   Total discharge capacity, c.f.s.  9,800  
    
HYDROPOWER     
Installation  270,000 kw in 6 units  
Rating, each generator, kilowatts  45,000  
Estimated energy output, average yearly, kilowatt-hours  800,000,000  
 
Normal Dam Operation: The hydropower pool for Wolf Creek Dam extends from the top 
of the conservation pool elevation of 673 ft. to 723 ft. The flood control pool extends from 
723 ft. to 760 ft. A seasonal operating guide within the power pool is commonly referred 
to as the “SEPA power marketing zone” but is more accurately called the “Power 
Marketing Band” (PMB) in this document. SEPA is the acronym for the Southeastern 
Power Administration which is the Federal entity responsible for marketing the power 




developed by SEPA, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Corps. The power 
marketing band starts the year low in the power pool, fills through the spring reaching the 
top of the power pool by summer, and then gradually falls through the summer and fall, to 
an approximate elevation of 683 ft. in time for the flood season. This is a non-binding 
operating guide that maximizes hydropower benefits while also supporting flood control, 
water quality, navigation, and other downstream uses dependent on the release of stored 
water through the summer and fall. The normal operation at Wolf Creek is to favor the top 
of the PMB, targeting a June 1 elevation of 723 it. 
 
Figure 7.3: Wolf Creek Average annual Outflows 
Hydropower:  For the purposes of cumulative effects, the spatial boundary coincides with 
the SEPA power grid. Demands for this resource include peaking power at Wolf Creek 
Dam and its contribution to the power grid. Demands for the water used for hydropower 
include water for minimum flow, water quality, fish and wildlife management, and 
recreation. Under minimum flow releases, hydropower generation adds little oxygen to 




hydropower is diverted through a sluice gate to meet both minimum flow and water quality 
needs. Lowering the lake reduces the amount of water available for hydropower. When 
lake levels reach EL 676 it, no hydropower can be generated.  
 
Figure 7.4: average Monthly Outflows (Wolf Creek) 
7.2. Wolf Creek Systems Model objectives and Framework 
The purpose of this project is to apply the systems reliability modeling approach to the 
Wolf Creek and John Day dams operated by the USACE. The project further promulgates 
the use of a systems modeling framework in the analysis of the performance of hydraulic 
flow control systems. One of the key objectives of the adopted modeling framework is to 
balance the main aspects of dam operation, performance and reliability into an integrated 
whole. That integrated whole is comprised of: (i) the natural siting of the dam with respect 
to its hydrology and geology, (ii) the physics behind water containment and the control of 




The philosophy of systems engineering as a whole has two essential attributes:  
• Structural performance and resilience; and  
• Functional performance and resilience  
Structural performance and resilience pertain to the ability of the dam to withstand the 
forces that are applied to it and to maintain the structural support and integrity required for 
the functions of the dam and reservoir. Functional performance and resilience pertain to 
processes, products and services that the dam is intended to provide. Specifically, the dam 
is intended to retain the stored volume and to pass all flows through and around the dam in 
a controlled manner. 
The systems approach also gives consideration to the influence of disturbances to one or 
more functions for reasons that can be external or internal to the system. The possibility of 
one or more combinations of both external and internal disturbances, ranging from those 
that occur essentially simultaneously to those that occur at different times but in ways that 
the effects of the disturbances combine, are also considered. 
One of the goals of this project is to understand how the interactions of systems 
components, control and combine to affect performance, and the potential for accidents 
and failures; thus, how simple but unforeseen chains of events might combine to affect the 
ability to control flows. Emphasis is placed on flow control components of the dam that 
will be modelled include the spillway gates, low level turbine intake sluices, lower level 






7.3. Hydrological Routing 
Hydrologic routing is used to model the downstream conditions within the Wolf Creek 
River System in response to a given flow hydrograph at the upstream end of the reach.  The 
modelling utilizes the continuity equation and analytic or empirical relationships between 
the channel storage and the discharge at the outlet. The continuity equation, as presented 
in chapter 4 for can be conceptualized as: 
Continuous time 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹(𝑅𝑅)
𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑅𝑅) − 𝑄𝑄(𝑅𝑅) (8.1) 




Where for the discrete time formulation 𝐼𝐼 is the average inflow at the upstream end of the 
river reach during time interval  𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅, 𝑄𝑄 is the average discharge from the reach during time 
interval  𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅 and 𝐹𝐹 is the reach storage. A 65-year history of streamflow data into the 
Cumberland river basin was used to generate stochastic Inflows through time series 
forecasting. A autoregressive-moving-average time series model was used to generate 





Figure 7.5: 65-year Historical Upstream Inflow Series 
 
 
































Min..1% / 99%..Max 1%..5% / 95%..99% 5%..15% / 85%..95% 15%..25% / 75%..85%




7.4. Wolf Creek Hydraulic Modeling of Dam and Reservoir Components 
The Cumberland River watershed, which is the natural sitting of Wolf Creek dam is a 
complex system comprised of numerous inter-related, inter-dependent, and interactive 
components which can be influenced by random events. The operation of the system is 
mainly governed by the actual water levels in reservoirs, actual inflow and SEPA guide 
curves that is based on historic safe and optimal operation of the Wolf Creek dam and 
Powerhouse. However, the system can be greatly influenced by other random events such 
as failures of transmission system; failures of flow control equipment; and failures to shut 
down properly by operators; failure of structural components of the dam etc. Other 
operational challenges that further contribute to the complexity of the system and its 
operation include: 
-Numerous contributing watersheds that are managed by other entities, 
- Many facilities requiring sluiceway equipment to be manually operated on site, 
- Fairly remote sites of these facilities, 
- Limited resources available to manage all sites, 
- Inaccuracy of the inflow flood forecast, 
- Environmental and other stakeholder’s requirements for water levels flow releases to 
maintain ecological and/or biological healthy system. 
 
Simulation of such a complex system is not practical using analytical solutions. Therefore, 
a dynamic system simulation (a systems approach) is used to analyze and predict how all 
components comprising the System interact and behave as a whole. Dynamic system 




behavior and dynamics of the various system components. The mathematical 
representation of the system should ensure the following: 
• Accurate representation of the system behavior under all conditions. Capability of 
handling the random characteristics of the system input variables.   
• The variables may be continuous (such as inflows) or discrete (n out of N gates 
and/or turbines working etc.). 
• Practical and manageable simplification of the real system. 
• Ability to reasonably mimic the decision-making process in real time operation 
under various scenarios. 
The GOLDSIM™ Platform was adopted to perform the dynamic system simulation. 
GOLDSIM™ is a Stock-and-Flow based simulation platform and has the benefits of 
hosting a range of water resources related features and statistical modeling and analytical 
tools including discrete events and Monte Carlo simulation. It is very flexible for 
visualizing and dynamically simulating physical, financial or organizational systems. 
Almost any system that can be quantitatively described using equations and/or rules can be 
simulated using GOLDSIM™. 
7.4.1. Reservoir Modeling 
The main function of this component is that the model determines the release outflow 
based on the inflow at the time, the current water level, the expected water level of the 
time period (the rule curve), the turbine generation requirements, the gate position and 




In functional terms, the purpose of the dam, reservoir and hydraulic structures together 
is to intercept upstream stream flows and transform them into controlled outflows. 
According to Afzali et al. (2008), the objective of reservoir outflow releasing philosophy 
is to minimize the sum of reservoir releases, while maximizing the sum of reservoir 
storages in each of the time periods. This is subject to a reliability constraint on the 
hydropower system’s energy yield. 
The Goldsim™ platform is used to model the response of the reservoir component to 
hydraulic/hydrologic loads and disturbances. The reservoir element is programmed to 
iteratively compute the addition rate, withdrawal rate and other salient reservoir functions. 
For the Wolf Creek system, the addition rate is computed by defining it as a function of the 
upstream inflow rate while the withdrawal rate is defined as a function of both the Spill 
through the Spillway gates and the volume routed through the turbines. 
Addition Rate=Upstream Daily flow                                                                                    (8.3) 
Withdrawal rate=Turbine Flow + Spillway Flow                                                            (8.4) 
The balance of inflow, outflow and reservoir storage is at the heart of dynamic simulation. 
The water balance computations are done at each time step. Like an Integrator, a Reservoir 
requires an Initial Value and a rate of change. The rate of change, however, is specified in 
terms of two separate inputs, an Addition Rate and a Withdrawal Rate. The water balance 
equation is: 




The above equation states that the reservoir volume at the end of the time t (V(t)) is the 
result of the initial storage plus the inflow to the reservoir minus the outflow. There are 
two unknown variables in the water balance equation: the end reservoir storage and the 
reservoir outflow. The reservoir withdrawal (outflow) may consist of flow discharges of 
turbines, and/or gates/sluices, lower level outlets, and overtopping flow , discharge from 
navigation locks, (if water level exceeds the crest elevation of the dam). 
The model computes the storage in the reservoir based on storage capacity tables (Figure 
7.7) provided by the USACE for Wolf Creek Dam. Thus, the Model is programmed to 
interpolate from the storage capacity table to compute the volume increments and 
decrements and the elevation increments and decrements.  
 

























545 0 0 0 590 5,450 72,200 36,400 635 23,500 707,000 356,000
6 40 20 10 1 5,780 77,800 39,200 6 23,910 730,000 368,000
7 75 75 38 2 6,110 83,700 42,200 7 24,320 754,000 380,000
8 120 170 86 3 6,440 90,000 45,400 8 24,730 779,000 393,000
9 150 310 160 4 6,760 96,660 48,700 9 25,140 804,000 405,000
550 190 480 240 595 7,090 104,000 52,400 640 25,550 829,000 418,000
1 240 700 350 6 7,420 111,000 56,000 1 25,930 855,000 431,000
2 300 960 480 7 7,750 118,000 59,500 2 26,320 881,000 444,000
3 350 1,290 650 8 8,080 126,000 63,500 3 26,700 908,000 458,000
4 400 1,660 840 9 8,410 135,000 68,100 4 27,080 935,000 471,000
555 450 2,090 1,050 600 8,730 143,000 72,100 645 27,470 962,000 485,000
6 500 2,570 1,300 1 9,140 152,000 76,600 6 27,850 989,000 499,000
7 560 3,100 1,560 2 9,550 161,000 81,200 7 28,230 1,018,000 513,000
8 610 3,680 1,860 3 9,960 171,000 86,200 8 28,620 1,046,000 527,000
9 660 4,320 2,180 4 10,370 181,000 91,300 9 29,000 1,075,000 542,000






Figure 7.8: Wolf Creek Stage Elevation Rating Curve 
If water level is denoted by ht then inflow within the interval [t, t+1) is not known at the 
time t and it can be known only when it has been realized at the end of time interval and 
for that reason will be denoted by qt+1. Storage has a unique property since its value st+1 at 
time t+1 can be calculated from its value st at time t using the following formula: 
 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1 (8.5) 
7.4.1.1 Regulation Curve 
The regulation curve represents the primary guidance for operations at Wolf Creek Dam. 
It defines the operating limits of reservoir elevations as a function of time of year and is 
presented graphically in figure 8.10. The Wolf Creek guide curve consists of three "hard" 
lines and two "soft" lines. The hard lines are described as such because they form the 
congressionally authorized operating boundaries which horizontally divide the reservoir 
into three distinct "pools", as described below. The soft lines further subdivide the power 




Inactive Pool: Inactive storage at Wolf Creek extends from the bottom of the reservoir up 
to elevation 673. Water is not released if it would bring the surface of the pool below the 
top of this zone. Inactive storage is provided primarily to offset lake sedimentation and 
provide head for hydropower. Other benefits of this permanent pool include depth for 
recreation, water intake installation, habitat for fish and other aquatic life, and insurance 
water for drought periods. 2.2.3.  
Power Pool: The power pool extends from elevation 673 up to the second hard line at 
elevation 723. This 50 foot depth is the "normal" operating zone of the reservoir. This is 
the zone in which water is stored for the purpose of generating electricity. The power pool 
is usually permitted to fill during wet winter and spring months and remain near elevation 
723 from mid-May through mid-June. During the summer and fall seasons, hydropower 
releases result in a steady drawdown of the reservoir. The power pool is further subdivided 
by two curves which define a continually varying zone within the power pool. This is called 
the "SEPA power marketing zone" or the "SEPA band". SEPA is the acronym for the 
Southeastern Power Administration which is the Federal entity responsible for marketing 
the power generated at all USACE projects in the Nashville District. The SEPA band 
ranges in depth from 4.8 to 18 feet, but for most of the year it about 11 feet in depth. The 
location of the band within the full power pool varies. Its low point throughout December 
is at elevation 682, nine feet above the bottom of the power pool. Its high point is from 
May 15th until June 15th when its top is at elevation 723, which corresponds to the top of 
the power pool. The lines which bound this zone are sometimes referred to as "soft lines" 





Figure 7.9: Wolf Creek Dam Guide Curve 
Flood Control Pool: The flood control pool extends from elevation 723 up to the top most 
hard line at elevation 760. The normal condition is for this pool to remain empty so that 
the space is available to store water during flood events and thus reduce the downstream 
damages due to flooding. Following a flood event water is released from this pool as 
quickly as possible based on downstream conditions in order to restore the capability to 
provide protection from future flood events. 
Goldsim™ Model Representation: The Goldsim™ model of the reservoir incorporates 
the stage elevation rating curves shown in Figure 7.8 to simulate the reservoir elevations 
at every point in time within the simulation. The limits of the reservoir pool elevation 
follow the operating rule requirements. During periods of normal regulation, the water 
surface elevation behind the dam is maintained within the hydropower pool limits (see 
Figure 7.11) and all releases are made through the turbines as governed by the demand for 
power. There is a large amount of flexibility in operating the Wolf Creek project within the 




used to locate a more specific desirable location for the water surface, but there is still a 
fair amount of flexibility within the band, and there is no absolute requirement for the pool 
to remain within the band. The reservoir system is modeled to follow the SEPA top curve 
but is also constrained by the upstream daily flows. The water level ht+1 at time t+1 can be 
determined from the storage st+1 using the stage-storage relationship from the stage rating 
curves. 
 





Figure 7.11: Simulated Mean elevations and SEPA stage prescriptions 
7.5. Wolf Creek Operating Rules and Power Generation 
The following descripts the critical aspects of operating the hydropower plant together with 
the salient aspects of the Spillway gate and Turbine systems. 
Critical Operating Elevations 
• Powerhouse is evacuated and bulkheads are installed at tailwater of 605 ft. 
• Powerhouse floods due to tailwater overtopping bulkhead at 610 ft. corresponding 
with a release of about 235,000 cfs 
• If the gates are not fully lifted before the headwater reaches about 757.8 ft. then 
more efficient spillway weir flow cannot be established and releases will continue 
to be in pressure orifice flow 
• If the gates are fully opened and the headwater is rising the spillway nappe will 
impinge on the bottom lip of the open spillway gates impeding free weir flow for 
headwaters above ~768 ft. 
• When the headwater exceeds elevation 768.21 ft. then water can flow over the top 
of the fully opened gates 
Spillway Gates 
• 10 Spillway Gates – 50-ft. x 37-ft. (W x H) 
• Ogee spillway crest elevation - 723.0 ft. 




























• Bottom of Gates in Maximum Open Position - 754.7 ft. (31.7 ft. Opening) 
• Maximum Headwater at which Gates must be Fully Opened in order to Transition 
from Pressure Orifice to Free Weir Flow - 757.8 ft. 
• Top of Gates in Maximum Open Position - 768.21 ft. 
• Low Chord of Bridge over Spillway - 765.8 ft. 
• Centerline of Spillway Gate Trunnion - 735.75 ft. 
Turbines 
• 6 Francis Hydropower Turbines 
• Penstock Diameter - 20 ft. 
• Centerline of Penstock on Upstream Side - 621.9 ft. 
• Top Elevation at 633.5 ft. and Bottom Elevation at 610.0 ft. 
• Bottom of Power Pool (Lowest Headwater for Power Generation) - 673 ft. 
• Nameplate 45 Megawatts per Unit Rating  
 
7.5.1. Spillway Gate Flow Modeling  
There 10 ogee style Radial (gates) Spillways. The top of the dam roadway embankment is 
773 ft. The discharge through the spillway gates at each simulated time step is calculated 
from the spillway rating tables (Figure 8.11). The maximum Wolf Creek PMF headwater 
elevation was 769.3 ft. which is 3.7 ft. below the top of the dam. During the peak storm 
events, in addition to the turbines being operated at their capacities, there may be a need to 
open the Spillway gates to route out excess flows. Within the model, the pool elevation is 
controlled with a built-in logic to operate the turbines to actively follow the prescribed 
SEPA Top curve. However, should the pool elevation rise above the spillway gate crest 
elevation of 723m, the spillway gates are opened to route out the excess flows and return 
the pool elevation to within the SEPA prescribed levels. Figure 10.15 shows the model 






Spillway Gate Rating Table 
 
Sluice Rating table 
 
Figure 7.12: Spillway Gate Rating Table and Curve
The Spillway discharges are a function of the reservoir pool elevation and the height of 





Mean of 100 realizations 
Figure 7.13: Spillway flow and reservoir inflow statistics 
Figure 7.13 shows the mean and 75th percentile functions of the Spillway and reservoir 
inflows. At the 75th percentile, there are no inflows when the simulation is run for a 12-
month period over 100-year historical realizations. This shows that historically, at least in 
75% of the years since wolf creek began operation, there has been no need to use the 
spillway gates for releases. Also shown in Figure 7.13 is the mean inflow over the 100-
Elevation 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
723 0 7 16 27 40 55 71 89 109 131
724 156 181 207 233 260 288 297 306 314 322
725 330 338 346 354 362 370 378 386 394 401
726 408 415 422 429 436 442 448 454 460 466
727 472 478 484 490 496 502 507 513 519 524
728 529 534 540 545 551 556 561 566 571 576
729 581 586 591 596 601 606 610 615 619 623
730 628 632 636 641 645 649 654 658 663 667
731 671 675 680 684 688 693 697 701 705 709
732 713 717 721 725 728 732 736 740 743 747
733 751 755 759 762 766 770 773 777 781 785
734 788 792 796 799 803 806 810 814 817 821































































year historical realizations. This points to the months between November and July as the 
periods that have a high likelihood of needing the Spillway gates for flood control. This is 
critical information for maintenance and other operational purposes. 
7.6. Model Results: Operating patterns and flow Routing 
The modelling framework conceives of the flow-control system as a number of 
components. The outputs of each component generally form the input to the next 
component in the system logic. The system is however usually not linear, but contains 
feedback loops and interdependencies. 
The reservoir inflows from upstream drainage basins are routed through the reservoir to 
create a demand function on the spillway outflow structure. Both the routed flow and the 
control system outputs are used to simulate the flow control system functioning. All 
possible means of passing the flow through the dam (spillways with gates and/or stop logs, 
emergency and overflow spillways, valves and turbines of the generating equipment) may 
be included in the flow control system. The reservoir component contains many 





Figure 7.14: Simulated Reservoir Response 
Imminent Dam Failure during reservoir inflow floods (Overtopping Failure) occurs when 
water reaches a stage specified in the operating documents as imminent dam failure 
elevation; thus when the elevation exceeds the imminent dam failure elevation, the dam is 
overtopped. A simulation for a year from start of a calendar year to end of calendar year 
was run with a 1000 realizations. Figure 7.14 shows a snapshot of the pool elevation and 
upstream flow as a function of time for an elapsed time of 1 year; the imminent dam failure 
elevation is marked to show the buffer between the operating elevations and the failure 
elevation (top core of dam). This plot shows the response of our reservoir and gate 








































Flows vs Pool Elevation
Realization #3





Figure 7.15: Simulated Reservoir Response (Mean) 
Within the model, the spillway gates are operated with a built-in logic (Operating Rule) to 
maintain the reservoir elevation along the prescribed SEPA Top curve (Figure 7.14) 
However, should the pool elevation rise above the spillway gate crest elevation of 723m, 
the spillway gates are opened to route out the excess flows and return the pool elevation to 
within the SEPA prescribed levels. . Also shown is the mean of a 1 year 100 realization 
simulation run. The mean plot shows the seasonality of the inflows and highlights periods 
of high inflows where there likelihood of the spillway gates being required to route out 
excess flows is high. This as creates a demand on downstream functions and reliability of 
flow control components. 
7.6.1. Operation for Power Generation and Turbine Flows 
During periods of normal regulation, the water surface elevation behind the dam is 












































Flows vs Pool Elevation
Mean




turbines as governed by the demand for power. There is a large amount of flexibility in 
operating the Wolf Creek project within the bounds of the power pool, which is 50 feet 
deep. As further guidance, the SEPA band is used to locate a more specific desirable 
location for the water surface. Maintain headwater elevation within the limits of the 
hydropower pool and release all water through the turbines as governed by hydropower 
generation schedules. In general, hydropower releases are scheduled to meet peak energy 
demands. The generation units consist of 6 Francis hydropower turbines, each with a 
maximum generation capacity of 45 MW. 
 




The power pool at Wolf Creek extends between elevations 673.0 and 723.0 (See Figure 
7.16). Except during flood control operations, when the reservoir level is within the power 
pool all releases are made through the turbines as governed by hydropower generation 
schedules. If the headwater level approaches the lower limit of the power pool, elevation 
673.0, reduce or curtail hydropower discharges as necessary to prevent the headwater from 
falling below elevation 673.0. 
 
Sluice Rating Table 
 
 
Sluice Rating table 
 
Turbine Discharge Curves 
 
Turbine Discharge Curves 
Figure 7.17: Wolf Creek Discharge Curves 
The Hydropower plant at Wolf Creek is operated by following the best efficiency power 
generation for a given head while attempting to keep the pool elevation at the SEPA top 
prescribed elevation. values provided in the unit rating table when upstream flow is equal 
to or more than the specified discharges for best efficiency power generation. Figure 7.18 
Head
in feet 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
100 1268 1269 1269 1270 1271 1271 1272 1272 1273 1274
101 1274 1275 1276 1276 1277 1277 1278 1279 1279 1280
102 1281 1281 1282 1282 1283 1284 1284 1285 1286 1286
103 1287 1288 1288 1289 1289 1290 1291 1291 1292 1292
104 1293 1294 1294 1295 1296 1296 1297 1297 1298 1299
105 1299 1300 1301 1301 1302 1302 1303 1304 1304 1305
106 1305 1306 1307 1307 1308 1309 1309 1310 1310 1311
107 1312 1312 1313 1313 1314 1315 1315 1316 1317 1317
108 1318 1318 1319 1320 1320 1321 1321 1322 1323 1323
109 1324 1324 1325 1326 1326 1327 1327 1328 1329 1329
110 1330 1330 1331 1332 1332 1333 1334 1334 1335 1335
111 1336 1337 1337 1338 1338 1339 1340 1340 1341 1341
112 1342 1343 1343 1344 1344 1345 1346 1346 1347 1347
113 1348 1348 1349 1350 1350 1351 1351 1352 1353 1353
114 1354 1354 1355 1356 1356 1357 1357 1358 1359 1359








shows an annual plot of the Turbine flows for one realization. Also shown in Figure 7.18 
is the mean flow statistics for pool elevation and power production respectively, as a 
function of time. The mean is averaged over the entirety of the simulation forecasts. 
 




Figure 7.18: Turbine Flows vs Reservoir Inflow 
 






































































































































The plot also shows the direct correlation between the reservoir inflows and the power 
generated. Finally, Figure 7.19 shows the expected correlation between the upstream flows, 
turbine flows and the power generation. The freshet (high inflow) period is consistent with 
increase in reservoir storage prescribed by SEPA while the low inflow period is consistent 
with the gradual drawdown of the to prepare for the following seasons high inflows. 
7.7. Systems Reliability of Flow Control Components 
Goldsim™’s reliability module leverages the power Dynamic fault tree analysis via Monte-
Carlo framework. The dynamic fault tree Dynamic simulation then allows the analyst to 
develop a representation of the system whose reliability is to be determined, and then 
observe that system’s performance over a specified period. It also provides the ability to 
model the interdependencies of components, as well as the capability to define multiple 
independent failure modes for each component.  
The Dynamic fault trees also enable the use of real-world systems reliability metrics such 
as availability and Reliability. Availability is more commonly used to represent a 
maintainable system which is a function of reliability and maintainability. The nature of 
the Monte Carlo framework makes it possible to compute the average 
unavailability/availability of components of interest based on failure rates, repair rates and 
demand failure probabilities (stand by failure rate) time to failure and time to repair over a 
period. Additionally, the system can evolve into any feasible state and its properties can 
change suddenly or gradually as the simulation progresses. The system can also be affected 
by random processes, within the system itself (internal failure) or from external an external 




the ability to track all the unique System and subcomponent states during the simulation 
(i.e., whether the component is operating, if a particular failure mode has occurred, if it is 
undergoing maintenance, is turned off, or its requirements- or fault tree shows the 
component cannot operate). These unique states also record the states of any reliability 
elements referenced as part fault-tree. 
Table 7.2: System state variable tables 
 
7.7.1. Turbine Reliability Modeling 
Passing the flow through the turbines of a hydroelectric generating station requires that the 
generating equipment is available and that the generated power can be accepted by the grid. 
Modeling of the availability of turbines to pass the flow requires the parametric 
characterization of life data of the salient components and sub-components of the turbine 
units. Extensive failure data was available for the generating units in the Wolf Creek Dam 
System. The parametric characterization of the degradation/failure time data was used to 
produce the Weibull characterizations shown in figure 7.20. Wolf Creek GS has six 




0 All requirements are met, the component is not failed. It is turned on and operating.
1 A preventive maintenance (that makes the component inoperable) is underway.
2 Internal requirements not met.
3 External requirements not met.
4 Element is not turned on.
5 Parent element not operating.





Table 7.3: Weibull Characterization of hydropower components 
 
 
Figure 7.21: Goldsim™ Turbine Unit Reliability Modeling Interface 
Figure 7.22 shows the fault tree diagram of the hydropower unit incorporated into the 
systems reliability model. The duration of failures is characterized by the exponential 
distribution with a mean delay time until repaired specified for each subcomponent. 
 
Major Component Sub Component
Max Life (Yrs) Beta Alpha (Yrs)
Exciters Controllers digital 20 3.3 20
Stator Windings less than 6900kV 75 3.3 62
Cores (fire) 100 3.8 95
Frame 100 3 30
Rotor Windings (fire) 100 2.9 98
Spider 100 2.66 109
Transformers Above 230 kV 100 4 64
Circuit Breakers Inside powerhouse - SF6 50 2.6 59
Outside powerhouse - Oil 75 3 57
Turbines Francis Type 100 3 102
Governors Digital 25 3.2 25
Gates Wicket gates 75 3.4 74






Figure 7.22: Goldsim™ dynamic Fault tree representation of Turbine Unit 
Figure 7.23 shows the failure of one of the major Turbine unit components for one 
annual realization. This shows that the component only failed once during the 100-year 
simulation run but was unavailable due to other external failures which rendered the 






Figure 7.23: Plot of Turbine System State as a function of time 
Kaplan type turbine Operational Availability: This is the fraction of time the element 
was operating over a specified time period immediately previous to the current time. 
Although the component had only inherently failed once, it was operationally unavailable 
due to other component failures external to the Kaplan type turbine. Kaplan type turbine 
Inherent Availability: This is the fraction of time the element was inherently operable 
over a specified time period immediately previous to the current time. This does not 
include all other instances of unavailability due to other component failures external to 
the Kaplan type turbine. An example is the entire Turbine unit being unavailable due to 
failure of the stator but the Kaplan type turbine although not failed, is unavailable 
because the entire unit is shut down for repairs due to the series arrangement of all the 
major components that need to function for the unit to be operable.  Hence, the Inherent 
Availability is always greater than or equal to the Operational Availability. See Figure 
7.24 for the mean Operational and inherent availabilities over 100 year and 100 


























Kaplan Turbine System State
Realization #1






1 Realization  
 
Mean  
Figure 7.24: Kaplan Turbine Operational and Inherent Availability 
When a unit is unavailable, the total discharge capacity through that turbine is only 0 m3/s. 
At full capacity, the discharge capacity through turbines equals 45 m3/s each. Occurrence 
of failures is characterized by Weibull distributions with a specified Mean time between 
failure characterized by exponential or lognormal distributions depending on the 
component/subcomponent. These parameters were determined by fitting parametric 
distributions to the failure data with the best performing (fitting) distribution chosen to 
characterize the failure of the turbine units. The duration of the failures; which is a sum of 
the time to repair and the actual repair duration, is characterized by an exponential 
distribution for each of the turbine unit subcomponents. 
When a Turbine is available, the amount of discharge through the turbine is dictated by the 
SEPA curve in combination with the upstream daily flow. If Head elevation exceeds the 
SEPA prescribed maximum, then the turbines will be operated at capacity. On the other 
hand if the Head water elevation is below the prescribed Minimum SEPA level, then the 



























































































7.7.2. Spillway Gate Reliability Modeling 
Gated Spillway systems are generally designed to set of defined engineering standards, 
however with the effects of aging, exposure, preventative maintenance, and lack of 
frequent operations in combination with human error seem to make these systems more 
vulnerable than one would think.  The on-demand failures of gated Spillways are complex 
and may be caused by a gate component that can be repaired in minutes to hours or a 
component that may cause complete failure of the gate system and unexpected release of 
the reservoir containment. 
 
Figure 7.25: Spillway Gate Systems Goldsim™ Model Interface 
7.7.2.1 Failure Time Characterization in Goldsim™ 
Goldsim™ supports two forms of the Weibull failure distribution. The characteristic life 
and slope factor or the mean life and slope factor can be specified. The PDF of the Weibull 















where α is the shape parameter and β is the characteristic life. Both parameters can be 
dynamic, but the value of the control variable at failure is only recalculated when the 
component is placed in service, replaced, or the failure mode repaired.  
Goldsim™’s reliability module leverages the power Dynamic fault tree analysis monte-
carlo framework. The dynamic fault tree Dynamic simulation then allows the analyst to 
develop a representation of the system whose reliability is to be determined, and then 
observe that system’s performance over a specified period of time. It also provides the 
ability to model the interdependencies of components, as well as the capability to define 
multiple independent failure modes for each component. Figure 7.22 shows the major 
components of the spillway gates incorporated into the systems reliability model. 
 
Figure 7.26: Spillway gate subcomponent interface  
7.7.2.2  Modeling Repair Times in Goldsim™ 
The simple failure rate is the default failure mode for both the Function and the Action 
element. It is equivalent to the Exponential/Poisson failure mode, and uses Total time as 




using the Replace trigger. The probability distribution function of the underlying 






  𝜇𝜇  
Equation 1: Failure Rate for Exponential/Poisson distribution 
When a unit is unavailable, the total discharge capacity through that spillway is 0 m3/s. At 
full capacity, the discharge capacity through turbines equals 40,000 cfs each. The mean 
time between failures (MTBF) for each sub component is characterized by an exponential 
distribution with the parameter  𝜆𝜆 (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) being the output of the life data analysis on 
component repairs. Hence, the duration of the failures; which is a sum of the time to repair 
and the actual repair duration, is characterized by an exponential distribution for each of 
the spillway unit subcomponents. 
7.7.2.3 Reliability Outputs 
 
1 Realization   Mean  
Figure 7.27: Spillway Gate Tainter Operational and Inherent Availability 
Figure 8.27 shows a plot of one of the Major components of the spillway gate—the 










































availability of the tainter gate is the availability of the entire spillway gate system itself 
where’s the inherent availability of the tainter gate represents the availability of the 
Spillway gate tainter component. 
 
 
1 Realization  
 
Mean  
Figure 7.28: Number of Spillway Gates Available  
The number of spillway gates available is a function of failure. This enables us to observe 
the availability on demand of the spillway gates as degradation sets in over time. The 
systems reliability model for wolf creek affords us the ability to track all the unique System 
and subcomponent states during the simulation (i.e., whether the component is operating, 
if a particular failure mode has occurred, if it is undergoing maintenance, is turned off, or 



























































CHAPTER 8: CASE STUDY 2 - MATTAGAMI RIVER HYDROPOWER 
PROJECT 
Systems simulation is being applied to an Ontario Power Generation (OPG) project in 
northeast Ontario. The project is a cascade of four power stations on the Lower Mattagami 
River. The number of riparian’s in the river flood plain is few and there is no commercial 
riverine navigation, so potential loss of life is negligible and operational safety dominates 
the engineering considerations. The problem facing the engineering analysis was to 
conceptualize a systems engineering model for the operation of the dams, generating 
stations, spillways, and other components; then to employ the model through stochastic 
simulation to investigate protocols for the safe operation of the project.  
 





The system borders two physiographic regions: the Canadian Shield extending from the 
south and, to the north, the Hudson Bay Lowlands. Several hydroelectric generating 
stations (GS) were built in the basin during the early twentieth century (Figure 8.1). In late 
1989, Ontario Hydro purchased the plants and through its successor organizations has 
operated the facilities since.  
8.1. Lower Mattagami River Hydroelectric (LMR) Complex 
The Lower Mattagami River Hydroelectric (LMR) Complex consists of four hydroelectric 
generating stations (GS) (Figure 8.3). These are located on the Mattagami River, which 
joins with the Missinaibi Rivers downstream of the project to form the Moose River, which 






















Figure 8.3: The four dams and generating stations of the Lower Mattagami Project of 
Ontario Power Generation. 
 
Little Long GS at the top of the cascade is a base load station with four vertical Francis 
type units and a capacity of 52 MW. Smoky Falls GS, Harmon GS, and Kipling GS each 
have two fixed-blade propeller type units and operate as peaking stations with station 
capacities of 136 MW, 140 MW and 156 MW respectively. Smoky Falls GS was the first 
GS to come in service in 1931 while Little Long GS, Harmon GS, and Kipling GS came 
into service between 1963 and 1966.  
When river flows exceed the maximum power flow of Little Long Dam, a bypass spillway, 
located 2.5 km east of the station, is used to pass excess water into the Adam Creek channel. 
The bypass spillway has eight sluices with a total capacity of 4870 cms. The bypassed 




secondary spillway structure constructed at the dam and releasing into the main Mattagami 
River channel has a capacity of 1217 cms, and provides flow to the downstream stations. 
Smoky Falls GS has a concrete, which incorporates intakes for a powerhouse, a spillway 
structure to bypass flows in the event of a sudden unit outage, and an earth-fill retaining 
structure located near the spillway. The head pond extends upstream 7 km, has a surface 
area of 5.3 km2, and a live storage of 106 mcm. The existing spillway structure consists of 
ten gated sluices, each 8.4m wide by 9.2m high, plus a 230m long overflow crest. The 
spillway structure was originally designed (prior to the construction of the bypass) to 
convey what was then the full design flood flow on the river.  
Harmon GS has a single concrete dam that incorporates the intakes for the power station 
and a spillway to bypass flows in the event of a plant outage. The head pond extends 4 km 
upstream. Its surface area is approximately 3 km2 and live storage is about 6.9mcm. The 
operating head is 31m and the rated flow is 525cms.  
Kipling GS has a single concrete dam incorporating an intake structure and spillway. The 
head pond is 5.6 km. It has a surface area of 1.2 km2, with live storage of 3.2mcm. The 
power plant is similar to those upstream but operates at 0.5m lower generating head.  
The Moose River Basin encompasses a drainage area of 109,000 km2. The Mattagami 
River flows in a northerly direction from its headwaters at Mesomikenda. Lake and is 
approximately 418 km long, covering a drainage basin area of 35,612 km2. It is generally 
a shallow and slow-flowing river with a seasonal flow regime. The long-term average river 




period of record from 1926 to 2005. Since OPG’s hydroelectric stations along the LMR 
are in close succession, intermediate drainage areas are small and the contribution from 
inflows between the stations is unimportant for planning purposes. 
Highway communication for the project is provided by Fred Flatt Road, the Smoky Line 
Road, and the Smoky Falls Road. The Fred Flatt Road is a 51 km long, two-lane gravel 
road leased by Tembec Inc. The road is open to the public and OPG currently contributes 
financially to its maintenance. The Smoky Line Road is a 42 km long, single-lane gravel 
road owned by OPG. The Smoky Falls Road is an 18 km long, two-lane gravel road, also 
owned by OPG. Highway 643 (formerly Highway 807) links Smooth Rock Falls to 
Fraserdale via a 73 km long two-lane paved road.  
 
Figure 8.4: Project layout. Water flows are shown in blue. Electrical lines are shown in 




Table 8.1. Characteristics of LMR Complex Stations 
 
Transmission of electrical energy from the four stations is provided by a 230 kV 
transmission line from Kipling GS via Harmon GS to Little Long GS substation and from 
there to the Pinard transformer station near Fraserdale ( 
Figure 8.4). Generation from the existing Smoky Falls GS is fed into a 115 kV transmission 
line that runs directly to the Tembec paper mill in Kapuskasing.  Relevant characteristics 




Table 8.2: Characteristics of LMR Complex Stations 
 
8.2. Objectives of the study and modelling framework 
The objective of the simulation was to understand systems interactions in the cascade, and 
the potential for accidents or failures caused by the interactions. The approach was the 
following: 
1) Formulate and construct a model to characterize the hydrodynamics of the cascade 
including the dynamics of transport, storage, and power generation.  
2) Apply the systems modelling framework to understand the systems interactions in 
the cascade of four dams. 
3) Holistically integrate river basin hydrology, routing of inflows through the 
reservoir system, operating rules and human factors of operating the spillway, and 
the dam component fragilities (structural, mechanical and electrical). 
4) Investigate unforeseen chain of events that could lead to accidents and failures by 
forecasting inflows for several thousand years and multiple realizations. 
5) Model the inherent disturbances (lightening, seismic, floating ice, grid disturbances 
and debris) via a probabilistic framework. 
6) Review the current operating rules to determine whether further optimization 





The general model interface with the salient aspects of the physical system being modelled 
is developed and presented herein.    
8.3. Hydrologic modelling and flow routing 
The 50-year historical data on reservoir inflows from the lower Mattagami basin into Little 
Long Reservoir was used to generate stochastic Inflows through time series forecasting. A 
autoregressive-moving-average time series model was used to generate stochastic inflows.  
A random starting point was chosen from the historic series to incorporate uncertainty in 
forwarding the historic series. This randomly sampled a starting point in the data set for 
each realization.   
8.3.1. Normal operation and power generation 
Under normal operations, water flows for the GSs are provided from the uppermost 
reservoir. The water level is normally within the operating headwater level range. The limit 
of the headwater level is the “absolute maximum operating level.” The difference between 
the absolute maximum and maximum operating levels is the flood allowance, which is used 
to hold water in extreme conditions to reduce downstream flooding. The storage between 
the absolute minimum and minimum operating levels is used if a system energy emergency 
occurs. Under normal operating conditions with equivalent discharges at each station, the 
full operating range would rarely be utilized. 
Under normal operating conditions, the outflow from the uppermost reservoir passes 
through all the GSs. During any outage of a GS, the spillway at the station experiencing 




conditions (e.g., spring runoff) when the uppermost reservoir is near its maximum limit, 
the spillway into the diversion is operated in conjunction with GS to pass the full river 
flow. 
8.3.2. Flow Routing at Little Long 
Current applications require Little Long to generate electricity at full capacity within its 
operating range. This means the turbines will be operated at maximum best efficiency flow 
until the lower operating limit at of the Little Long Reservoir is reached; at which point the 
turbine flow becomes equal to the inflow into the reservoir if inflows fall below the flow 
required for best efficiency flow. On the other hand, if inflows are greater than the 
requirements for best efficiency flow, the excess is used to fill up the Reservoir until its 
peak operating limit. In this case the excess Inflow is spilled through the Adam creek 
bypass. There are 8 gates that open into the Adam creek and two that open into the 
Mattagami River. The two that open into the Mattagami River are only to be used in case 
the 8 gates at Adam creek are insufficient. Below is a summary of the operating notes from 
OPG for Little Long. 
8.3.3. Operation (Little Long) 
The Adam Creek Diversion bypasses the Mattagami River plants from above Little Long 
GS to below Kipling GS and is the primary floodwater route. Dam Safety Response Water 
Levels have been established in accordance with the requirements of Dam Safety 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) standards to guide operators in case 




should be filled to an elevation not exceeding 198.00 meters.  After achieving that 
elevation, any inflow greater than the amount of water required for two-unit operation (583 
m3/s) should be spilled down Adams Creek. 
Table 8.3. Dam Safety Water Response Levels 
 
 The reason for this maximum level of 198.00 meters is to allow for safe operation of the 
station in the event of a contingency that results in the loss of units and operating control 
(e.g. a lightning strike).  Such a contingency would make it impossible to remotely control 
sluice gate operation of Adams Creek.  This 12-centimeter of storage will allow for the 
four-hour time lag required to dispatch operator agents to the station to deal with the 
contingency. The maximum forebay level of 198.00 meters is during the freshet period 
only. There is no requirement to spill through the main dam.  This practice should be 
avoided to improve operating efficiency at Smoky Falls during freshet.  Another reason for 
avoiding this practice is to eliminate the stranding of sturgeon in the spillway pools and the 
subsequent rescue operation. The forebay should be filled gradually to 198.12 meters in 
the last seven days of freshet. 
Sluicegates 5, 6, 9, and 10 are controlled locally by the operator agents at the gates.    Two 
to four hours may be required to reach the site. There is a concern of further undermining 
of the sluiceway apron at Adams Creek sluicegates 8 and 9.  An engineering assessment, 
Level




Structural and/or Operational Equivalent
1 Non-Failure Emergency 198.12 Absolute Maximum Water Level
2 Potential Failure Developing 199 30 cm below top of core of earth dyke
3 Imminent Dam Failure 199.3 Top of core of earth dyke




which included a diving inspection, carried out in September 1996 confirmed that no 
restrictions are required on sluicegates 3 to 10 at this time.  The area is to be re-inspected 
subsequent to each major spill in which sluicegates 8 and 9 are utilized.  As a minimum, 
the area of the sluiceway apron is to be inspected every three years.  The last inspection in 
July 2001 reported no further erosion of the bedrock below the sluice apron since 1996. 
As the differences in water levels across the trash racks of Little Long G.S. have frequently 
been found to be excessive, these differences must be measured frequently and kept in 
moderation by clamming.  In addition to the dangers of potentially drawing air into the 
penstocks, the head losses associated with large trash rack differentials can be quite costly. 
8.4. Mattagami Basin Systems Reliability Model 
 




8.4.1. Gate operations and gate fragility 
At each component, the upstream demand function is applied to the operation of the 
component. Engineering reliability models are used to evaluate the performance of that 
component in relation to the demand function as later shown in this chapter. For example, 
the performance of the component can be described by a relationship between the demand 
placed on the component and the probability of its failure.  
These loads/demand functions are related to gate availability through fragility curve 
relations. A fragility curve represents the probability of adverse performance or failure as 
a function of the load on the structure. The inputs to the gate operations simulation at any 
time step are the respective states of the input and disturbance variables. The outputs are 
the gate availabilities (probability of use on demand). 
 




Gated spillways are designed to engineering standards, however with aging, exposure, 
preventative maintenance, and lack of frequent operations they become vulnerable to non-
availability. On-demand failures of gated spillways may be caused by a gate component 
that can be repaired in minutes to hours or a component that may cause complete failure of 
the gate system and unexpected release of the reservoir containment. 
Gated spillways are a complex integration of structural, mechanical, and electrical (SME) 
components that must operate on demand. For Little Long reservoir, there are a total of 10 
sluices with gates. Two of the 10 sluices (Nos. 1 and 2) are alongside the generating station 
and open into the river, while eight are 3.2 km upstream and open into the bypass. Sluices 
1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 are remotely controlled. Sluices 5, 6, 9 and 10 are locally controlled by 
agents at the gate. The sluices are numbered from left to right looking downstream.  
Gate operations are also affected by instrumentation, supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems and controls. The simulation approach is well suited to 
uncovering the implications of component performance assumptions on overall systems 
operations.  
Figure 8.7 shows a simulated result over a 12-month period of gate operation including 
SCADA performance and gate binding. The red curve shows reservoir inflow in cubic 
meters over time. The inflow rises during the spring freshet in May and June based on the 
stochastic time series of inflow data. As the pool level rises, these SCADA systems 
generates control instructions to the gates. At two points in late June early July, for 




green spikes. Depending on other factors in the simulation, these two instances of the gate 
binding may or may not lead to adverse systems behavior. 
 
Figure 8.7. Simulated effect of disturbances: red is reservoir inflow, blue is SCADA 
controlled spill, and green is structural binding of gate. 
8.4.2. Mechanical fragility 
In risk assessment, limit states or probability of failure serve as yardsticks of system 
performance. The fragility curve is used to predict the probably of dam failure, given an 
hydraulic load (Chase, Sr, 2012). A fragility curve is defined by the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of the system response curve to a load. A typical fragility curve for 
probability of mechanical gate failure as a function of gate opening under full pool is shown 
in Figure 8.8. The fragility curve is the standard way in which structural and geotechnical 
reliability functions are captured. Fragility curves are pre-calculated, usually using an event 





Figure 8.8. Fragility Curve for Mechanical Gate Failure 
 
Structural and mechanical reliabilities of spillway gates are dependent on the level of water 
on the gates, while the electrical reliabilities are randomly distributed in time with a fixed 
occurrence rate (here, 0.017 failures per day). In the present model, unavailability due to 
electrical gate failures are far more common than mechanical failures, and occur a number 
of times per year. Structural failures are even less probable in the current model.  
Figure 8.9 shows gate failures for one annual realization of Spillway Gate 4. This was a 
peculiar year. There were several electrical failures and one structural failure. The 
structural failure was modelled as a gamma distribution with mean delay time until repaired 
of six months and a standard deviation two months. The effect of this random repair time 
delay was that the structural failures took a long time to repair whereas electrical gate 
unavailability were usual repaired within the same day.  
The effect of failure on the performance of the entire system can be observed from Figure 
8.10. Spillway Gate 4 was inoperable due to its failed state under structural failure and was 
down for repair sometime before the peak flow for the year (April). Between April ending 




controlled gates were required to route excess inflows out of the reservoir. Bearing in mind 
that each gate has a capacity of 608 cms, it can be observed in Figure 8.10 that with 
Spillway Gate 4’s failure, the SCADA gate system was routing about 1800 cubic meters 
of water out of the reservoir instead of the total capacity of about 2400 cubic meters during 
peak flows.  
8.4.3. Electrical Failure 
The Failure Rate (also known as the hazard rate) represents the mean failure rate and has 
dimensions of inverse time. Failure is assumed to be a Poisson process (which implies that 
if the rate is constant, the time between events is exponentially distributed). Failures 
modeled in this way are computed with respect to the time since the simulation started an 
hence the time is the failure mode control valuable.  
Electrical Reliability, specified as the electrical availability On Demand of the System 
(including operator push button error and external and internal power failures) is estimated 





Figure 8.9: Plot of component Reliabilities vs upstream daily flow vs time 
Figure 8.9 and Figure 8.10 also shows another comparison of mechanical failure coinciding 
with the demand for spillway flow. From the plots, it can be observed that around the start 
of freshet, there was a mechanical failure at Gate 4. This failure lasted for about seven days 
in the month of May. It coincided with the start of freshet, meaning the spillway gates were 
unavailable on demand. The effect of this mechanical failure was the loss of capacity of 
the SCADA controlled Spillway system. As can be observed, the rest of the spillway gates 
started operating just as the freshet started to peak with a combined discharge of about 
1800 cubic meters instead of the total capacity of about 2400 cubic meters. This occurs 
until Gate 4 is fixed and adds an additional 600 cubic meter capacity to the SCADA 














































Figure 8.10 also shows the probabilities of mechanical failure as a function of time for 1 
realization for Spillway gate 1. The probability of mechanical failure is usually higher 
around the peak of freshet when the elevation of water on the gates are the highest. Figure 
8.11 shows the mean of mechanical failure, Spillway Discharge and upstream flow over 
many realizations. There is a strong correlation between all three parameters.  
 












































































Figure 8.11: Plot of SCADA (gate 4) Controlled spill vs upstream daily flow vs time 
 
8.4.4. Disturbances 
Sometimes in the course of the operation of a dam system an extraordinary event occurs, 
such as an earthquake, an earth or rock slide into the reservoir or conveyance works, a 
major fire in the drainage area, or the like, at a time which cannot be anticipated, but that 
may affect dam operations or even dam safety. Within the simulation, such events, and 
their more modest siblings, are treated as exogenous disturbances. Disturbances, can in 
principle include a broad variety of phenomena, both of natural origin such as lightning 
strikes affecting power supplies or instrumentation, or of anthropogenic origin such as the 
grid being unable to accept power and thus the powerhouse waterway having diminished 
discharge capacity, or operational incidents or accidents such as powerhouse fires. The 
exact definition is a matter of modelling convenience; severe floods or droughts may for 
instance be considered as disturbances or alternatively just as aspects of the stochastically 
modelled catchment hydrology.  
A disturbance of major concern in the project is ice buildup. The stochastic input for this 
simulation is the variability in daily temperature generated from a statistical time series 
identified to temperature data over the past century. Daily temperatures are simulated, and 
Stefan’s Equation (USACE 2002) is used to calculate ice thickness on the reservoir. 
Stefan’s equation uses anticipatory degree-days below freezing with an empirical constant 




8.4.5. Modeling Ice Storms Disturbance 
Ice storms can damage structures because of the weight of accumulated ice. Ice storms are 
known to occur in Eastern Ontario and Quebec. On average, Ottawa and Montreal receive 
freezing precipitation 12 to 17 days a year. However, this type of precipitation generally 
lasts only a few hours. Though it did not occur near the LMR Complex, in January 1998, 
a severe ice storm occurred in Eastern Ontario and Quebec; over 90 millimeters of freezing 
drizzle fell during the 5-day storm. This magnitude has an annual probability of occurrence 
of about 1 in 100 (Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2009).  
The occurrence of Ice storms that affect Spillway gate occurrence is modelled as a discrete 
process since the only information we have on Ice storm occurrence is that of a severe Ice 
storm of 90mm thickness which has a probability of 1 in a hundred years of occurring. The 
time of initiation of the event is simulated as a Poisson process, such that the expected 
number of occurrences over some time period T is equal to the product of the Rate 
(.01/year) and time T. The duration is modelled as a gamma distribution for structural 
member failure and an exponential distribution for structural binding failure (Table 9.4).  
Table 8.4: Down times and repair times of component failures 
Ice Storm Failure Type Repair Duration Type Mean Down Time Standard Deviation 
Structural Member Failure Gamma Distribution 6 months 2 months 
Structural binding failure Exponential Distribution 1 day - 
Figure 15 shows the fragility curves for both Structural member failure and Structural 
binding failure. The fragility curve shows intensity on the x-axis and probability of failure 




variable. That is either 0 or 90mm of ice on the gates. Since the data for the amount of ice 
accumulation at each of the sites is unavailable, modeling the intensity of Ice storms as a 
continuous variable is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Figure 8.12: Fragility curves for Ice Loads on Spillway gate 
 
Figure 96 also shows how the Ice Storm Failure mode is incorporated into the event tree 
analysis for one of the Spillway gates. 
8.4.6. Modeling floating Ice                                                                                                                                                                         
The ice thickness is a fundamental parameter for practically all ice problems. At the 
simplest level, one can use empirical analyses based on the Freezing Degree Days (FDDS). 
This can be refined in various ways, especially if ice thickness data are available for 
calibration. The ice thickness is a fundamental parameter for practically all ice problems. 
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often its return period as well, with little information. The LMR complex case study also 
has the same caveat with no historic data on floating ice available. However by tracking 
the Freezing degree days, Steffan came up with a formula for calculating the height of 
accumulated ice. The historic temperature data in Figure 8.13  was used to calculate the 
height of accumulated ice at any given point in time. 
 
Figure 8.13: Historic temperature data LMR complex 
8.4.7. Simplified Thermal Analyses 
The ice thickness is a fundamental parameter for practically all ice problems. At the 
simplest level, one can use empirical analyses based on the Freezing Degree Days (FDDS). 
This can be refined in various ways, especially if ice thickness data are available for 
calibration. The ice thickness, h, produced by static ice formation is most commonly 
predicted based on the accumulated Freezing Degree Days (FDDs), as given in Table 10.6. 























thermal growth rate, and by making various simplifying assumptions (USACE 2002). 
Where 𝛼𝛼 is an empirical coefficient that varies from site to site depending on local 
conditions such as the snow cover, winds, and solar radiation. 
Table 8.5: Stefan equation values for α. 
 
Typical values of α (degrees-C) 
Ice Cover Condition α 
Windy Lake w/no snow 2.7 
Average Lake with Snow 1.7-2.4 
Average river with snow 1.4-1.7 
Sheltered small river 0.7-1.4 
Table 8.6. Potential external disturbances at the LMR complex 
 
Condition Principal Affected Component(s) of the Project 
Flooding Integrity and function of external structures and systems. 
 Integrity and function of dams. 
Ice Integrity and function of dams and water intake systems. 
Forest Fire Integrity and function of GS and associated facilities. 
Severe Weather  Integrity and function of external structures and systems. 
Seismic Events  Integrity and function of dams, spillways and powerhouses. 
Climate Change Integrity and function of external structures and systems. 





Figure 8.14: Simulation Results showing seasonal variation in temperature (°C) and Ice 
build-up in cm 
 
The disturbances included in the present model are limited to external loss of grid 
availability, lightening (affecting grid availability), floating ice, icing on structures, 
instrument or SCADA mis-operation, and human error. Each is treated as a Poisson process 
in time, possibly with a corresponding probability distribution of magnitude.  
Ice storms can damage structures because of the weight of accumulated ice. Ice storms are 
known to occur in Eastern Ontario and Quebec. On average, Ottawa and Montreal receive 
freezing precipitation 12 to 17 days a year. Nevertheless, this type of precipitation generally 
lasts only a few hours. Though it did not occur near the LMR Complex, in January 1998, 
a severe ice storm occurred in Eastern Ontario and Quebec; over 90 mm of freezing drizzle 
fell during a 5-day storm. This magnitude has an annual probability of occurrence of about 






















































Figure 8.15: Fragility curves for Ice Loads on Spillway gate. Structural failure in red; 
binding in blue. 
The occurrence of ice storms that affect spillway gate operation was modelled as a discrete 
process since the only information then available on ice storm occurrence is that of a severe 
ice storm of 1988. Figure 8.15 shows fragility curves for structural member failure and 
structural binding failure of a gate. The time of initiation of the event is simulated as a 
Poisson process, such that the expected number of occurrences over some time period T is 
equal to the product of the rate (0.01/year) and time. The duration is modelled as a gamma 
distribution for structural member failure and an exponential distribution for structural 
binding failure. For this section, human operators as pertaining to the LMR complex will 
be treated as “humans in the loop” as if they are any other sub-component of the complex 
technological systems. This simplistic assumption allows us to model human operator 
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Figure 8.16: Modeling Operator Related Delay 
 
According to the operating rules for Little Long GS, operators are to be dispatched to Little 
Long GS when the 4 Spillway gates that open into the Mattagami River are insufficient in 
routing peak flows out of the dam to keep the reservoir below its operating range maximum. 
It generally takes operators 2 to 4 hours to get to the site after they’re dispatched but it may 
take longer due to inclement weather scenarios in which case it might take much longer to 
gain access to the control station of the dam as roads might blocked etc. To capture these 
rare but possible scenarios outside the usual 2-4 hour time required to get operators on site, 
a truncated lognormal distribution with an upper limit of 24 hrs and a minimum limit of 2 
hrs with a true mean of 3 hrs. as can be seen in figure 56. Figure 8.16 shows a plot of the 





8.5. Model results: Operating patterns and flow routing 
Flows in the Mattagami River are highly regulated by the presence of hydropower 
generating facilities and water control structures that provide electricity generation and 
flood mitigation. 
During the spring freshet, flows in the Mattagami River typically exceed the flow 
capacities of the GSs and therefore must be diverted through the Adam Creek Diversion. 
Adam Creek then discharges this overflow into the Mattagami River downstream of the 
Kipling GS. Figure 8.17 shows historic daily inflows into Little Long reservoir. When 
flows exceed 583 cms, excess water that cannot be used by the Mattagami River GSs is 
diverted to Adam Creek. The average peak flows during the spring freshet are above 1,500 
cms and can be variable.  
8.5.1. Little Long Flow Routing 
As discussed earlier in the hydraulic modeling chapter, Little Long GS is operated within 
an operating range of 195.10 m-198.12 m with the main aim of the operating rules being 
to optimize power generation and route flow safely downstream. 
Each of the gates were modeled independently as they each have independent reliability 
components at both the component and subcomponent level. 
As discussed in the chapter 4, Little Long forebay is filled to an elevation not exceeding 
198.00 meters.  After achieving that elevation, any inflow greater than the amount of water 
required for two-unit operation (583 m3/s) is spilled down Adams Creek.   The difference 




operator agents to the station to deal with the contingency. The maximum forebay level of 
198.00 meters is during the freshet period only. There is no requirement to spill through 
the main dam.  This practice should be avoided to improve operating efficiency at Smoky 
Falls during freshet. Sluice-gates 5, 6, 9, and 10 are controlled locally by the operator 
agents at the gates.  Two to four hours may be required to reach the site. 
8.5.2. Reservoir Operations Summary 
The water flows for the four GSs are provided from the Little Long GS reservoir. The water 
level is normally within the operating headwater level range. The extreme limit of the 
headwater level is the “absolute maximum operating level”. The difference between the 
absolute maximum and maximum operating levels is referred to as the “flood allowance”, 
which is only used to hold water in extreme conditions to reduce downstream flooding. 
The storage between the absolute minimum and minimum operating levels is only used if 
a system energy emergency occurs. Under normal operating conditions with equivalent 
discharges at each station, the full operating range in the Smoky Falls GS, Harmon GS and 
Kipling GS head ponds would rarely be utilized and head pond levels will be significantly 





Figure 8.17: Historic Daily Inflow Statistics, Little Long GS 
Under normal operating conditions, the outflow from the Little Long GS reservoir will pass 
through all the GSs. During any outage of a GS, the spillway at the station experiencing 
the outage will be operated to pass the desired flow to the other GSs. During high river 
flow conditions (e.g., spring) when the Little Long GS reservoir is near its maximum limit, 
the spillway at Adam Creek is operated in conjunction with Little Long GS to pass the full 
Mattagami River flow.  
Imminent Dam Failure during reservoir inflow floods (Overtopping Failure) is assumed to 
occur when water reaches a stage specified the operating documents as imminent dam 
failure elevation; thus when the elevation exceeds the imminent dam failure elevation. A 
simulation for a year from start of a calendar year to end of calendar year was run by 
sampling a calendar years’ worth of inflow data from the historic time series and routing it 
through the system. Figure 8.18 shows a snapshot of the pool elevation and upstream flow 
as a function of time for an elapsed time of 1 year; the imminent dam failure elevation is 




core of dam). This plot shows the response of our reservoir and gate operations to variations 
in daily inflows. 
 
Figure 8.18: Simulated effect of Inflows on pool elevation 
 
8.5.3. Power Generation  
The Little Long GS provides a maximum power flow of 583 cms at a head of 28 m. The 
estimated turbine and generator characteristics for each station are shown in Table 8.7. 
With the salient aspects of the model formulated and constructed, the next step is to 
generate results and analyze whether it accurately replicates the real system. This is part of 
the model validation process and hence outputs from the model were compared to data 



























































No. of units 2 4 2 2 
Gross head (m) 27.9 34.4 31 31 
Station discharge capacity 
(cms) 583 188 525 585 
Station turbine capacity (MW) 136 52 140 156 
Unit capacity (MVA)/ Turbine 68 13 70 78 
Best Efficiency Rate  
kW/(cms) 235.7 288.9 272.3 272.7 
 
 
Figure 8.19: Upstream daily flow Simulation Results over 51-year period 
The practice of Spilling into the main river is generally discouraged and the two Spillway 
gates at Little Long only come into use as a contingency when the eight spillway gates that 
open into Adam creek are insufficient in routing peak flows to keep the reservoir pool 
























8.5.4. Pool and Volume Capacities 
For the 51-year run, it’s important to analyze how the flow routing procedures ensure that 
reservoirs are mostly operating within the operating range. The operating range for Little 
Long reservoir is 195.10m – 198.12m. As can be observed in figure 44, the performance 
of the flow routing techniques generally keeps the elevation in the dam below the imminent 
dam failure elevation but occasionally exceeds the maximum operating elevation about 
once every 2 years by just skimming at the plot of course this does not affect dam 
operations with regards to power performance or safety as it’s still a full meter below the 
imminent failure elevation.  
Figure 8.19 shows upstream daily flow from the Mattagami River into Little Long 
Reservoir over 50 years. The peaks are the freshet flows each year. The maximum inflow 
over this 50-year simulation was 4942 cubic meters which is consistent with the maximum 
inflow from the data set. Figure 8.20 shows the spill into Adam Creek which follows a 





Figure 8.20: 50-year simulation Run of Spill into Mattagami River and Adam Creek 
Bypass 
 
8.5.5. Power Production 
As dictated by the operating rule, the dam is filled to an elevation of 198 m and the 
calculated head over the turbine intake is 27.28 m. At maximum reservoir operating 
capacity of 198.12 m, maximum head over the turbines is 27.9 m. The difference-as noted-
is to allow for the four-hour time lag required to dispatch operator agents to the station to 
deal with the contingency. Hence the model is programmed such that Little Long Reservoir 
fills to 198 m. If the inflow into the reservoir exceeds what is required for best efficiency 
power generation as provided in the unit-rating table, the excess inflow is routed out of the 
reservoir through the spillway gates.  
Consequently, if the inflow into the reservoir is below that required for best-efficiency 
flow, and the reservoir elevation is at the minimum operating elevation, then same head is 































if the inflow into the reservoir is less than the minimum for best-efficiency flow but the 
reservoir elevation is above the minimum operating elevation, then the reservoir elevation 
is gradually lowered while generating the minimum best efficiency power until the 
minimum operating threshold is crossed.  
In the simulation, the Little Long GS is operated for best-efficiency power generation, 
provided in the unit rating table when upstream flow is equal to or more than the specified 
discharges for best-efficiency power generation. Where the inflow is more than the best 
efficiency discharges, the excess inflow is routed through the spillways automatically 
















































Figure 8.21: Plot of Mean Total Power upstream daily flow for a year run and 50 
realizations. 
 
Figure 8.22: Plot Showing Seasonal Variation for total power production at all 4GS 
 
If the four SCADA controlled gates that open into the bypass are insufficient (i.e., when 
reservoir elevation is greater than 198 m and upstream flow exceeds the total of turbine 
flow and spilled flow), human operators are dispatched to the site to operate the additional 
gates that open into the bypass with a mean lag time of four hours. If all the gates opening 
into Adam Creek bypass are still insufficient, the additional two gates that open into the 
Mattagami River are used to supplement spilled flow and keep the dam from overtopping.  
Figure 8.21 shows a plot of daily power production as a function of time from start of 
January to end of December for many replications. As can be expected, the profile of power 
generation is correlated with that of upstream daily flow. Figure 8.22 shows the seasonal 




8.5.6. Model results: Reliability and dam safety analysis 
The main function of Spilway gates is to safely pass water from one point to another; 
usually from a reservoir, through a dam to a downstream river or reservoir  This is achieved 
by keeping the main components, namely: the rate of flow, the physical conveyance of 
flow and the kinetic and potential energy of the flow under control.  
The components of water conduits are all natural or manmade structures with civil, 
mechanical, and electrical functions, and with certain capabilities to resist the dynamic and 
static loads imposed on them. For a spillway to perform its task safely, flow must be kept 
to within a range that does not exceed the design capacities of it’s subcomponents 
(electrical, structual, mechanical, etc.). Thus, the reliable peformance of a spillway system 
is both a function of time and the loads placed upon upon it.  As discussed earlier, the 
structural and mechanical reliabilities of the Spillway gates are dependent on the opening of 
the spillway gates while the electrical gate failures are exponentially distributed in time 














































Figure 8.23: Plot of component Reliabilities vs upstream daily flow vs time 
 
The result of this is that unavailability due to electrical gate failures are far more common 
and occur a number of times per year with structural failures being the rarest. Figure 8.23 
shows the gate failures for realization 31 (Spillway gate 4) of the simulation run. The 
mechanical failure discussed earlier has a gamma distributed delay time until repair 
(MTTR) with a mean of 1 week and a standard deviation of 1 week. The effect of this 
is that mechanical failures take much longer to repair while electrical gate unavailability-
with a gamma distribution (mean=10hrs, Standard deviation=8hrs) are usual repaired 
within the same day. The right side of the y-axis is the survival mode and the value of 2 
represents failure due to the fact that internal requirements are not met. From Figure 8.23 
it can be observed that the electrical failure followed right after a mechanical failure on 
SCADA gate 4. The electrical supply is from one source (no back-up, total correlation) 
hence electrical failure causes the loss of capacity of all 10 spillway gates. This event 
happening concurrently with a 50-year storm peak caused the imminent dam failure 
elevation to be exceeded and hence failure of the entire dam system. 
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By delving deeper into the model to investigate what exactly caused the minimum dam 
failure elevation to be exceeded, it can be observed from Figure 8.24 that there were 2 
electrical failures and a mechanical failure throughout the year. 
8.5.7. Gate Operations and Results Analysis 
Imminent Dam Failure during reservoir inflow floods (Overtopping Failure) is assumed to 
occur when water reaches a stage specified the operating documents as imminent dam 
failure elevation; thus when the elevation exceeds the imminent dam failure elevation. 
A high-level model is useful in understanding some of the behavior patterns responsible 
for the unavailability of a spill way gate on demand; which induces a high risk of system 
failure. A simulation for a year from the start of a calendar year to end of calendar year was 
run by sampling a calendar years’ worth of inflow data from the historic time series and 
routing it through the system. Figure 8.25 shows a plot of SCADA controlled Spills within 
a single calendar year as a function of time. A graph of the upstream daily flow is also 
superimposed on the plot to enable viewing the correlation between the upstream daily 
flow and the SCADA controlled Spillway discharges (withdrawals). As expected, the two 
are heavily correlated with the peak flows coinciding with the peak Spillway discharges by 
the SCADA controlled gates. Each Spillway gate has a maximum capacity of 608.8 cubic 
meters; meaning the combined capacity of the four spillway gates is about 2400 cubic 
meters. During peak inflows we can see that the combined effect of the four gates is around 
this capacity. 
Where the combined effect of the four SCADA controlled Spillway gates are rendered 




four manually operated gates to add additional spill capacity to the gates and prevent the 
dam from being overtopped. Figure 72 shows a plot of the operator controlled Spill as a 
function of time with a graph of the upstream daily flows superimposed on the plot. These 
gates double the Spill capacity of the Little Long GS. 
 
Figure 8.25: Plot of Upstream Daily flow vs Operator Controlled Spill Vs Time 
 
When the four Human Operated gates are also rendered insufficient in routing the excess 
inflows, there are two additional SCADA controlled gates that open into the Mattagami 
River that are instructed to be used in these rare scenarios where the 8 that open into the 
















































Figure 8.26: Plot of Upstream Daily Flow Vs Total Spillway flow 
 
Figure 8.27: Plot of Upstream Daily Flow Vs Spill Into Adam Creek 
Figure 8.27 shows a plot of the total spill into Adam Creek bypass as a function of time. 
As can be observed from the plot, there was no need to spill through the Mattagami River 
since the Spillway gates that open into the bypass where sufficient in routing out the 
peaking flows. Figure 8.27 shows a plot of the total spill into Adam creek bypass as a 












































































Figure 8.28: Plot of SCADA Gate 3 Discharge Vs Gate Opening Vs Upstream flow 
To demonstrate the effect of the gate opening and closing on discharge, a plot of the 
spillway discharge rate (in red) and the gate opening height (green) was plotted; see Figure 
8.28. The height of the gate opening is generally at a maximum of 9.2m during the peak 
flow periods to enable maximum routing water from the reservoir. The gate opens at an 
average of 0.68m/min and closes at the same rate. Its opening is triggered by the operating 
rule requirements which enables the SCADA systems to open the gate when these 
requirements are met and vice versa. 
 


































































































Figure 8.29 shows the correlation between high inflows and the upstream daily flow. The 
sill of each Spillway gate is at elevation 188.98m which means that within the operating 
range, there is always some level of water on the gates. This affects the reliability of the 
gates since the water on the gates induces both hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces on the 
gates. Level of water on the gates are the failure mode control variable for both the 
Mechanical and structural failures; meaning the higher the water elevation on the gates, the 
higher the effect of the aforementioned forces and consequently the higher the probability 
of failure. 
 
Figure 8.30: Mean Statistics for Upstream flow vs Gate Opening vs Discharge  
Figure 9.30 shows a plot of the mean upstream daily flows, gate opening range and 
discharge form Spillway gate 3 (Adam creek) for the 51 years of historic data. This shows 
the correlation between the peak inflows and the maximum gate opening ranges and also 















































Figure 8.31: Probabilities for Gate opening as a function of time. 
Figure 8.31 also demonstrates the annual probabilities of gate opening operations. This is 
important because should a number of gates fail during the period of April to July and are 
not able to get fixed quickly, the likelihood of the dam being overtopped is much higher 
than for the rest of the year. It is imperative that during this period when the requirements 
on the gates are high, contingencies are put in place to backup any gate failures. 
 







































Min..1% / 99%..Max 1%..5% / 95%..99% 5%..15% / 85%..95%































Figure 8.33: Probability statistics for Operator controlled spill 
Figure 8.32 is a plot of the mean operator Spill over the 51 years of historic data from start 
of January to end of December. It can be inferred from this plot that Operators must be on 
standby during the start of freshet to travel to the site and operate the additional gates if 
need be. It’s important for management to ensure that from the start of April to August 
ending, all roads to the control center are cleared of any snow etc. and be accessible to 
human operators on demand to enable swift response to signals to operate the additional 
four gates during high inflow periods. Figure 82 also shows that based on historical data, 
the requirement for operators to be dispatched to the site through the year is below the 50th 
percentile with the annual peak flows having annual probability of about .45 to require 
human operators.  
Figure 8.33 shows a plot of the Probability of Spill into the main Dam. This is important 
in order to prepare for the consequences of Spilling into the main dam. Over the years, the 
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percentile) of zero cubic meters year on year. All though this indicates that Spill into the 
Mattagami is rare, contingencies must be put in place to ensure that when it occurs, its 
consequences are mitigated. 
Figure 84 shows the mean  of operator controlled spill and total spill from start of year to 
end of year for 51 replications. The difference between these plots-although they both 
follow the same profile- is the operator-controlled spill. This plot demonstrates the 
importance of human operators in safely routing out excess inflows from the lower 
Mattagami reservoir. Hence hindrance to their operations or errors by them could be 
catastrophic in the events of high inflows. 
 
Figure 8.34: Operator Controlled Spill Vs Total Spill  
Figure 8.34 shows the annual probabilities for Spillway overflows and from the plot we 
can infer that until the start of April, there is generally no Spillway flow. The month of 
May seems to have the highest demand for Spillway activities with probability of Spillway 












































CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
9.1. Summary 
The framework and techniques presented in this thesis provide the foundation for 
Simulation based Systems reliability approach to analyzing operational risks in complex 
engineered systems. Systems engineering and systems thinking represents a new 
dimension in risk analysis for hydrosystems and has built on the advancements made using 
contemporary methodologies such as event trees and fault tree analysis. The contemporary 
methods clamp different aspects of dam performance into separate failure modes and treat 
these failure modes separately. The history of dam safety suggests that accidents and 
failures occur in more complex ways, mostly due to systems and human interactions, and 
need to be addressed accordingly. The systems reliability approach addresses these flaws 
from the first generation/contemporary methods. It does so by approaching dams as 
engineered systems and dam operations as an integral part of safety. Modeling these 
systems quantitatively is highly more complex than first generation analyses. Models of 
physical systems differ fundamentally from models of sensor and SCADA systems or from 
models of human operator actions or operational rules. Additionally, the systems being 
modelled are complex and exhibit non-linear behavior, from interacting components, often 
involving sub-systems that are themselves complex. Data mining the outputs of the 
simulation runs enables us to also identify and examine the build-up of conditions leading 
to accidents or failures, the structure and nature of dependency among failure modes and 
the nature of interactions among failure mechanisms. The framework and the tools to 
support the systems reliability approach to modeling operational risks in hydrosystems is 





The argument made in this thesis is that systems reliability approach to analyzing 
operational risks—precisely because it treats systems interactions—cannot be based on the 
decomposition, linear methods of contemporary practice. These methods cannot logically 
capture the interactions and feedback of complex systems.  Analyzing operational risks in 
engineered systems using the proposed systems reliability approach is very promising. 
There are many factors leading to this conclusion, among them,   
• The importance of emergent behaviors, which cannot be enumerated ex anti;  
• The need to account for time in failure analysis; 
• The feedback of operating procedures and human reliability in systems function; 
• The need to fuse models across different technological and human systems; 
• The chaining of precursors in accident sequences. 
These have not usually been accounted for in operational risk analysis in dam safety and 
the proposed systems simulation approach in this thesis doe accounts for systems 
interactions and feedback loops that are generally unaccounted for in the contemporary 
methods. Examples of how the presented systems reliability framework incorporates these 
and the implications of these factors for moving to simulation-based approaches is 
presented in this thesis. 
9.3. Recommendations for Future Work 
Systems reliability models do not perfectly characterize a system, thus no matter 
how well a model is constructed, there will always be some discrepancy between the real 




based on features that are too complicated to be included in the model, features omitted 
due to lack of knowledge, disparities between the scales on which the model and the system 
operate, and simplifications and approximations in solving the mathematical equations 
underlying the system. Thus, understanding structural uncertainty and how to 
accommodate it into the systems model is one of the most challenging aspects of the 
systems reliability framework which requires further research. Another challenging aspect 
of structural uncertainty is the quantification of the uncertainty that arises due to the 
parametrization of only the salient aspects of the system; resulting in unmodelled physical 
processes. In model development, certain physical processes will inevitably be neglected 
if there’s a belief that these processes have little to no effect on the model’s accuracy yet 
adds complexity to the mathematical description. Moreover, during model development, 
there may be a failure to include certain physical processes due to a lack of knowledge 
about those processes. Other uncertainties such as observational uncertainty— which arises 
due to errors in the measurement of natural systems—and uncertainties about the Initial 
Boundary conditions need to be explored and accounted for in the systems reliability 
modeling framework. 
Additionally, although the influence of disturbances external or internal to the 
system is considered in this thesis, further work needs to be done to explore the 
complexities inherent in such disturbances. Most natural hazard disturbances such as 
earthquakes, forest fires and lightning strikes occur not only in time but also in space 
(spatio-temporal processes). A significant strength of the systems modeling approach to 
flow-control reliability is the multi-physics framework in which disturbances such as 




research needs to be performed on mathematical characterization of such disturbances, so 
they may be incorporated into the systems model where present. The possibility of one or 
more combinations of both external and internal disturbances, ranging from those that 
occur essentially simultaneously to those that occur at different times but in ways that the 
effects of the disturbances combine, also need to be considered.  
Going forward, a full understanding of human errors in flow control systems and 
the development of a proper methodology for human reliability analysis is important to 
incorporate into the proposed systems modeling framework. The development of a new 
holistic HRA model is a critical task for the future of dam and levee safety risk assessment. 
The general trend today in incorporating human errors in Dam safety risk analysis is to 
treat humans as machines with failure rates. The behavior of human operators in fault 
situations is, of course, more complex than modeling operators as behaving as error-prone 
equipment. The state of information available to the operator is critical, as are his or her 
detection, situation analysis, and problem-solving skills to assess that information. Thus, 
the influence of operator behavior is more complex than may easily be captured via 
traditional reliability modeling. For hydropower systems, many of the human errors are 
focused during the operations phase but they are also frequently found in design 
deficiencies, maintenance practices or strategies, lack of updated safety manuals and upper 
management decisions regarding such systems. Accidents and failures occur not just 
because hazard loads are high and dam components are fragile, but through the interactions 
of physical systems, sensor and SCADA systems, operating policies, human factors, and 
other aspects of dams. The concept of model integration is central to all systems modelling. 




how the whole responds to changing conditions and disturbances in human operation. 
Additionally, the documentation of existing HRA methods is very important in 
understanding the human performance functions from both the cognitive and physical 
perspective. These performance functions are critical to developing a realistic framework 
that can be used to understand the human failure events and estimate the Human Error 
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